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Regions, Ethnic Minorities and
European Integration:
A Case Study of Italians in Slovenian Istria
by Ksenija Šabec
The first State of the Art Report (Šabec, 2005) dealt with issues
such as the historical background of the Italian community in
the Republic of Slovenia, the minority-majority relationship,
regional development and the processes of European integration
of Slovenia as a new EU member state. Findings from the first
report significantly contribute to the following case study.
In accordance with the project objectives, the current case
study strives to respond to the following four research questions:
-What have been the effects of EU integration and cross-border
cooperation initiatives on the Italian national community and
on minority communities in terms of rights and protections,
political participation, socio-economic activity, cultural vitality
and mobilisation? This question should be explored on a comparative
basis i.e. looking at changes in the situation after the dissolution
of communist regime and the creation of new independent Slovene
(and Croatian) states in comparison to conditions in the former
Yugoslavia.
-How and to what degree has the Italian national community in
Slovenia been involved in cross border cooperation up until
now? Does cross-border cooperation promote integration between
minority and majority populations (Italians in Slovenia and
Italians in Italy) or between two minority populations (Italians
in Slovenia and Slovenes in Italy)?
-According to respondents, what are the main threats to minority
identity, culture and interests in the multi-cultural European
sphere?
-How do minority and majority representatives perceive their
regional or national-ethnic identity in relation to the EU and
European values?
The case study report focuses on the condition of the Italian
national community in Slovenia and in the statistical border
region of Littoral-Karst (Obalno-kraška). Although the eligible
area of cross-border cooperation between Italy and Slovenia
(Phare in the past and Interreg III A Italy – Slovenia for the
present) also includes the Goriška statistical region on the
Slovenian side or the border, there is not a substantial Italian
community in this area. The report also discusses the Italian
national community in Croatia since it represents a significant
number of the Italians in the former Yugoslavia (2,258 members
of Italian national community lived in Slovenia in 2002 and
19,636 in Croatia). The relationship of these two Italian minority
populations on the territory of new independent states created
in the 1990s is a particularly interesting question as regards
European integration processes. Slovene EU membership on the
one hand and Croat accession status has had a notable affect,
particularly on Slovenia’s small Italian minority. However,
the real impact of the EU on the once unified Italian community
(in former Yugoslavia in the past and in the EU in the future)
can be fully understood only after Croatia becomes a full member
state in the EU.
The structure of the report follows the research questions enumerated,
although there were some important findings that feel outside
the defined questions that were included. A background section
summarizes the historical situation of Italians in this region,
particularly after World War Two. A comparison of the community’s
rights and protections in the former Yugoslavia and in the current
Republic of Slovenia is presented followed by the political
and economic consequences of the dissolution of Yugoslavia for
the entire minority community in Istria region.
This situation is also discussed in light of recent European
integration. Political and economic factors undoubtedly affect
the social manifestations of community identity as well as its
cultural vitality and mobilisation (that it the organizational
structure of the community) in bilingual regions. Cross-border
cooperation initiatives and their implications for the integration
of the Italian community in the region, and particularly in
relations to the Slovene minority in Italy, are also discussed.
According to many respondents, there are common threats to and
demands made of the Italian community that will need to be considered.
These are divided into five categories: consistent implementation
of bilingualism, economic autonomy, educational problems, mass
media, and socio-demographic issues. A discussion of the (re)configuration
of regional (Istrian) and national-ethnic (Italian, Slovene)
identity vis-ŕ-vis identification with Europe and European values
concludes the report. The report also includes an appendix presenting
an organization chart of the Italian national community in the
Republic of Slovenia and additional tables and diagrams.
Italians in Post-War Yugoslavia
As a number of researchers and authors have already claimed,
the Italian minority in former Yugoslavia deserves special attention
because after World War II – during which virtually the entire
German minority community left the former Yugoslavia – it remained
the only Western European ethnic minority in the country. Because
of this distinction, both the Italian and Hungarian minority
populations became the subject of attention and studies after
the end of the war.
In the aftermath of World War One, Italy acquired in accordance
with the secret Treaty of London (1915) extensive territories
of what is today western Slovenia. These territories included
the Primorska region, Istria, and parts of Dalmatia in what
is today Croatia. After World War Two, Italy was compelled to
give up these same territories. For a variety of reasons, most
of the Italians residing in Istria and Dalmatia made the decision
to migrate to Italy after the borders were redrawn in accordance
with the Paris Peace Conference in 1947, and a second time in
1954. For the most part, the emigrants were Italians settled
on the coast and hinterland of the Istrian peninsula, in the
Kvarner Islands of Cres and Lošinj, and along the Dalmatian
coast between Zadar and Split. Within Istria itself, the Italians
who remained modified their ethnic identification so that today
one frequently hears about a unique Istrian regional identity.1
Italians in this region tended to settle in cities and were
historically (let’s say from the Middle Ages on) employed in
the non-agrarian sector. Due to the economic power of the bourgeoisie,
even Slavic immigrants moving from the hinterland to coastal
cities became Romanized2 as early as the first generation. Most
of the Italians who remained in the former Yugoslavia today
live in Croatia, with approximately 90% of them on the coast
and the remainder in the continental area. While the Italians
in the coastal belt of Croatia are part of an old historical
and autochthonous group, the Italians residing in the continental
part of Croatia tend to be exclusively migrants either from
the Istrian coast or from Italy (Klemencic and Zupancic, 2004).
Italians in Slovenia and Croatia represent an old component
of the ethnic structure of these regions. Some researchers define
the Northern Adriatic region as a place where five “autochthonous”
ethnic groups live: Slovenes, Italians, Germans, Croatians,
and Friulians, the latter having been considered a separate
ethnic group since World War II (Klemencic and Klemencic, 1997:
288). The demographic development of the Italian minority in
the regions where they were settled demonstrates a trend of
slow decrease in population numbers following the dissolution
of Yugoslavia. This downward trend can be explained by outside
factors (geographic features of their settlement areas, for
example, natural shifts, migration) and by internal factors
(statistical methods of census taking, government policies of
the state, mixed marriages, changes in the identity of the population,
and non-coerced assimilation). Most of the Italians in Slovenia
and Croatia are partially autochthonous and partially resettled
groups that repopulated the region during 1918-1943 when Primorska
and Istria, Rijeka, parts of Dalmatia and the islands of Cres,
Krk, Lastovo and Palagruža were part of Italy. During this period,
Italian Fascists also forcefully assimilated Slovenes and Croats
or forced them to leave. The Italian census of 1936 indicated
some 230,000 people who listed Italian as their main language
of communication in the territory of contemporary Slovenia and
Croatia (then part of the Italian state). Of this figure, 194,000
reside in what is today Croatia and some 36,000 in what is today
Slovenia. As previously mentioned, many of these Italians left
when the territory became part of Yugoslavia in 1947. From the
end of World War Two through 1953, various sources suggest that
between 250,000 and 350,000 people emigrated from these regions.
Approximately, two-thirds were ethnic Italians and one-third
Slovenes and Croats who opposed the Communist regime in Yugoslavia.
Some 15% of all emigrants left without migration permits, though
most left with the approval of the authorities. These were the
so-called optanti emigrants: those who were permanent residents
of this region and on June 10, 1940, opted to emigrate to Italy
where they would obtain Italian citizenship. The emigration
of Italians reduced the total population of the region and altered
its ethnic structure. After the “exodus”, only 36,000 Italians
lived in Yugoslavia in 1953, 16% of the pre-World War Two population.
Italians continued to emigrate in subsequent decades, most of
them to the United States and other foreign countries. For this
reason, the Italian population declined during each census taken
until 1981.
The number of Italians continued to change in the last two decades
of the twentieth century. In the 1991 census, a large increase
in Italians was recorded as compared to the 1981 census. Many
Italians who in previous censuses did not declare themselves
as Italians did so in the 1991 census because they counted on
the help of Italy in the forthcoming regional crisis. Once the
situation in Slovenia and Croatia was settled and the countries
became independent of Yugoslavia (and most importantly the war
in Croatia ended), there followed a decrease in the numbers
of declared Italians in both countries (Klemencic and Zupancic,
2004).
The Italian Population in Yugoslavia 1953-2001/2002
Source: Klemencic and Zupancic, 2004: 856.
The most recent population census in Slovenia (2002) shows a
significant decrease in the members of the Italian (and Hungarian)
minority. It should be noted, however, that the number of Slovenes
(88.31% in 1991 and 83.06% in 2002) and other national affiliations
(Montenegrins 0.23% in 1991 and 0.14 in 2002; Croats 2.76% in
1991 and 1.81% in 2002; Muslims 1.39% in 1991 and 0.53% in 2002;
Serbs 2.48% in 1991 and 1.98% in 2002) also showed significant
decreases (Šabec, 2005). According to Klemencic and Zupancic
(2004) the reasons for the statistical decrease in the numbers
of the Italian (and Hungarian) minority can be found mostly
in the changed methodology of the census rather than in actual
sociological factors. During this period, there was no significant
emigration of ethnic minorities and no significant pressures
for emigration. Possible methodological changes include the
fact that in 1991 and previous censuses, one member of the family
identified nationality for the whole family, while in 2002 each
person over fifteen years old was allowed to tell the census
takers his or her ethnic identity. At the time of the census,
many people were not available to report their ethnic identity
to the census takers. It was possible for them to send a subsequent
statement of ethnic identity to the census commission, but many
did not do so. Therefore, some 126,325 persons (6.43% of the
population of Slovenia) are included under the rubric "ethnic
identity unknown”. In 1991, the number had been only 2.21%.
In addition, emigrants who were temporary workers abroad were
not included in the 2002 census. In previous censuses, a person
who had his or her permanent residence formally in Koper, for
example, was included even if he or she had lived for a decade
in Trieste or Hungary or elsewhere. The 2002 census included
only those who actually lived at their official permanent residence.
There is also a problem with having to choose one ethnic identity
at the census. Many people in ethnically mixed territories are
from ethnically mixed families and didn't want or couldn't answer
the question on ethnic identity. In the 2002 census, some 60,673
respondents simply didn't answer this question. As noted in
the State of the Art Report, the number of inhabitants who declared
their mother tongue to be Italian was greater than the number
of people who declared Italian ethnic affiliation (3,882 and
3,762 in 1991 and 2002 respectively) and hasn'tchanged in total
proportions (0.2% of total population in 1991 and 2002) (Šabec,
2005). The decrease in ethnic identity affiliation would have
been significantly lower if mother tongue was taken into account.
In sum, the reduction of the Italian minority group cannot be
explained only in terms of assimilation or emigration; methodological
factors must be considered as well.
Minority Rights in the Former
Yugoslavia and in the Republic of Slovenia
From 1945 to 1991, during the period of Communist Yugoslavia,
the equality of ethno-nations and national minorities and the
policies for handling inter-ethnic relations were crucial matters
of Yugoslav domestic politics. In November 1943, the federation
of Yugoslavia was proclaimed by the second assembly of the Anti-Fascist
Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) and
two multi-ethnic autonomous regions within Serbia (Kosovo and
Vojvodina) were created. The fourth paragraph of the proclamation
stated the following: "Ethnic minorities in Yugoslavia shall
be granted all national rights." As far as terminology is concerned,
Yugoslavia was made up republics, each of which was comprised
of a dominant ethnic group (narod) and ethnic minorities (narodnost).
Bosnia was an exception, having been comprised of three ethnic
groups, all considered equal. The above principle regarding
the rights of ethnic minorities was codified in the 1946 and
1963 constitutions and reaffirmed again in the last federal
constitution of 1974, which gave even greater power and independence
to the republics. It declared that all republics and ethnic
minorities would have equal rights (Article 245) and that "each
ethnic minority has the sovereign right to freely use its own
language and script, to foster its own culture, to establish
organizations for this purpose, and to enjoy other constitutionally
guaranteed rights" (Article 274). Despite the fact that the
federal constitutions (1946, 1953, 1974) and the constitutions
of the republics and autonomous provinces, as well as various
other laws, emphasized the protection of ethnic minorities,
an ever-widening gap between theory and practice was emerging.
In theory, Yugoslav standards were even higher than the standards
in other European states (Klemencic and Zupancic, 2004). Yet
today, it appears that the discrepancy between theory and actual
conditions persists in independent democratic Slovenia.
The system of special minority rights did not come into existence
until after the independence of Slovenia. Though elements of
minority protection were in place soon after World War II, the
whole system was more or less completed only by the mid-1980s
(Šabec, 2005: 25). The 1963 Constitution of the Socialist Republic
(SR) of Slovenia already guaranteed the equal rights of the
Italian (and Hungarian) minority as well as the possibility
of development and progress in all fields. It also guaranteed
the equality of languages in ethnically mixed territories, which
included the maintenance and development of educational, print,
radio, and cultural institutions (Article 77). The importance
of both minorities was also emphasized in articles regarding
the special rights of Italians and Hungarians in the last Slovenian
Constitution promulgated in the former Yugoslavia (1974, Articles
250 and 251). These articles guaranteed both minorities free
usage of their languages, expression of their national culture,
usage of symbols, and establishment of special organizations.
In ethnically mixed territories, the languages of minorities
were proclaimed equal to the Slovene language, and members of
minorities were guaranteed the right to bring up and educate
their children in their own language.
With the creation of the new Slovene state in 1991, the protection
of minority communities needed only to be adapted and upgraded
into the newly pluralistic political system. The transition
from communism and the process of constructing democratic political
systems in Slovenia didn't radically modify the structures and
forms of political representation for minority communities.
The dissolution of Yugoslavia was certainly a major turning
point in the post-war history of all of its successor states,
but for the position of the Italian community, the turning point
was more economic than political. The so-called historical Italian
minority3 in independent Slovenia had not undergone political
mobilisation on an ethnic basis not had it demanded additional
minority rights or protection since these existed already (at
least in theory). The argument that the distinct cultural identity
of the Italian community had been stifled in the former Yugoslavia
and after 1991 in Slovenia could be proven only with great difficulty.
The previous regime had trumpeted the presence of the Italian
minority every chance it got for political and ideological reasons,
in order to demonstrate to Western Europe (and above all to
Italy and Austria) how open the Yugoslav state was and how well
it treated its minorities. A similar phenomenon occurred during
the process of Slovene independence when the newly emerging
state needed international confirmation of its democratic standards,
its legislation, etc. As indicated above, the crucial issue
remains the consistent implementation of law into practice.
The starting point for the protection of ethnic communities
in Slovenia is provided by the concept of ethnically mixed territories
and the system of collective rights that the state grants irrespective
of absolute numerical strength or the proportion of members
of an ethnic minority in an ethnically mixed territory (the
absence of a numerical clause). Representatives of the Italian
(and Hungarian) ethnic community actively participated in the
process of erecting legal norms that apply to all aspects of
the existence of the ethnic community. They have the status
of subject in this process, which is to say that their destiny
cannot be imposed on them without the explicit consent of legitimate
representatives of the ethnic community. Representatives of
the ethnic community have the right to veto all decisions of
the legislative body (from the state to the local level) in
matters that relate to the special rights of the ethnic communities.
This is the highest guarantee against possible attempts by representatives
of the national majority to force directives on the ethnic communities
to which they do not consent (Šabec, 2005).
Slovenia had placed special emphasis on the protection of its
autochthonous communities, in part because of its international
obligations after World War 11, but also because it was in keeping
with the process of decentralization and democratisation of
the then Yugoslav federation and the "opening of frontiers"
that took place at the end of the 1950s and beginning of the
1960s
(i.e. the right of Yugoslav citizens to travel abroad which
allowed tourism to become one of most important Yugoslav industries).
Slovenes began to perceive ethnic minorities on both sides of
the frontier as a sort of connecting tissue. Another important
factor that determined the level of protection of autochthonous
minorities was the concern for the well-being of Slovene minorities
in neighbouring countries. This concern remained despite the
fact that the level of protection of the Slovene ethnic minority
in those countries was then and still is today significantly
lower than that of corresponding minority communities in Slovenia.
This contention is easily proved with a cursory study of the
conditions of the Slovene minority in Italy and the Italian
minority in Slovenia, and specifically by comparing twenty-four
categories of special rights, privileges and protection enjoyed
by each of these minorities after the passage of the Special
Protection Law by the Italian parliament in February 2001. Slovenia
grants its Italian minority all twenty-four categories of special
rights, privileges and protections. In marked contrast, Italy
grants the Slovene minority living in the region of Trieste
and Gorizia only fourteen categories of rights, of which four
are fully applied and ten are partially applied. In the region
of Udine, Italy partially applies four categories of rights
and only one category of minority protection is fully applied
(Klemencic and Zupancic, 2004).
Minority protection in Slovenia is based on two principles:
the principle of territoriality and the principle of collectivity.
The first determines territories of autochthonous settlements,
which includes all the settlements where Italians (and Hungarians)
have been settled for centuries. The second emphasises the collective
nature of minorities and their needs, in addition to general
and special individual rights. These designated territories
have two official languages: Slovene and Italian (or Hungarian).
By law, visible bilingualism is not restricted to signs on streets
and official buildings such as courts, county and municipal
buildings, but is also guaranteed on private buildings and other
state-owned enterprises.
Bilingual documents (identity cards, passports, driving licences,
vehicle registration documents, medical insurance booklets,
etc) are compulsory for all inhabitants of ethnically mixed
areas, irrespective of ethnic affiliation. Bilingual procedures
are also prescribed for judiciary institutions, with courts
obliged to guarantee the equality of the minority language.4
However, members of the minority must make an explicit demand
to have the court proceedings in their languages or bilingually.
This applies to other administrative procedures and correspondence
as well. Employees are entitled to higher pay for their knowledge
of the Italian (or Hungarian) language. Members of the Italian
(and Hungarian) minority in ethnically mixed territories also
have the right to use their language in dealings with the municipal
administration. In any discussion of these legal rights, however,
it is essential to recognise that these rights exist on paper,
but the actual use of them depends on everyday practice by members
of elected bodies and other citizens. As registered in State
of the Art Report statement of the Committee of Experts on the
Application of the European Charter for Regional and Minority
Languages (ECRML), there is a marked discrepancy between the
provisions of the law and daily practice. Despite its co-official
character in ethnically mixed areas, and the financial bonus
for public employees with active or passive knowledge of Italian,
it seems that Italian is almost never actually used in dealings
with administrative bodies. In most cases, people are obliged
to switch to Slovene and most written communication is issued
exclusively in Slovene. Sometimes the use of Italian is refused
by officials. A possible explanation for this might found in
the Slovene recruitment policy in the local offices of the state
administration. Often, people from the inland part of the country
with no knowledge of Italian and no awareness of the bilingual
character of the coastal region are installed in the public
administration of bilingual territories (Šabec, 2005).
The right to education in the Italian language is implemented
within the monolingual school program for members of the Italian
ethnic minority, though learning Slovene is compulsory. Italian
is also compulsory in the ethnically mixed territory of the
Slovene coast for students who are attending schools where Slovenian
is the language of instruction. Schools with Italian as the
language of instruction are not limited to members of the Italian
minority. Because of limited opportunities to study in the languages
of autochthonous minorities, Slovenia signed agreements with
Italy (and Hungary) that allow members of minority community
on both sides of the border – Slovenes from Italy (or Hungary)
and Italians (and Hungarians) from Slovenia – to study at universities
in either country. Another essential right of national minorities
in Slovenia is the right to be informed in their own language.
A radio station in the Italian language was established in 1949
and today transmits twenty-four hours of broadcasting in Italian.
A television station was added in 1971. It broadcasts nine hours
of daily television programme (two hours out of nine of its
own informative, cultural and youth-oriented production) in
Italian language.5 Both TV and radio provide information to
the Italian population in Slovenia and Croatia. The Italian-
language radio and television stations function as part of the
organizational framework of Slovene National Radio. The Italians
minority in Slovenia and Croatia also put out their own newspaper,
published by EDIT which is located in Rijeka (Croatia) and has
a correspondence office in Koper. The Slovene government supports
the print media with financial subsidies, though the amount
represents only 20% of the sum allocated to these activities
by Croatian government (Klemencic and Zupancic, 2004).
The Italian (and Hungarian) minority also enjoy the constitutional
right to fly their flags on the territories of their autochthonous
settlements, although this right is not often exercised in practice
(R10).
According to the Slovene Constitution, designated ethnic minorities
have the right to two votes in the elections of members of the
State Assembly as well as in elections for the organs of local
self-government (city councils). The minority group may use
the first vote in accordance with their political affiliation
and the second to elect special minority representatives. Slovenia
has authorized self-governing ethnic communities to compile
electoral registers of citizens who are community members. The
deputies of the Italian (and Hungarian) minority are elected
by all members of the ethnic minority who have voting rights,
regardless of whether they live in an ethnically mixed territory
or elsewhere in Slovenia. Self-governing ethnic communities
were established in every municipality inhabited by members
of autochthonous ethnic minorities. The municipal ethnic communities
then join together to form the so-called Italian (or Hungarian)
ethnic community.6
European Integration, Domestic
Context of Change, and Cross Border Cooperation in the Region
Within the framework of the former Yugoslavia from the 1960s
on and especially with the increasing openness of political
borders, the political, economic and geographical position of
Slovenia had been growing stronger: first in the framework of
the Alps-Adriatic Working Community in the context of Central
Europe, then in the context of the Central European Initiative,
and finally within the European space as a whole. “In comparison
to other socialist countries in general and to the other Yugoslav
republics in particular, the Iron Curtain began opening a good
thirty years earlier in Slovenia. This was certainly the first
significant step in opening Slovenia to Europe and the world”
(Jesih et al, 1994: 11). Tendencies toward greater openness
were also fostered by the concept of polycentric development,
a trend that began to counter the depopulation of border regions
and cause the rise of secondary regional centres along the borders
with Austria and Italy. This ongoing opening was given further
impetus by the collapse of the Eastern bloc. With the increasingly
intensified development of the role of border regions and the
linking of these with the regions across national borders, opportunities
became available to Slovene minorities in neighbouring countries
(in Friuli-Venezia-Giulia in Italy, in Carinthia and Styria
in Austria, and in Porabje in Hungary) as well as to the Italian
and Hungarian communities in Slovenia to play an important role
in facilitating economic, cultural and other linkages between
the Slovene state and its neighbours.
In the 1960s, for example, communist Yugoslavia and Italy signed
several bilateral agreements that enabled the substantial flow
of people, goods and services between the two countries. The
increasingly liberal regime in the border region is also proven
by the fact that, by the 1970s, there were seventy border crossings
of various categories over the 235 kilometres of the Slovene
section of the Yugoslav-Italian land border. In 1980, there
were 17 million individual crossings of the Yugoslav-Italian
border, most of them through Slovene border points (Klemencic
and Klemencic, 1997: 291). The open frontier facilitated the
rapid economic development of the region, particularly on the
Slovene side. In Slovene and Croatian Istria, the tourism industry
developed quickly. In the 1970s and 1980s, Italians were buying
the cheaper gasoline to be had in Slovenia (and Croatia), while
the residents of Yugoslavia left millions of American dollars
in Trieste and Gorizia purchasing goods they couldn’t find in
Yugoslavia. “The importance of this region for the economic
development of the wider Central European region is shown in
the expansion of its ports. Three large ports developed on fifty
kilometres of coastline: Trieste, Rijeka, and Koper” (Klemencic
and Klemencic, 1997: 291).
To summarize, the dissolution of the federal Yugoslavia, the
establishment of two new sovereign and independent states (Slovenia
and Croatia), the transition from a socialist to democratic
system, the implementation of a free market economy, and last
but not least the European integration process in the 1990s
and its (financial) opportunities, have all had an impact on
the border region and the position of the Italian community
within it. Interview results suggest that the following three
consequences have been the most noteworthy:
-the division of the Italian ethnic community between two independent
and autonomous states (Slovenia and Croatia), complicated further
by the fact that only one of the two states became an EU member
in 2004;
-economic weakness and dependence of the Italian minority community
on government subsidies;
-European integration and cross-border cooperation opportunities.
All three many-sided factors are mutually and interactively
linked so it is impossible to analyse them individually, that
is without at the same time taking into account influences one
each other. Nevertheless, these factors represent major turning
points for the community under study in this report.
The Transition to Democracy
The conditions of change which began in the late 1980s and continued
into the 1990s with the fall of communism and the subsequent
restructuring of political, social and economic conditions and
institutions was followed almost immediately by Slovene preparation
for European integration processes shortly after 1991. Full
Slovene membership was achieved in May 2004. The situation needs
to be understood from the historical perspective of the so-called
Yugoslav legacy: namely, in terms of the relationships and circumstances
in the former Yugoslavia that were briefly described in section
two, the relationship of Yugoslavia toward the Italian community,
and last but not least the relation of the Italian minority
community to the Italian state. The Yugoslav legacy inherited
by Slovenia and Croatia as former Yugoslav republics and as
formal successors of the common state continues to effect Slovene-Italian
relations on the one hand and Slovene relations with its own
minority community on the other.
To summarize, the period immediately after 1945 was marked by
Italian-Yugoslav disputes and a variety of arrangements regarding
the new frontier between Italy and Yugoslavia, the emigration
of Italians from Yugoslav territories, the settlement of their
property etc. (Šabec, 2005). After years of discord, the Italian-Yugoslav
Osimo Treaty in 1975 formally established minority protection
of Slovenes in Italy and Italians in Yugoslavia, but Article
8 was always subject to different interpretations and remained
a source of trouble in the relationship between the two countries.
In 1992, after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Slovenia as one
of the successor states of Yugoslavia accepted all of previous
treaties with Italy. In fact, from the point of view of international
law, relations between Slovenia and Italy contain no open questions.
However, the legal aspects of relations between the two countries
are burdened by a series of political and pseudo-legal interpretations,
the sources of which can be found in various institutions. Most
significant perhaps was that shortly after an exchange of memorandums
in July 1992, Italian foreign policy gradually began to incline
towards certain principles that the Triestine neoirredentist
circle7 had been attempting to revive since 1985 and which had
their roots in the principled rejection of the Yugoslav-Italian
Osimo Treaty (Drcar-Murko, 1996). This issue is still open today,
despite the fact that some ongoing disputes over Italian property
have been settled, and in particular the dispute over the Manzioli
Palace in Izola where the seat of all three Italian community
organizations are located (the Self-governing Community of the
Italian Minority, the Dante Alighieri Italian Association and
Pasqual Besenghi Italian Association).
In fact, the Slovene-Italian frontier was not the most important
“new” border in the region. After the dissolution of Yugoslavia,
not only Italians in Slovenia but the whole border region has
felt the new border between Slovenia and Croatia that emerged
with the independence of both countries. The border was felt
even more acutely with Slovene accession to the EU. Previously
there had been close and intense connections between people
on both sides of the border, not only in terms of familial ties
but also in terms of economic, cultural and other interactions
all of which became more tenuous after the dissolution of Yugoslavia
and emergence of the new EU border. The Italian community had
felt much stronger in the former Yugoslavia when Italians from
Slovenia and Croatia were perceived as one community and enjoyed
close ties. After the changes, Italians on both sides of the
newly established frontier began to lose the will and interest
to engage in border matters with one important exception: namely,
the Italian community in Croatia which is numerically superior
(approximately 20,000) than the corresponding community in Slovenia
(approximately 2000) and feels a stronger affiliation to its
Italian identity. In Slovenia, there is a certain division within
the Italian community itself and this has only become more palpable
since Slovene independence. Specifically, the community is divided
among so-called “autochthonous” Italians or “internal” Italians
(these are Italians who have lived in Slovenia for centuries)
and “external” Italians (those who immigrated to this area,
mainly from Croatia). The great majority of the Italian community
in Slovenia are not the locals (or “internal”) because they
immigrated from the Croatian part of Istria during 1954, 1955,
and 1956 when the optanti chose to leave the area. According
to some,8 it is precisely the differing origins of Italians
in Slovenia (locals versus those from Croatian or southern Istria,
Pula, Porec, Rovinj) that might be a cause of the ongoing internecine
conflicts in Italian community in Izola certainly, but also
perhaps in Koper and Piran as well. These conflicts have served
to weaken the community.
It is paradoxical that, despite the fact that the Italian community
in Croatia has fewer legal rights (at least on paper), it probably
has better possibilities for development and prosperity because
of its size. Perhaps because of this situation, the process
of assimilation is occurring with more intensity in Slovenia
than in Croatia. This situation could change, however, when
Croatia becomes an EU member state as the Italian community
in Slovenia has already started to invigorate its relations
with Croatia as well as with Italy. With independence, Italians
in Slovenia lost the great majority of the Italian community
to Croatia. This has handicapped the community in Slovenia both
on the symbolic level and in the socio-economic areas of employment
and education. New borders meant new legislation and employment
laws. School systems, curricula and school terms are no longer
compatible between the two countries. School textbooks are no
longer the same. Within the common Yugoslav state, for example,
many Italian parents from Croatia sent their children to Italian
(mostly secondary) schools in Slovenia. After the dissolution
of Yugoslavia, it has become much more difficult for Italians
from Croatia to attend Italian schools in Slovenia at all, still
less for adults to be employed in Slovenia. These incompatibilities
have grown even more pronounced since Slovene membership in
the EU. Nowadays, very few Italian students from Croatia attend
Italian gymnasium in Piran9 or secondary school in Izola.10
The dissolution of Yugoslavia affected the entire system of
Italian schools in Istria. In Yugoslavia schools had been systematically
established for the whole Istrian territory (both Slovene and
Croatian), usually with different programmes in different locations.
For example, the economics high school was located in Koper,
Slovenia, the construction secondary school in Buje, Croatia,
and so on. Today this system is no longer valid and students
have fewer choices about what and where to study in the Italian
language school system. There is the additional problem of so-called
nostrification (equivalence) of school certificates and diplomas.
This particularly effects the validity of Slovene degrees in
Croatia, as Croatian legislation demands supplementary examinations
in Croatian language, history and geography for those students
who attended Italian school in Slovenia. The nostrification
process is costly and time-consuming. Other forms of cooperation
between the minority community in the region which is now divided
among two separate states has without a doubt become much more
difficult.11 As previously mentioned, European integration will
have an importantly effect on the Italian community in the whole
Istrian region including its Slovenian part when Croatia becomes
an EU member state and when the border between Slovenia and
Croatia will become less rigid again.
From Planned Economy to Free Market
Conditions
Despite the fact that the former Yugoslavia was grounded in
socialist ideology and a planned economy and the independent
Republic of Slovenia is a democratic state with free market
capitalist system, at last one resemblance exists between the
two countries in terms of the Italian minority community. Not
all minorities in the former Yugoslavia had the same status.
During Yugoslav times, the Italian minority possessed special
privileges because it had connections with and bordered on Italy,
a Western country. This situation contrasted with that of the
Hungarian minority in Slovenia, the Romanian community in Serbia,
and the Albanian one in Kosovo. Because of its position in the
border region between Yugoslavia and the West, and also because
of its equivalent position between the Iron Curtain and western
capitalist countries, the Italian community represented a handy
means for the former state to show the West how well and correctly
Yugoslavia treated its minority populations. Two motivations
stand out above the others:
1. To prove something to the rest of the world (and above all
western countries) was more important than the proper treatment
of all minorities in Yugoslavia. Accordingly when it came to
economic problems, the state often intervened on behalf of the
Italian minority, and the Italian minority never had to worry
about acquiring additional state financing for events (albeit
cultural not economic ones).
2. To justify the demands of the Slovene minority in the Friuli-Venezia
Giulia region (Italy) and in Carinthia (Austria), both of which
represented an economic segment of the Slovene republic in the
West. It was impossible for Slovenia or Yugoslavia to import
from Italy (or Austria) without Slovene minority companies from
Italy (or Austria) acting as mediators and the other way around
(i.e. exports from Yugoslav republics had to go through Slovene
minority companies). The main consequence was that the Slovene
minority communities in Italy and Austria were economically
strengthened during these years. According to R21 even the bankruptcy
a few years ago of the Trieste Credit Bank (the bank of the
Slovene Italian minority) did not destroy the economy of the
Slovene minority in Italy.12
The special treatment of the Italian community did not end with
the disintegration of Yugoslavia, but continued through the
process of Slovene independence and for several few years afterwards
during the period when independent Slovenia was striving for
international recognition as a modern, democratic, pluralist
state. After independence, Slovenia was determined to integrate
into Europe and to become a full member of the EU, and its two
ethnic minority communities represented a legitimisation and
confirmation of Slovene democratic values.
This situation changed after Slovene accession to the EU a decade
later. Today the minority communities are no longer needed to
legitimise the democratic values of Slovene state and the Slovene
government lacks the political will to help the Italian minority
become economically independent (R14, R26). A certain continuity
from the Yugoslav period to the independent Slovene period can
also be observed as regards the economic position of the Italian
community in Slovenia and the absence of a strong economic foundation
and the ability to generate their own financial resources independent
of state subsidies (for example, from private sector sources
within the Italian community).13 Indeed, the transition from
the socialist central planning system to free market conditions
has proved to be a disadvantage for the Italian community. This
stands in marked contrast to the Slovene community in Italy.
The sources of the problem, which has been pointed out numerous
times by community representatives,14 can be found in sociohistorical
conditions. After World War Two, the Slovenes living in Italy
simply continued their normal economic and business activities.
Unlike on the other side of the border, neither the political
nor the economic system changed after 1945. During that period
and particularly after 1954, not only did a substantial majority
of the Italian population emigrate from this territory but particular
policies were put forward that reduced the economic freedom
of the Italian minority – and this despite the London memorandum
(1954) that called for the foundation of a minority bank also
in Yugoslavia (similar to the Trieste Credit Bank for the Slovene
minority in Italy). This idea was not put into force on the
Yugoslav side of border for ideological reasons.
One of the consequences of this Italian emigration was the weakening
of the Italian community, as not only workers but Italian tradesmen,
small entrepreneurs and intellectuals emigrated as well. The
majority of Italians who remained in Yugoslavia were farmers
dependent upon their land and their cattle, older people, fishermen
and other individuals “who had nothing to lose in the new system”
(R23). They didn’t want to leave what little property they had
behind. On the other hand the general socio-economic conditions
in post-war Yugoslavia did not foster prosperity in business
and development of trade in general or for the Italian community
in particular. As a result, today, sixty years later, there
is still a poor economic foundation for the Italian community.
The economic foundation of a community, however, has an important
influence on all of the other activities of that community (culture,
sports, etc.) and their overall financial condition, which has
the potential to build independence and autonomy. In the absence
of a vibrant economic life – and this is precisely what afflicts
the Italians in Slovenia – the community becomes dependent on
state and local governments. In addition, current measures to
cut state spending on all levels extend to minority protection
as well, despite the fact that broader community organizations
are financially dependent on state support. The ideological
and socioeconomic changes that occurred after the disintegration
of Yugoslavia have shaken the Italian community and have forced
it to adopt the new principles of the free market economy and
the common market, and to accept cutbacks in states subsidies.
Yet the main deficiency remains the same: the Italian community
in Slovenia doesn't have its own economic sphere of activity
and is not economically independent. “Of course, individuals
and businesses finding themselves in new conditions have the
opportunity to establish themselves and to initiate economic
activity, but start-up capital is needed” (R21). The Italian
community, looked at as a collective subject, cannot take advantage
of these opportunities because it doesn’t have the capital to
do so, or even to lobby political parties for additional resources.
The process of lobbying for political advantages is extremely
difficult for the minority community, because in principle it
avoids taking political sides.
When denationalisation and the privatisation of social property
began in the 1990s, ethnic minorities in Slovenia strived to
get a piece of the privatisation cake. Certain measures were
passed in Slovenia that looked promising in terms of the initial
accumulation of capital for the Italian (and Hungarian) minority.
In 1995, a law on the use of funds acquired from the sale of
property was passed on the basis of the already existing law
for capital (ownership) transformation of assets that under
the former socialist regime had been treated as “social property”
(Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 45/95, …,
47/02). According to Article 7 of this law, 2.5% of the funds
generated would be allocated to building an economic foundation
for the Italian (and Hungarian) minority community.15 The Slovene
government took some important first steps in this direction,
but with few concrete results (R26). In the end, too little
effort was made by the Slovene government and, worse still,
several bad loans were extended under the program and it was
considered a failure. As a result, the Italian minority has
remained economically weak and has lagged behind the average
in the Littoral-Karst regions, which otherwise is one of the
most rapidly developing regions in Slovenia. Because of insufficient
community funds and state cutbacks, social and cultural activity
has become even more restricted. However, the Italian community
continues to struggle for greater financial independence, knowing
that its own economic foundation will make its existence easier
(Jesih, 1994: 16). The procedure to establish its own financial
company (FINEURO) began six or seven years ago because the community
wanted to use funds acquired by previously mentioned sale of
common social property (from the former socialist system). For
this, it needed to have a financial organization founded as
a business company with its headquarters located in bilingual
territory. The Slovenia government supported this project, giving
EUR 25 million to both minority communities (two-thirds of the
amount went to the Hungarian ethnic community and one-third
to the Italian community). Thus far, however, the project exists
only in the planning stage. The process needs time and, according
to minority protection measures in the Slovene constitution
and legislation, it is not sufficient to merely ensure conditions
for the existence of these communities, but for their development
as well (R25). In short, the Slovene government lacks the political
will to resolve this issue by approving the establishment of
a financial company that would serve the Italian (and Hungarian)
community and would represent the basic starting-point for economical
independence of the minority.
The southern Littoral-Karst region, which contains three of
the main bilingual municipalities (Koper, Izola, Piran), is
among the most developed region in Slovenia (R26).16 Therefore,
the economic difficulties experienced by the Italian minority
cannot be blamed on general development problems in the region.
There are, however, a number of specific problems that plague
the three main bilingual municipalities although there are some
important distinctions between them. One of the problems is
traffic infrastructure, which is insufficient in terms of land
transport from Koper and the Port of Koper to the north of Trieste
(i.e. the northernmost port with access to the hinterland).
The other are socio-economic conditions at least in one of the
three municipalities. Izola, in comparison to Koper and Piran
and Slovenia as a whole, has relatively high unemployment, and
particularly among women in the last five years. The companies
that previously employed unskilled female workers, Delamaris,
Mehanotehnika and Droga to some extent, all confront a downturn
in their businesses. Because of high daily labour migration
(some thousand people in the region commute each day to go to
work), this downturn has also been felt in Koper and Piran.
Unfortunately, people are commuting to Koper and Piran for better
paid work and in the other direction, from Koper and Piran to
Izola, for unskilled and semi-skilled work (R8). Izola, however,
does not fall below the Slovene average, but only under the
average of the southern Littoral-Karst region, and particularly
under the average of the Istrian area (especially in terms of
education levels). This municipality suffers from low educational
standards in general and this fact is responsible for many of
its other problems. For example, it has caused difficulties
in the socialization of certain population groups, and in particular
immigrants (first, second and even third generation) who came
to this region from other republics of the former Yugoslavia.
Approximately 20% of Izola’s inhabitants originate from this
particular immigrant pool. Integration of this segment of the
population has not been satisfying, particularly in terms of
education. The level of education achieved by the children of
these immigrants is below the level of Slovene children (R8).
It is hard to explain the reasons for this situation, but it
is repeated over generations. According to some, a combination
of social conditions lead to this situation and its consequences
are not restricted to education. There is a high level of drug
addiction and alcoholism in the region, though again broader
social factors should be taken into consideration in order to
find a more nuanced explanation for these phenomena.
Gross domestic product by statistical region, 2002 - current
prices:
Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, http://www.stat.si,
25. 2. 2006
European Integration and Cross
Border Cooperation Programmes
Slovenia’s entrance into the European integration process has
not yet had a substantial impact on the (over)developed Slovene
regions and the ongoing reduction of centralist regulation.
Indeed because most measures and arrangements were defined and
implemented during the pre accession period, any effect has
been muted. In this respect, the dissolution of Yugoslavia and
subsequent foundation of the first independent democratic state
in Slovene history represented a far more noteworthy change.
Nevertheless, certain new (economic) potentials have emerged,
though it would not be accurate to see EU accession as a distinct
turning point in terms of practical economic factors (R26).
EU membership has had significance particularly on the symbolic
level. In any event, the official accession of Slovenia as an
EU member state in May 2004 proved that Slovenia’s economic,
diplomatic and political efforts since independence, as well
as the orientation of Slovene policy after 1991 toward (Western)
European countries and away from the Balkans, had been successful.
Slovenia is perceived within the EU as a less-developed area.
Since European regional policy refers not to small territories
but to economically encircled areas, Slovenia is registered
as one region in accordance with European criteria. Because
of this definition, Slovenia as a whole lags behind the EU average
and receives the maximum amount of EU aid. The state organs
of Slovenia are authorized, however to decide (independent of
the EU) whether EU development funds will be regionally directed
to particularly needy regions or whether the aid will be invested
in augmenting GDP and the competitive position of all of Slovenia
(which some argue would result in strong development for all
regions). Thus far, the Slovene government has decided for the
second solution, though there is an internal agreement that
60% of all EU funds will be directed to underdeveloped regions
within Slovenia. The Littoral-Karst region where most of the
Italian community is settled is defined as an (over)developed
regions, second only to the Central Slovene region with Ljubljana
as its centre. Therefore it is not entitled to regional development
assistance.17 However, it should be noted that the whole issue
of regional development opportunities in Slovenia is part of
a broader problem that has to do with Slovene regional structure
and the size of separate regions. Currently, Slovene regions
are so-called “statistical regions” and therefore do not accurately
represent regional structure. There are currently twelve statistical
regions that are too small in size to have any functional validity.
If Slovenia were divided into two or three regions (this is
currently being debated by the Slovene government), the regions
could feasibly exercise an influence on centralised state organs.
As it is, however, regions are too small and weak to have any
effect on regional policy, to play a role as a serious negotiator
or competitor with the state, or indeed to participate in the
decision-making processes, and ultimately achieve greater decentralisation
of the state. To the contrary, the process of increasing state
centralisation continues with the establishment of even smaller
municipalities within Slovene regions.18
Whether or not European integration will bring additional value
to everyday life in border regions is difficult to predict.
According to R2, it depends above all on the officials who are
responsible at the state and local level, and secondly on the
mentality and attitudes of the population as a whole. As far
as minority populations are concerned, EU accession should offer
new opportunities but in practice it will take a long time for
any real change to occur. The fact is that EU CBC funds as a
real factor in European integration are extremely limited (0.3%
of Slovene GDP) (R22). Moreover, because Slovenia is at the
beginning of the programme period, the effect of EU programmes
will be evident only at the end of the period in 2010. It is
unlikely, however, that there will be any substantial change
since EU funds are so limited and they don’t represent ongoing
investment funds, but start-up funds to trigger change (the
long-term goal being to make the state and individuals to begin
thinking in developmental terms). Typically, Slovene pre-accession
expectations were quite different from the actual situation.
During the pre- accession negotiations, the EU treated all candidate
states the same and used the same methodology, regardless of
national specificities. Slovenia and Malta cannot be compared
to Poland, for example. But since EU cohesion policy is regionally
orientated, small states were compelled to establish new regions
even if it didn’t make any sense to do so. However, the EU persisted
with the rule that every state must be divided into a certain
number of regions, out of which a few regions would be selected
to receive EU funds. Having no choice in the matter, Slovenia
selected three pilot regions (Pomurje, Savinjska and Zasavje)
and, in 1999, the Slovene parliament passed a law on regional
development. In the meantime, the European Commission belatedly
discovered that all candidate states were not equal and comparable,
and that it was nonsensical for small states to be further broken
up into smaller regional units. The situation became completely
confused, as Slovenia had already begun the process of regionalisation.
Pilot studies had been conducted, regional developmental agencies
established, etc. The situation is still not resolved today,
despite the fact that Slovenia should have completed the regionalisation
process (NUTS 2) before it became an EU member state. To this
day, Slovenia lacks the political will to resolve this situation
even internally. Statistical regions, as they exist today, do
not in anyway contribute to decentralisation of the state. The
idea of establishing from two to four provinces, and later three
regions, was also not achieved because of the lack of political
will. In sum, Slovenia continues to have only statistical regions,
which are useless in terms of real regionalisation and decentralization.
“The inescapable fact is that the Slovene failed utterly to
complete either the regionalisation or decentralisation processes
prior to accession. Since Slovenia is now a full member state
of EU, any subsequent decision on whether to have one, two or
three regions (these are the options currently being negotiated)
as well as non-decisions will have serious financial consequences
on regional development” (R22).
Cross border cooperation (CBC) between Slovenia and its neighbours,
including Italy, existed already in the framework of the former
Yugoslavia. As previously mentioned, most of the economic cooperation
between the two states occurred through Slovene minority companies
in Italy. The formal beginning of the Italy-Slovenia CBC took
place in 1995. In Slovenia, a small state with many borders,
only one among the twelve statistical regions (the Zasavje region)
is not entitled to CBC funds according to current regulation.
Its borderland status is of great significance to all of Slovenia
in terms of development of entrepreneurship, agricultural and
environmental issues, cultural and social cooperation, etc.
At first CBC projects were mostly initiated by the central government
and were orientated toward the development of physical infrastructure
(border crossings, etc). As such, they had no higher purpose
in terms of real collaboration. The main goal at that point
was to use the money that was available. There was no real cross
border cooperation, as each partner involved in the project
simply worked on its own side of the border (R1). However, since
1998, intensive cooperation projects have been launched, some
as a result of the modified European legislative framework.
After 2000, the European Union demanded some common structures
to decide upon projects, though there were still separate calls
for application in Italy and Slovenia. Since that time, cooperation
has expanded not only between Slovene and Italian partners,
but also within the Slovene territory. Some modest improvement
in terms of social, economic and institutional cooperation,
if not actual integration, has been achieved during this period.19
Nevertheless because of the small budget allocation (which became
even smaller since Slovenia’s accession into the EU), only non-profit
organizations and institutions can apply for those projects.
This remains true after May 2004.20 Nevertheless, according
to analysis based on hard data and to most member states involved
in CBC projects, the programme has been one of the best instruments
for European cohesion policy. According to R22, CBC projects
are low-budget, moderate in terms of funding, transparent, and
by their nature and the philosophy of their implementation highly
accommodated to real regional needs. CBC projects are small,
usually already existing projects that people in the region
originate. They are often highly effective in terms of increasing
regional stability and maintenance of peace. Namely, CBC projects
are often implemented in border regions that have been the location
of specific historical tensions. The Slovene-Italian CBC region
is characterised by regions or provinces where the political
influence of the prevailing regional governmental is decisive.
As a result, the selection of CBC projects and their approval
have generally been politically motivated, though in theory
and according to project rules, project selection should be
entirely professional and independent of political influence.21
Because of this, some problems and frictions have emerged in
certain projects, though where the minority group is a partner,
good cooperation tends to prevail (R22).
Three stages can be differentiated in the evolution of CBC programmes
in Slovenia. During the first stage, from 1995 to 1999, CBC
was extremely weak, existing more on the rhetorical level. Italy
and Slovenia each had its own separate CBC programme document.
The second stage took place from 2000 to 2003. For the first
time, the Slovene and Italian governments ratified a joint CBC
document. Since then, there has been more cooperation and contacts
between both sides and their respective administrations. Although
projects became more cross-border in orientation, many were
not real CBC projects, not “orthodox” CBC projects. The third
stage began in 2004 (after EU accession). Standards and regulations
became more unified. Prior to 2004, Slovenia was in the process
of implementing pre- accession standards. Afterwards the rules
changed and cooperation with Italians increased. Authorized
institutions and agencies maintained regular weekly contacts.
For the first time, they managed a simultaneous call for applications
on both sides of the border in Slovenia, Friuli-Venezia Giulia
and Veneto (the last two calls for applications were in 2004
and 2005). For the first time in CBC history, all applicants
and partners were prepared for the project. Calls for applications
have been made more uniform because of the specificity of administration
and national legislation. Yet one obstacle still remains in
the current programme period: separated accounts for Slovenia,
FVG and Veneto (R2).
Up until now, the national minorities have not received special
treatment within the CBC programme or only to a limited extent.
There was one particular financial line from 2002 to 2003, dedicated
only to cross border cooperation between the Slovene-Italian
minority groups (either minority 1 – minority 2 or minority
– home state cooperation). The reason for this exception was
that some additional funds were found and a decision was made
to earmark the money for minority projects. In general, each
member state (or, in the case of CBC programmes, both member
states) must decide whether the minority issue is crucial enough
to be handled separately, that is if minorities should be treated
in a special way because of their minority status and have priority
with respect to EU funds. For the last ten years, minorities
in Slovenia have always been involved in CBC projects at least
as applicants. However, there is sometimes a difference between
the theoretical readiness of minorities to cooperate in EU programmes
and the actual proposal and implementation of a concrete project.
Without a doubt, the allocation of funds for regional development
and particularly cross border cooperation (Phare, Interreg)
creates new opportunities for minority (and majority) activities.
The question remains to what extent the community itself seizes
these opportunities for cross border cooperation and what objective
restrictions (such as financial incapacity) prevent it from
participating as a partner or coordinator in these programmes.
Changing Opportunities and Constraints
for Minorities
The Socio-Economic Position of the Italian Community in the
Context of European Cross Border Cooperation Opportunities
The Italian ethnic community in Slovenia has been most cooperative
with the Slovene minority in Italy, predominantly in the spheres
of sports, culture and education, though not in sphere of economics.
Their collaboration began in the 1970s with sports activities,
and namely with the Minority Sports Competition. Today not only
the Slovene minority in Italy and the Italian minority in Slovenia
compete, but also the Slovene minority living in Austria and
minority groups from Croatia. At various times, between ten
to thirteen minority groups have participated in this particular
CBC as well as in other educational or cultural activities.
In terms of CBC programmes funded by the EU the Italian minority
community in Slovenia became active after 2000. The most important
consequence of this collaboration is that the ongoing relationship
between the Slovene minority in Italy and the Italian from Slovenia
has become more intense, close and fruitful (R2). The initiative
came from the Slovene community in Italy that had established
an entrepreneurial team called Euroservis that aimed at building
intensive cooperation with and giving support to minority groups
and others. Often they called for applicants from the Slovene
side who needed a partner on the Italian side. The Euroservis
team can locate partners on the Italian side of the border because
they know the territory. Cooperation between the Italian community
and the Slovene minority in Italy emerged entirely on the basis
of concrete mutual interests and the need to achieve certain
goals through cooperation. The format simply hadn’t existed
in the past. Real concrete possibilities spurred real concrete
cooperation as both sides were compelled by self-interest to
get involved in these projects. As a result, a unified commission
with members from Slovenia and from the region of Friuli-Venezia
Giulia has been established that includes special minority board
members from both Italian and Slovene minority communities.
Some common European projects in which both the Slovene and
Italian minority groups are systematically included arose from
this particular context.22 The advent of such close and positive
cooperative between the Slovene minority in Italy and the Italian
minority in Slovenia has generated some important findings.
One of them is that minorities should not be used as a state
instrument for manipulation in negotiations between state institutions
and governments. Minorities sometimes suffer from the same or
similar problems as majority populations, and cooperation and
interaction are a far better and more powerful method of seeking
solutions than state instrumentalisation.
According to the development agencies and some community members
(R2, R16, R21), one goal of CBC projects should be to lift minorities
out of their own isolated space or reservation. Minorities need
to mix with the broader environment and be integrated as equals
into Slovene and Italian institutions of the majority population.
The principle problem experienced by the Italian minority in
Slovenia is that there is little connection and cooperation
with members of the majority community. The same situation exists
among the Slovene minority in Italy. The goal is to give the
minority its own “added value” so it can contribute to the wider
community, and not remain segregated in a ghetto. The Italian
and Slovene governments need to organically and systematically
include the Italian minority in European CBC projects. Because
this has not yet been achieved, it is difficult to assess the
real effects of EU projects. It is simply too soon to judge.
More practise and experience will be needed to evaluate the
real impact of European projects, though they are certainly
welcome because they provide motivation for cooperation.
The major uncertainty remains that these projects will not really
affect minority members and the minority community will underestimate
their potential.
As far as CBC projects and the Italian minority community in
Slovenia is concerned, one of the most troubling obstacles is
that the community lacks skilled and trained specialists who
would be able to handle project documentation, preparation,
implementation etc. As a result, the community often doesn’t
manage its own project initiatives, but more commonly participates
as a partner. Hopefully, the Europa Office will be successful
in correcting this shortfall. The second problem that prevents
the Italian minority community from a more active role in CBC
projects is the start-up capital that is condition for participation.
Although these means are eventually refunded, the Italian minority
community does not even have the short-term resources to participate
in CBC projects. The stagnant relationship of the Italian minority
community with the Slovene government paralyses cross-border
cooperation and hinders relations between Italy and the Italian
border regions. Without the indirect interference of the Slovene
government (though ironically in accordance with its legislation),
a more vibrant relationship with Italy would help the Italian
minority community to achieve greater economic independence.
Together with the Slovene minority in Italy, the region of Friula-Venezia-Giulia
and its financial company Fines (Port Koper, Istrabenz, the
Slovene company, and Bank of Koper) want to establish a consortium
in which each of the partners contributes certain funds to be
invested in various projects in and outside of the region. The
Slovene and Italian minority (on either side of the border)
should each put up 10% of the starting capital. The Slovene
minority in Italy has already provided funds in the amount of
EUR 1.5 million while the Italian minority in Slovenia has not
done so because it has no independent resources. As a result,
it may secede from the project, which is extremely important
for the creation of development opportunities for the Italian
community in Slovenia. On the other hand, it should be noted
that the Italian government strategy to economically penetrate
Yugoslavia (in the past) and Slovenia and Croatia (today) explicitly
shuns the Italian minority communities in those countries despite
the fact that four-fifths of all Croatian banks are owned by
Italians. In Slovenia, the Bank of Koper is now Italian-owned,
but the local Italian community is not even recruited as a linguistically
skilled labour force. The reason for this is presumably the
still acute historical memory and prejudice according to which
Italians in Slovenia and Croatia are considered “communists”
by the Italian state and “Lahi” (a pejorative name for Italians)
by the Slovene government and inlanders in general.23 This is
a pity since the programs represent an attractive way for the
younger generation to become more active in community activities.
In addition, they have the potential for creating interesting
employment opportunities and making the Italian minority community
more visible to and integrated with the broader majority population.
In this sense, Interreg programmes aim to achieve greater social
and economic cohesion in regions. They are not large investment
projects programmes, they are more or less “soft” projects,
and yet they could lead to more substantial investment projects
in the future (R1).24 The intermediate goal is to build and
increase the level of trust between partners in the programme.
Recognition, knowledge and trust are preliminary conditions
for further cooperation, collective planning, investment, and
the solving of common problems. The most positive and long-lasting
result of EU and CBC programmes is that cooperation between
regional communities will continue after the project has formally
ended.
The Political Participation and
Cultural Mobilisation of the Italian Community
The political and cultural organization of the Italian community
is comprised of self- governing communities of ethnic Italians,
the Italian Union, and various so-called communities of Italians.
All of these entities are engaged in political, cultural and,
lately also, economic activities, but there is an important
distinction. The self-governing communities are corporate entities
regulated as of 1994 by the law of self-governing communities
which is the fundamental law dealing with minority communities
and their rights and is binding on both the state and local
level. The Italian Union and its communities of Italians are
corporate entities regulated by their own private laws and by
the state laws governing associations.25 It is important to
recall that they all existed in the former Yugoslavia.
Self-governing communities originated in a provision of the
1974 constitution of the Slovene republic (Article 251). This
provision allowed the Italian minority community to found of
self-governing communities to work in the interests of Italian
education and culture. These were established in February and
March of 1975 and functioned as the immediate representatives
of the Italian minority in municipality assemblies, though only
in Slovenia, not in the rest of Yugoslavia.26 Delegates of the
Italian community were elected in accordance with territorial
principle. All self-governing communities in bilingual municipalities
were then integrated into the coastal self-governing community
for education and culture. After the dissolution of Yugoslavia,
the transition to a new political system brought only minor
reforms to matters concerning the Italian community. The most
substantial change was that representatives of Italian community
were and still are elected directly in local and federal elections.
On the initiative of the Italian (and Hungarian) minority communities,
the new Slovene constitution of 1991 retained the self-governing
communities as legitimate representative elected bodies of the
Italian (and Hungarian) minority community in the territories
where the minority community is settled. A special law on self-governing
communities of interests was passed at that time (Official Gazette
of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 65/94). According to the law
on organization and financing of educational activities (Article
41, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 12/96),
the self-governing communities should be cofounders of Italian
language public kindergartens and schools (or bilingual schools
in the case of the Hungarian minority) and they also have an
important role in mass media production. As noted previously,
the Italian (and Hungarian) community has its own radio and
television broadcasting (Šabec, 2005).27
Next to the self-governing communities, the Italian Union is
the second most important organization for the Italian minority
community. As noted at the beginning of this section, it has
the status of an association in Slovenia, whereas in Croatia,
it is registered as the main organization of the Italian community.28
Indeed, occasional disagreements arise because of differing
legal status of the Italian Union in Croatia and Slovenia (R26).
The Italian Union represents the Italian community in the territories
of both former Yugoslav republics – Slovenia and Croatia. As
such it is formally recognized by the Italian government. Its
seat is in Rijeka (Croatia) and Koper (Slovenia). The Italian
Union’s predecessor in the former Yugoslavia was called the
Italian Union of the Istrian District and Rijeka. It was established
on the initiative of the communist party and Italian anti-fascists
in 1944 to direct the Italian anti-fascist forces within the
Liberation Front. After the end of World War Two, the organization
was transformed and its main focus became the cultural mobilisation
of the Italian ethnic community (R4). Maintaining Italian identity
was the most important aim of the Italian cultural circles that
were founded in 1946 in the territories where Italians were
settled. These cultural circle operated under the auspices of
the Centre of Italian Popular Culture (Centro di cultura popolare
italiana) in Koper and were renamed Unione degli Italiani del
circondario dell'Istria in 1950. After the London Memorandum,
all Italian cultural circles were incorporated under the protection
of the Italian Union of the Istrian District and Rijeka. Renamed
Communities of Italians in 1971, these were not only cultural
but socio-cultural organizations and they still exist in this
form. When the self- governing communities were founded in 1974,
the Italian Union of the Istrian District and Rijeka didn't
have any political authority; its primary function was the coordination
of social and cultural activities. The Italian Union of the
Istrian District and Rijeka began as organization again in 1990.
One year later, it was renamed the Italian Union and its activities
were no longer limited to the cultural and social, but encompassed
the sphere of economics and politics as well (R26). The Italian
Union is organized as a delegation system of separate communities
of Italians, i.e. representatives or delegates of separate associations
of Italians allocate the interests of their associations on
the level of the Italian Union (Jeglic, 2000: 75-77).29
There have already been some problems for these associations
in the independent Slovenia. These occurred when Italians tried
to formally register the associations under the basic minority
right to organize and other applicable laws. From 1992 to 1998,
the government and local authorities hemmed and hawed, refusing
to register the associations. Ultimately, they were not registered
until 1998, despite the fact that they had existed since Yugoslav
times. At the beginning of independence, only the municipality
of Izola decided to change its statute and register the Italian
associations. This provoked a heated response along with the
absurd statement that the establishment of Italian associations
was unconstitutional. Every move that the Italian community
made to establish political representation on the local level
provoked (at least in certain circles) initiatives for the evaluation
of the constitutionality of such representation. The Constitutional
Court considered the registration of the Italian associations
for nearly five years before it finally made the decision that
the Italian communities could be registered as associations
(R17). After Slovene independence, the Italian community began
to reorganize and to become more diverse in terms of their representative
organization. Numerous new associations were established not
only among the minority, but also among the majority population.
Members of the Italian community began to establish new associations
on the basis of separate or special interests (sport, music,
culture, etc.). New associations were also created on the initiative
of the Italian Union as result of internal differences and disagreements.
These associations have played an important role in socializing
their members and mobilizing the culture community after the
creation of Slovenia. This is in contrast to the self-governing
associations that remained (at least until the beginning of
the 1990s) political entities and the main negotiating partner
with the government. Members of the community (or at least some
of them) are striving to become more engaged in the life of
the community and this can be perceived as increased cultural
mobilization (and political mobilization to the extent that
we understand civil engagement as political action as well).
The reactions of the majority representatives to this increased
organization tendencies on the part of the minority have been
varied. In some municipalities, the community’s activities were
perceived as a normal democratic process of organizing people
according to their private interests. In others, the enthusiasms
of the transitional period had yet subsided and the post- independence
outburst of Slovene nationalistic feelings still prevailed.
Despite their differing legal status, both the Italians associations
and the Italian Union on the one hand and the self-governing
communities on the other are important actors in the social,
cultural and political mobilisation of their members. The question
has been raised whether it is rational for such a small minority
community to have so many different associations and whether
efforts must be squandered because of lack of communication
and coordination between some of the groups and their leaders.
There are two associations of Italians in Izola alone, while
the situation in Piran and Koper may be closer to cooperative
dialogue and constructive cohabitation.30 There is also the
need for wider recognition and visibility of these associations
throughout the entire region and among the majority population
as well.
The goals of virtually all organizations in the Italian minority
community are more activities, more effective political participation,
and more socio-cultural mobilisation. They focus on economic
development to a somewhat lesser extent. Some tensions can be
discerned within the Italian community itself as the interests
and authorities of the organizations have started to grow more
complex and overlap. According to a number minority members
and majority representatives as well (R8, R9, R14, R16, R29),
the activities of the self-governing communities and the Italian
Union have started to look redundant, though both play an important
role in the preservation of Italian culture and the cultural
mobilisation of the Italian community. The Italian Union has
become a sort of representative body of the Italian ethnic community
in Slovenia, Croatia and particularly in Italy, representing
it in interactions with the Slovene, Croatian and Italian governments.
Indeed, the Slovene government has consented to the demands
of the Italian Union on several occasions. However, the Italian
Union’s interactions with Italy and with Slovenia are considered
not sufficiently transparent by some. The law permits members
of the Italian community to establish other organizations that
will express their political will, and maintain and preserve
their ethnic identity. However, these organizations cannot replace
self- governing communities in their primary function as sole
legal counterpart in negotiations between the ethnic community
and the government (Komac, 1999: 64).
In terms of cross-border cooperation opportunities, European
integration has undoubtedly opened a wider space of interaction
and communication in the border region. At the same time, the
countervailing force of globalisation poses new challenges to
minority communities. If the Italian ethnic community in Slovenia
has any ambition to become a relevant actor, not only in the
region but also in cross-border cooperation processes in the
broader European space, it is essential that internal conflicts
within the minority community be minimised as much as possible.
The various Italian organizations and associations should make
an effort to combine their critical potential. This is especially
important because the minority community is so small (in absolute
numbers). By augmenting its position in the region, the Italian
minority community might be able to circumvent two of its major
problems: the internal problem of aging community members and
deficit of younger members, and the external problem of the
new relations with the government that occurred with the independence
of Slovenia. Minority rights in democratic Slovenia have become
no different from individual rights and must be demanded by
each individual. This is a new state of affairs for members
of minority ethnic communities in Slovenia. In the former Yugoslav
state, the community was treated as collective body in the first
place, and as a group of individual citizens in the second.
Today minority status is no longer a collective matter; it is
the individual right of each citizen person to declare (or not)
himself or herself as a member of a minority group.31 This requires
a special effort and not all community members are willing to
invest that effort.
Social-Economic Integration and
Cultural Vitality of the Italian Community in New Conditions
As previously mentioned, the system of legal protection for
autochthonous minorities in Slovenia grants more rights than
proscribed by European standards. Yet the problems the minority
communities face do not result from the laws themselves, but
from their flawed implementation. According to some authors,
the main reason for the inconsistency is the lack of a culture
of law- enforcement in Slovenia (Klemencic and Zupancic, 2004).
This could have been influenced – though not excused – by Slovenia’s
Yugoslav heritage. An additional factor that contributes to
the new conditions for minority communities in independent democratic
Slovenia is the historical economic weakness of the Italian
community described in the previous section.
Political and economic factors undoubtedly affect the social
manifestations of community identity as well as its cultural
vitality and integration with the majority population in otherwise
bilingual regions. After the establishment of the independent
Slovene state, the Italian minority community found itself in
new political, economic and social conditions. The vitality
of an ethnolinguistic community could be defined as “that which
makes a group likely to behave as a distinctive and active collective
entity in intergroup situations” (Štrukelj, 1993: 230). Therefore,
a variety of different factors influence vitality. First, (1)
there is the interaction of the community's economic wealth,
social status, socio-historical prestige, and language status
all of which influence the vitality and identity of a particular
minority community.32 Demographic factors (2) are no less important.
These include population numbers and distribution, birth rate,
endogamy as well as immigration and emigration rates.33 The
third essential factor for community vitality is institutional
(governmental) support (3). This category includes the representation
of the language in various institutions in the region: education,
government services, media, culture, religion, industry.34 Complicating
matters, these factors are not independent, but highly interrelated.
The relative economic status of the in-group and out-group impinges
on their social and cultural status, social status may be also
draw on socio-historical status, and both may be dependent in
various ways on elements of institutional support. In short,
equivalent weight is given to each of the factors determining
community vitality (Giles et al., 1977).
In 1993, an exploratory study examining perceptions of vitality
and positive identity elements of the Italian community in Istria
(both Slovene and Croatian Istria) was published (Štrukelj,
1993). Research results revealed the low ethno-linguistic vitality
of the Italian community in Istria. The study concluded that,
considering their objective situation in terms of control over
economy and business, political power, the amount of Italian
spoken in government offices, businesses and majority schools,
social mobility in general, “Italians may find serious reasons
for undergoing a crisis of self-esteem” (Štrukelj, 1993: 232).
In the then period of political and socio-economic transition,
the community perceived itself as a subordinate group that was
restricted in its development. Consequently, their ability to
oppose assimilation decreased. Community connections with a
wealthy historical state and a rich cultural heritage contributed
to the Italians satisfactory identity. Yet all the same, once
the regional component (itself a result of a minority population
well integrated into majority that inhabits the same region)
was added to their ethnic identity, a large number of community's
members identified themselves as primarily Istrians (60.1% of
the respondents declared themselves as Italian Istrians) and
not only Italians.35 “Taking into consideration the socio-structural
variables influencing psycho-sociological attitudes, it is possible
to conclude that the strategies at present available to the
Italian minority to avoid being progressively assimilated are
restricted and will remain so until the group members are able
to reverse their status position in terms of socio-economic
power” (Štrukelj, 1993: 233).
Important elements in the socio-economic power of a minority
community are its socioeconomic integration into the majority
environment on the one hand, and the willingness of the latter
to accept the minority on the other. Tensions between majority
and minority community cannot be easily avoided, particularly
when national and ethnic affiliations are added to the brew.
In the former Yugoslavia, such tensions did exist but not in
such an acute form as today. This was in part because of general
ideological principles (“brotherhood and unity” etc.), and in
part because of the association of republics and their minorities,
in which minorities were viewed as constitutive elements of
the system and its mechanisms. Slovenia, in contrast, was founded
in 1991 not as a federation, but as a nation state with all
the elements of a modern democratic state. As a result, the
relationship between minorities and the state has changed. Today,
the Slovene state needs to arrange its relations with all of
its minorities. That |
