The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia:
from King Aleksandar to Marshall Tito, 1918-1980
by Matjaž Klemencic

Twice in the last century there existed a country called Yugoslavia. Within both, there lived united south Slavic ethno-nations (narodi) and ethnic minorities (narodnostne manjine) or nationalities (narodnosti). On both occasions, Yugoslavia’s leaders, during its seventy-three year existence, aimed at unification and agreement among its ethno-nations and ethnic minorities on the basis of equality and a common state. Initially, Yugoslavia was a parliamentary monarchy (‘a kind of anarchy’, due to the unsolved national question). Later, it became a personal dictatorship first of King Aleksandar 1, after 1934 of Prince Regent Pavle. Then in 1939, the leaders of the Serbs and Croats reached agreement to resolve the Croatian Question by establishing Croatian Banovina: they planned to establish a Banovina Slovenia and ‘Serbian Lands’ (Srpske zemlje) which would have meant the transformation of Yugoslavia into a confederation (Fig. 1). The outbreak of World War II, however, prevented the realisation of these ideas and saw the revival of ancient inter-ethnic hatreds, especially among Serbs and Croats. A Yugoslav republic based on the principles of equality among its ethnonations and minorities was (on paper) created during the War. It was, however, the communist dictatorship which made it possible for Yugoslavia’s ethno-nations and nationalities to co-exist for forty-five years in the so-called ‘Second’ Yugoslavia, a confederation or federation in one form or another.

Introduction: A Yugoslav Empire
Yugoslavia had been a dictatorship of King Aleksandar and his successors during the inter- War period, and it was a communist dictatorship during the reign of Josip Broz-Tito 2. Thus we can speak also of a Yugoslav Empire. The two leaders were reminiscent of emperors in their life styles. For example, they had castles all over Yugoslavia. In addition to palaces in all the republics of the former Yugoslavia, Tito also reserved to himself an island off the coast of Istria (Vanga in the Brioni Islands). There he received all important emperors, kings, presidents, and also film-stars and other important personalities for his own education and entertainment. Tito’s uniforms, worn as Marshall of Yugoslavia, were also imperial in appearance. While Aleksandar had no influence in international politics, Tito was the leader of the non-aligned world (founder, indeed, of the non-aligned movement) which in 1970s included more than one hundred states (mostly poor countries, besides the Muslim and Arab World): he was a communist leader who succeeded in deceiving both East and West as well as in charming African and Muslim leaders.

Table 1. Languages, alphabets and religions of the major ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia.


Of course, the bloody demise of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, when the process of democratization started in Eastern Europe, proved that Yugoslavia could never be a democracy. It could survive only as a dictatorship. American and European politicians were naive in insisting that Yugoslavia remain as a democratic and unified state. In June 1991 James Baker, U.S. Secretary of State, demanded this of the leaders of the Yugoslav republics. What followed is known to every one who watched CNN in the 1990s, viz. bloodshed and millions of refugees …

Yuguslavia as an Ethnically and Religiously Diverse Country
The kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was declared on 1 December 1918, and was erected out of the ruins of Austria-Hungary and the kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro. It was created from regions which, before World War I, had belonged to different countries which and underwent very different economic and cultural development. This resulted in very different political, cultural and economic legacies and different regional and religious characteristics.

Table 2. The Ethnic Structure of Yugoslavia in the years 1921, 1931, 1961 and 1981 (in thousands).

REMARKS: 1) Population by Mother Tongue; 2) Population by national identity; 3) Counted from idem “Serbo-Croatian Language”. On the basis of: Yugoslavia, Vol. 1: Physical Geography, London 1944, p. 155; 4) In the category “Serbs”; 5) Rudolf Bicanic’s estimate on the basis of counting from idem “Serbo-Croatian Language” ; 6) Together with Czechs; 7) Together with Ruthenians; 8) In the category “Czechs, Slovaks and Ukrainians,” 9) In the category “Others.”

SOURCES: Žuljic S, Narodnostna struktura Jugoslavije i tokovi promjena [The Ethnic Structure of Yugoslavia and Currents of Changes], Zagreb 1989, p. 23; Petricevic J., Nacionalnost stanovništva Jugoslavije [Ethnic Structure of Yugoslavia], Brugg 1983, p. 29; Popis stanovništva 1961. Knjiga VI: Vitalna, etnicka i migraciona obeležja – rezultati za opštine, Beograd 1967; Popis stanovništva, domacinstava i stanova u 1981. godini. Statisticki bilten 1295: Nacionalni sastav stanovništva po

Out of the twelve million inhabitants, eight million spoke Serbian and Croatian (which were considered the same literary language, Serbo-Croatian). However, Serbs and Montenegrins wrote in the Cyrillic alphabet, while Croats used the Latin alphabet. Slovenes spoke their own Slovene language and also used the Latin alphabet. The authorities denied the very existence of Macedonians as a specific nation, even though they had their own language which used Cyrillic alphabet 3.

In spite of these differences, there was a feeling of a community among Yugoslav citizens who accepted that they were ethnically related. The official ideology was based on the proclaimed principle that the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were tribes of the same unified Serb-Croat- Slovene nation. The authorities during the inter-War period did not take account – except as regards education – of the separate identities of these three ethno-nations. Politicians and administrators ignored completely the historical and ethnic diversities of the country when they divided it into administrative units. They also neglected cultural, linguistic as well as religious traditions of individual ethno-nations and minorities. The ignoring of the national identities of some individual ethno-nations such as Montenegrins and Macedonians should also be mentioned 4. Therefore no one in Yugoslavia – apart from the Serbs and the pro- Serbian part of Montenegrins who supported Karadjordjevic dynasty (in opposition to the ‘nationalist’ Montenegrins) – was satisfied with the concept of Yugoslavia as regards its implementation. In Karadjordjevic’s Yugoslavia, as well as in post-World War II Yugoslavia, unity was ordered from above. In communist Yugoslavia diversity was recognized at least on paper, and ‘brotherhood’ was added to the slogan of ‘unity’. ‘Brotherhood and unity’ and the equality of the Yugoslav ethno-nations was enshrined in all of the constitutions of communist Yugoslavia. Yet it was implemented in the framework of communist dictatorship. During the existence of Yugoslavia none of its ethno-nations had an absolute majority. In a complicated constitutional framework, some minorities were more numerous than some of the constitutive ethno-nations.

Censuses of Yugoslavia conducted in 1921 and 1931 suggested that there were those whose mother tongue was ‘Serbo-Croatian’, those with Slovene as their mother tongue, and minorities. The ‘political reality’ was that there were only ‘Yugoslavs’ and minorities living in Yugoslavia. The authorities tried to portray Yugoslavia as an ethnically homogenous country: they quoted the censuses and concluded that ‘83 % of the people … identified [themselves] as Yugoslavs’ 5, obscuring the fact that other peoples lived in Yugoslavia and that the Serbs did not have absolute majority. In the post-World War II censuses, the authorities aimed for more accurate results, but not always successfully even though the communist regime allowed peoples to express their ethnic identities freely. The introduction of new terminology (especially for Muslims and Gypsies/Romanies) and new categories caused major problems: for instance, the category of ‘Yugoslavs’ (Jugoslaveni), introduced in 1961, now defined a specific (national) ethnic identity, though previously a category for those unable to decide on this. The new census categories were resisted by the Croatian and Muslim populations and some minorities who were convinced that they were invented to reduce their status (by minimizing their numbers), so strengthening the Serbs’ position 6.

These changes in census methodologies effectively eroded the status of the minorities whose numbers – except for Albanians – continually declined. A particular problem was the Gypsies/Roma, who were sometimes identified as members of one of the Yugoslav ethno-nations, sometimes another 7. The absolute number of south Slavic ethno-nations constantly increased during the period 1921-1981 while concurrently the percentages of the whole population of Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes in Yugoslavia decreased – the reason being the increasing number of Albanians, Muslims and Macedonians. (Table 2 and Fig. 2) This shift in Yugoslavia’s ethnic structure reflected a differential in the natural increase of population of individual ethno-nations and ethnic minorities, plus various forced and voluntary migrations. After 1965 around million people emigrated: according to the authorities, they found temporary employment abroad (gastarbajteri) 8 .The first changes were already apparent soon after World War I when members of the German and Hungarian bureaucracy and numerous great estate owners emigrated. From Yugoslav Slovenia two thirds of German-speaking population emigrated, and their percentage of the overall population declined from c. 10% to c. 4% 9. From Vojvodina 50,000 Hungarians emigrated so that their percentage declined from c. 28% to c. 24% 10. After 1921, however, there were almost no significant changes in Inter-War Yugoslavia’s ethnic composition.

The consequences of the unsolved national question in Yugoslavia during the Inter-War period were seen during World War II. In Croatia, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina the Ustasha regime of the independent state of Croatia massacred a few hundred-thousand civilians of Serb nationality. An early example of the ethnic cleansing of the 1990s brought about great changes in the population’s ethnic structure. From 1945 almost all the Yugoslav Germans emigrated, fearing revenge by the communist regime, since almost all had identified with the Nazi-policy of denying the Yugoslav state. Thus the ethnic structure of some cities in Slovenia 11, the regions of Kocevje/Gotschee and Apaško polje/Abstall and parts of Croatia and Vojvodina changed significantly. According to German estimates, 690,000 Germans lived in Yugoslavia in 1940. By 1953, the German minority had declined to 35,000, and to 8,000 by 1981 12. German emigration was most marked in Vojvodina: by 1948 c. 250,000 people had settled in Vojvodina, mostly Serbs and members of other south Slavic ethno-nations 13. Significant changes occurred also in those regions which from 1947, by the Paris Peace Conference and the final settlement between Yugoslavia and Italy (1954), were annexed to Yugoslavia: c. 300,000 persons emigrated – c. 200,000 Italians and c. 100,000 Slovenes and Croats opposed to communism 14. Mass emigration of Turks from Macedonia, Kosovo and Sandžak also occurred: a special agreement between Yugoslavia and Turkey saw c. 250,000 Turks, Albanians and Muslims emigrate to Turkey as “Turks” 15. Numerous conflicts occurred between members of different ethnic groups, especially in Vojvodina, Kosovo and Macedonia. Also some political and even private conflicts were painted as ‘national’, i.e. conflicts among different ethnic groups. The communists instituted repression to control those conflicts, in the belief that the ‘Yugoslav Empire’ would last for ever.

The Materialization of the Yugoslav Idea: WWI (1914–1918) and the Establishment of the Kingdom of the Serbs Croats and Slovenes
The Austro-Hungarian attack on Serbia and Montenegro, whose national assemblies had jointly decided on war against Austria-Hungary, precipitated the first moves towards the unification into one state of the Yugoslav ethno-nations. The Serbian and Montenegrin army won the first battles of World War I but was soon defeated and fled, after great losses, to the Greek Island of Corfu 16.Yet after the Front of Salonika opened in summer 1918, and the Bulgarian army was defeated in September, the rebuilt Serbian/Montenegrin army contributed to ending the war. Serbian politicians following the Serbian and Montenegrin army were politically active on the island of Corfu (1915-18). In Austria-Hungary, the activities of political leaders of the south Slavic nations (Croats, Slovenes and Serbs) were curtailed by wartime restrictions. The only exception made was for deputies in the Reichsrat (the Austrian Parliament). They united in the Reichsrat’sYugoslav Club 17. Those pro- Yugoslav intellectuals who had escaped from Austria-Hungary before war began gathered in London as the ‘Yugoslav Committee’ 18.

After 1917 many political parties and groups, including those supporting Austria-Hungary on the outbreak of war, urged the unification of the south Slav ‘nations’ in one state, but considerable differences existed about procedures for unification and the organization of this state. At the start, the president of the Serbian government, Nikola Pašic, feared that in a future unified country the Serbian orthodox population would become a minority, and so sought unification only for such south Slavic lands as would not jeopardise a Serbian majority in the future state. His vision was of an enlarged Serbia. Later, he demanded the inclusion of the Croatian and Slovenian lands and Bosnia and Herzegovina in this enlarged Serbia but not Macedonia (which the Allies promised to Bulgaria, if it joined the Allied side). Later, however, the Allies rewarded Serbian success and suffering by granting Vardar Macedonia to Serbia. Pašic wanted the future state to be a centralized monarchy with the Serbian bourgeoisie in a leading position 19.

By contrast, Slovene, Croatian, and Serbian politicians from Austria-Hungary who gathered in the Yugoslav Committee in London wanted to join with Serbia and Montenegro to form Yugoslavia. They were afraid of pressure for Germanization from the north and pressure from Italy in the west. To reconcile these differences, representatives of the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee on Corfu Island signed a compromise Agreement, the Declaration of Corfu (Krfska deklaracija), in June 1917 for an independent Yugoslav state 20. This agreed that the new state ‘will be a democratic and parliamentary monarchy under the rule of the Karadjordjevic dynasty’, with equality for Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, (the three constituent ‘tribes’ that formed ‘our nation of three names’), and for the three flags, coats of arms and names, the Cyrillic and Latin alphabet, and the Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Muslim religions in their relations with the state. It proclaimed that ‘our nation’ should be liberated and united, on the ‘principle of national self-determination’, with no part of the territory ‘separated from and united with any other state without consent of the nation itself’. Yet, these principles were perhaps unrealistic when considered in the light of later battles for the new country’s frontiers and also the secret London Agreement 21.

While the Serbian government and Yugoslav Committee demanded the establishment of an independent Yugoslav state, 33 Slovenian and Croatian deputies in the Reichsrat joined together in the Yugoslav Club and issued the May Declaration (30 May 1917). This insisted that ‘all territories of the Monarchy in which Slovenes, Croats and Serbs live unite under the sceptre of the Habsburg-Lorraine dynasty into an independent state body … established on democratic foundations.’ Adopted under the strong influence of the Slovene People’s Party, this document called for the unification of only those south Slavic nations living under the monarchy, but not for unification with the Serbs and Montenegrins 22.

In 1918, political leaders of the Yugoslav nations from Austria-Hungary started to organize national councils to promote an independent Yugoslavia encompassing all regions in Austria-Hungary in which Slovenes, Serbs and Croats lived. During his last days, Emperor Karl conceded demands for reorganizing the Habsburg Empire with the introduction of ‘trialism’. This principle of ‘trialism’ was based on the empire’s threefold division into ethnically- and culturally-based entities with the third entity (in addition to Austria and Hungary) being one which united all south Slavs of the Habsburg Empire. Anton Korošec, Slovene deputy in the Reichsrat and chairman of Yugoslav Club there, responded Zu spät Majestät [too late, your Majesty] 23. In October 1918 the representatives of all three Yugoslav ‘nations’ in Austria-Hungary established in Zagreb a joint political representation, the National Council of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs [Narodni svet Slovencev, Hrvatov in Srbov]. This Council proclaimed the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, consisting of the ethnic territories of the south Slavic nations of Austria-Hungary 24.

The new state soon faced many political and military problems. It was not internationally recognized: Serbia initiated diplomacy to maintain its position as the only state in the process of the formation of Yugoslavia. The Serbian government seemingly agreed to negotiations with a delegation of the National Council. Following the basic principles of the Yugoslav Committee, President Ante Trumbic demanded the creation of a common state of equal nations, pressing Nikola Pašic, Serbia’s foreign representative, to accept the concept of confederation, comparable to the Dual Monarchy, as the framework for the new government. The Serbian opposition to Pašic and the Slovenian People’s Party leader, Monsignor Korošec, joined forces with Trumbic to secure the so-called Declaration of Geneva [Ženevska deklaracija] which the Belgrade government repudiated two days 25. In the end, the articles of this Declaration, assuring equality of the Yugoslav ethno-nations within the new state, were never realized. The naiveté of the National Council contributed to this outcome: it sent a delegation to Belgrade to negotiate, despite the opposition of leaders such as Stjepan Radic 26. Yet the National Council was under pressure, since the Italians were advancing into Slovene Coastland [Primorska] and Dalmatia and the revolution had started to spread from Hungary 27.

Meanwhile Serbia had already unified with Montenegro. The Montenegrin parliament deposed Petrovic’s Montenegrin dynasty and declared the unification of Montenegro with Serbia and other south Slavs on 26 November 1918. The unification of Serbia with the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs was proclaimed by Regent Aleksandar Karadjordjevic on 1 December 1918, so completing the establishment of the Yugoslav state after World War I (Fig. 3) 28.

History of the "Yugoslav Empire” 1918–1941
After the creation of a new state and especially after World War II, Yugoslav historians debated heatedly whether there were histories of individual nations in this country. Serbian historians in particular tried to convince the general public in Yugoslavia that the history of individual peoples ceased with the country’s unification. On the other hand, historians from Slovenia and Croatia insisted that (separate) histories of individual nations, such as Croats, Macedonians, Serbs, Slovenes, should continue after Yugoslavia’s creation. In practice, throughout its existence, the history of the Yugoslav state was essentially the history of relations between the various Yugoslav nations, relations between the two largest nations – Serbs and Croats – being the key factor 29.

On 28 November 1920, the elections for the Constitutional Assembly were held. The strongest parties were the National Radical Party (Radicals: Narodna radikalna stranka, NRS) with 91 seats, the Yugoslav Democratic Party (Democrats: Jugoslovenska demokratska stranka, JDS) with 92 seats, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) with 58 seats, and the Croatian Republican Peasant Party (Hrvatska republikanska seljacka stranka, HRSS) with 50 seats in the Assembly.30 The distribution of votes was very significant, since the votes were distributed along the ethnic lines. The NRS gained seats only in Serbia, but had virtually no support in Croatia or Slovenia. The JDS won seats in Serbia and Bosnia- Herzegovina, some in Croatia, but also in Kosovo and Sandžak where, out of fear of Nikola Pašic’s. Great Serbian policy, the Muslim population voted for them. The Communists gained most of their votes in Macedonia and Montenegro, not in the industrially more developed northern part of the country. All other parties won seats only in one region of the country (e.g., the Slovene People’s Party (Slovenska ljudska stranka, SLS) in Slovenia, the HRSS in Croatia, and the Yugoslav Muslim Organization (Jugoslavenska muslimanska organizacija, JMO) in Bosnia and Herzegovina) 31.

The Constituent Assembly met on 12 December 1920. The leader of NRS, Nikola Pašic established a government of the NRS and JDS with the support of some smaller parties. On 5 January 1921, the government submitted to the Assembly its plan for the Constitution (Nacrt ustava), a centralized unitary parliamentary monarchy with a weak parliament and a strong monarch. This constitution, passed on the anniversary of the battle of Kosovo, was known as the Vidovdan (St. Vitus Day’s) Constitution. It defined the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as a hereditary, parliamentary monarchy. The highly centralized unitary political system was dominated by a monarch with sweeping prerogatives 32.

From the perspective of ethnic relations, unitarism was its overriding characteristic and was reflected in the constitutional concept of ‘one nation of three names’, historically divided into three ‘tribes’ – Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. This concept, based on Serbian expansionist tendencies, denied the very existence of Macedonians, Montenegrins and Bosnian Muslims as distinct ethnic groups in this ‘three-name nation’. The constitution recognized only one official ‘Serbo-Croatian-Slovene language’ that had never existed in practice. The ‘Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian’ nationality of the individual was required for the exercise of certain political rights, such as for election to public office, or for employment as higher public servant. As for other citizens, they had to meet certain additional demands, such as the ten-year permanent residence requirement following the acquisition of citizenship, before they could exercise these rights. The Constitution did not establish any special protection or linguistic rights for the numerous ethnic minorities. Nevertheless it provided that minorities of other ‘race and religion’ had the right to elementary schooling in their mother tongue under conditions determined by law.

Territorial organization and division were also determined by centralist and unitarist principles. There was no ethnic or regional autonomy, the intention being to divide all distinct ethnic communities into several administrative units so as to decrease their internal ethnic coherence. The largest administrative units were districts, with up to 800,000 inhabitants. Other, smaller, administrative units were departments, counties, and communes 33. This Constitution remained into effect until January 1929.

During this first period different attempts were made by elected representatives to reach a peaceful solution to the Yugoslav national question. All in vain. Quarrels in the parliament reached their peak on 25 June 1928, when Puniša Racic, member of the NRS, killed two Croatian deputies with a pistol. Stjepan Radic and two other deputies were seriously hurt in this fight. The government resigned soon after these events 34.

King Alexander offered the post of prime minister to numerous politicians. Initially no one wanted it. In late July 1928, the president of the SLS, Rev. Dr. Anton Korošec, took the job. For the first time, the government of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was not led by a Serb. Several politicians claimed that Korošec, a Catholic priest, was a Vatican agent so deepening the political crisis and forcing Korošec’s government – unable to stop violent unrest in Croatia following the death of Stjepan Radic in August 1928 – to resign at the end of December 1928 35. After the government’s resignation, King Aleksandar concluded that the only way to retain the state was a personal dictatorship of the king. The history of the Yugoslav Empire began.

On 6 January 1929, King Aleksandar annulled the Vidovdan constitution, dissolved the parliament, consolidated royal rule and took the government into his own hands. This marked the beginning of the ‘January Sixth Dictatorship’ and ended a period of constant political instability (1921–1929) 36. A package of (special) laws and royal decrees further limited the right to association and other political rights, including the freedom of speech. The king forbade activities by all religious and tribal political parties, other ethnic and religious organizations, as well as trade unions. All criticisms of the existing system or initiatives to change were proscribed and liable to prosecution. Centralization and unitarism were further strengthened.

In October 1929 the Law on the Name and Division of the Monarchy into Administrative Regions was passed, introducing the monarchy’s new official name, ‘The Kingdom of Yugoslavia’, thereby confirming the concept of the unitary one-nation-state of the one ‘Yugoslav nation’ (jugoslovenska nacija). ‘Tribal names’, ethnic life, religion and political parties were forbidden. The law also created a new territorial organization and division so as to strengthen central authority and promote a uniform nation. The new, largest administrativeterritorial units, replacing districts, became provinces, called ‘banovinas’ (banovina, pl. banovine). Eight banovinas were named after the main rivers (Drava, Sava, Zeta, Vrbas, Drina, Danube, Morava and Vardar) and one was called Littoral Banovina. Banovinas were established to reduce the previous administrative atomization and increase central authority. Their borders were conceived in such a way as to break up historically-formed lands and ethnic communities and to divide them between two or more different banovinas. Wherever possible, banovinas were so designed to strengthen the proportion of the Serbian population in their overall population. In this way the king hoped to weaken and suppress national (ethnic) feelings and popular unrest against central government in particular regions.

The government, denying the very existence of ethnic diversity, kept trying to establish a unified ‘Yugoslav nation’, so provoking further unrest. To resolve this, the king issued a new constitution on 3 September 1931, the Constitution of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, also called the Granted Constitution. This constitution consolidated ‘national unitarism’ together with the ‘Yugoslav (national) ideology’ based upon it. The constitution further increased the power of the monarch, and reduced that of the parliament, the National Assembly. It forbade every kind of political association on a ‘religious, tribal (ethnic) or regional’ basis, thereby substantially restricting such political rights as freedom of association, assembly, and speech. The only trace of linguistic or ethnic pluralism in the Constitution was the definition of the official ‘Serbian-Croat-Slovene’ language, based on the recognition of the actual existence of, at least, three different languages 37.

Unrest and dissatisfaction among the ethno-nations of Yugoslavia prompted the proscribed political parties to issue programmes in 1933 on the reconstruction of Yugoslavia – punktacije. The Zagrebacke punktacije called for the restoration of the status quo before 1 December 1918 and the abolition of Serbian hegemony so as to enable the ethnonations to decide freely on their destiny 38. The SLS, JMO and Ljuba Davidovic (leader of Democratic Party) issued similar programmes, so highlighting the differences again between Serbia and the other Yugoslav lands. The authorities arrested several important politicians (especially) in Croatia and Slovenia – among them Vlatko Macek and Anton Korošec. They also continued their repression against the banned Communists who continued secretly to organize. The king’s authoritarian policy and police surveillance on the regime’s opponents fuelled discontent and even armed activities. This gave an opportunity to Croat and Macedonian nationalists to develop their respective organizations: the Croat Ustashi (ustaši) and the Inner Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO) both conspired against the regime, culminating in the assassination of King Alexander during his unofficial visit to Marseilles, France in 1934. A member of VMRO, Vlada Georgijev, killed the king on the orders of the Croat Ustashi leader, Ante Pavelic 39.

Alexander’s eldest son, Peter, was then only eleven, so royal powers were assumed by a regency of three men under the leadership of Prince Pavle Karadjordjevic, Alexander’s first cousin, as provided in the king’s will. A succession of short-lived governments followed during his regency before Milan Stojadinovic was named prime minister by Prince Pavle. Stojadinovic articulated his government’s aims in a speech to his party congress in summer 1936:
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, in an atmosphere of confidence, should build the internal organization of their own house in unity … I believe that we will create in our country an atmosphere of mutual confidence in which it will be easier to solve the Croatian question which today looks so difficult … In our programme the principle of wide self-government is emphasized. That is our political ideal. We shall work for its realization. For eighteen years now a huge misunderstanding has characterized our political life 40.

Stojadinovic tried to establish a government of national unity, including the Croats. Vlatko Macek, the leader of Croat Peasant Party, demanded the establishment of an autonomous Croat entity and the country’s division into six or seven autonomous (ethnic) units. This was not acceptable to Stojadinovic.41 Thus, the central issue concerning ethnic relations in the country, the ‘Croatian question’, remained unresolved, while Serbian nationalists and other politicians accused Stojadinovic of being too indulgent of the Croats. Stojadinovic’s government maintained friendly relations with Fascist-Italy and Nazi-Germany 42. He failed to solve Croatian Question, and in 1939 a new government was formed. The new prime minister was Dragiša Cvetkovic, minister of social policy in the Stojadinovic’s government.

The existing ethnic tensions in the country, tense international relations, the rise of Fascism and Nazism in Europe, and pressure from the British government forced Cvetkovic and his government to address the ‘Croatian question’ immediately. Their search for compromise with the Croat politicians resulted in the Cvetkovic-Macek Agreement (Sporazum Cvetkovic-Macek) signed by Prime Minister Cvetkovic and Vlatko Macek, leader of HSS and the Peasant Democratic Opposition, on 23 August 1939. This compromise became possible because the Croatian and Serbian elite(s) had come to recognize that ethnic differences would not disappear, and that existing national identities could not be merged into a new Yugoslav national identity. The agreement anticipated the formation of the ethnically defined Banovina of Croatia with wide, state-like autonomy and emphasized the equality of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in a common state as the basis for resolving the national question in Yugoslavia. Following this, the Croatian Banovina was formed by a special decree, issued by the vice-regency under the constitutional provisions of the state of emergency. This Banovina included all the counties with a Croat majority population. The parliament (Sabor), of the Croatian Banovina was restored and given substantial powers and autonomy. The king now appointed the governor (ban) on the recommendation of the Sabor 43. In a way, the Croatian Banovina’s creation marked a turning point in Yugoslavia whose political development had previously been characterized by centralism and unitarism. It may be interpreted as the beginning of the process of democratization, decentralization and federalization. Similar claims for autonomy, decentralization and federalization could now be anticipated from all the other nations in Yugoslavia, so providing an opportunity for democratization and for the official recognition and democratic regulation of the existing ethnic pluralism in Yugoslavia. Yet, this agreement may also be seen as just a political bargain between the two largest national elites so as to assure their future domination 44.

On 1 September 1939, Germany attacked Poland and the Second World War began in Europe. The Yugoslav government proclaimed its neutrality. Despite that, Adolph Hitler asked Yugoslavia to join the Tripartite Pact (Germany-Italy-Japan) at the beginning of 1941. At first, the government resisted: Great Britain asked Yugoslavia not to break its traditional friendship with the Western democracies. Additionally, influenced by the Communists, there were demands for increased cooperation with the Soviet Union. Yet, when Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania signed the Pact, the Yugoslav government yielded, signing in Vienna on 25 March 1941. This provoked mass demonstrations and a coup d’état by the army under the leadership of General Mirkovic, helped by the British Special Operations Executive (SOE). Although the new prime minister, General Dušan Simovic, did not cancel the Tripartite Pact, Germany, Italy and their allies attacked Yugoslavia on 6 April 1941 45.

Yugoslav Ethno-Nations During WWII (1941–1945)
The attack spelled the end of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav army capitulated after eleven days. King Petar and most of the government fled to British-controlled Cairo 46.

Yugoslavia was occupied by Germany, Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania and divided in accordance with their wishes 47 (Fig. 4). The Independent State of Croatia (NDH – Nezavisna država Hrvatska) was established in Croatia (without Dalmatia between Zadar and Split and Medjimurje and Baranja), Bosnia and Herzegovina and Srem. This was a puppet state, ruled by the Ustasha government of Ante Pavelic, independent only in name. Its government aimed at an ethnically-cleansed Croatia with the help of German and Italian occupation forces. Serbs, Jews, Gypsies (Roma), Muslims and Croatian political rivals were persecuted and murdered. Mass murders, especially of the Serb population, took place in eastern Herzegovina, Lika, Kordun, Banija and some regions of Bosnia 48. Concentration camps were established. While Jews and Gypsies could not defend themselves, two million Serbs in the NDH started to organize their own defence.

Political terror and ethnic cleansing by occupation forces assisted by some local ethnic political leaders forced many to flee their homes. Scattered uprisings began. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) also began organized armed resistance, its leader Josip Broz-Tito fomenting socialist revolution 49. CPY preparations began immediately after the Axis attack: it established the military command of its partisan National Liberation Movement (NLM) under Tito’s leadership 50, and in July ordered the start of resistance. By August, the partisans had liberated the first territories in western Serbia, Kordun, Lika and Banija (in Croatia), Montenegro and western Bosnia. Following partisan occupation of these territories, the old Yugoslav administrative authorities, which the Axis forces had left untouched, were abolished and the NLM began to create new local authorities, the National Liberation Committees, the nucleus of a new revolutionary administration 51.

The ‘bourgeois’ parties and the Yugoslav Government in Exile were surprised by this CPY uprising with international Communist support. Fearing the NLM’s initial successes, the Government in Exile supported the Chetniks’ resistance movement (officially, the ‘King’s Army in the Homeland’). Based on the Greater Serbia programme, the Chetniks presented themselves as a Serbian saviour ready to attack the occupiers at the ‘right moment’. The first groups of Chetniks started to gather in southern Serbia, Kosovo and northern Montenegro in April 1941. They fought first against the Albanians of Kosovo. Although some Chetniks had wanted to attack the occupying forces – in accordance with anti- Turkish traditions of resistance – by August 1941 they had sided with the Germans out of fear of the NLM. A second group of Chetniks gathered in May 1941 under the leadership of Colonel Dragoljub-Draža Mihailovic in western Serbia. Their intention was to preserve at least a spark of Serbian independence. Out of this nucleus an uncontrolled army developed, loyal to the monarchy and the myths of Serbian history, which left deep but ambiguous traces in occupied Yugoslavia 52. Its members believed they were called by God to avenge the crimes of the Ustasha army against the Serbs. They also implemented a programme of ethnic cleansing in Serbian-controlled regions, and attacked the Croatian and Muslim populations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sandžak, Dalmatinska Zagora and elsewhere. In the name of Greater Serbia, they killed thousands of Muslims and Croats and terrorized the Serbian and Montenegrin people supporting the partisans 53. The Chetniks enjoyed the support of the Yugoslav Government in Exile. Draža Mihailovic became its minister of war in January 1942. The Western Allies recognized the Chetniks initially as the legal army of the Yugoslav government, but once Chetnik collaboration with the occupiers became apparent from 1943, war interests prompted a change in British government policy. In 1944 the Allies shifted their support from the Government in Exile and the Chetniks in favour of the NLM. This provided the basis for their recognition of the new political realities in Yugoslavia after World War II 54.

Although a few Chetnik units had initially engaged the Germans in some small skirmishes before the collaborationist phase, the partisan NLM was the only group that led the fight for Yugoslav liberation throughout the War, resisting the occupiers and their domestic collaborators, such as Ustasha and Chetniks. The NLM was part of the global anti-Fascist coalition. Its slogan called for ‘fraternity and unity’ among the Yugoslav peoples. In ethnically-mixed territories it resisted the genocide by the occupying authorities and their domestic collaborators. Its vision was of a Yugoslav federation of equal nations. However, the Communist-led partisan NLM also pursued socialist revolution as its goal. In addition to social justice and equality, its declared revolutionary goals included just and harmonious relations and equality between ethnic groups, decentralization and the social and political reforms unimplemented by the Yugoslav monarchy of the Karadjordjevic dynasty 55. In September 1941, Tito, as supreme commander of partisan units, moved from Belgrade to liberated territory in western Serbia. He met twice with Draža Mihailovic to urge Chetnik cooperation with the NLM, but the Chetniks saw the revolutionary Communists as the main threat to their plans for a Greater Serbia and restoration of the old Yugoslav monarchy. Instead, by autumn 1941 the Chetniks had entered into secret negotiations with the occupying authorities, and this collaboration became open by spring 1942, especially in territories under Italian occupation 56. Accordingly, the NLM started to fight the Chetniks as well, and in effect this determined the fate of the monarchy. Of the many battles, the most important one was that of Neretva River in March and April 1943: the Chetniks, with Italian support, tried to destroy partisan units encircled by the Germans and Ustasha, but the partisans broke through the Chetnik front. The Chetniks never recovered from this defeat 57. Partisan military successes established individual liberated territories, which survived for varying periods. Some, such as Lika, Bosanska Krajina and Kordun, existed throughout the War. National Liberation Committees were established to govern liberated villages, communities and regions but also operated in halfliberated and occupied territories.

On Tito’s initiative, the AVNOJ (Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia) was formed as the supreme political authority of the NLM in November 1942, constituting itself as the supreme political representative of the Yugoslav nations. It proclaimed the equality of all Yugoslav nations and the creation of the Yugoslav federation. The AVNOJ, during its second meeting in Jayce in November 1943, established a provisional government, the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia, and elected Tito, declared Marshall of Yugoslavia, as president. The return of King Peter and the Government in Exile was prohibited pending popular decision after the War 58. The AVNOJ also established the basis for a new post-War social-political order. When the Western Allies recognized the de facto political situation in Yugoslavia in 1944, they insisted on a compromise between the AVNOJ and those political parties which had not collaborated during the War. This was the essence of the agreement between Tito and šubašic, on behalf of the Government in Exile, signed on the island of Vis in June 1944 59. By the end of the War in Europe, the partisans had liberated the whole territory of the former Kingdom of Yugoslavia and large parts of historic Croatian and Slovenian ethnic territories ceded to Italy after World War I. These territories included Istria, Slovene Coastland, the city of Trieste, Zadar and islands of Cres, Lošinj and Lastovo, which the AVNOJ had formally annexed to Yugoslavia in September 1943. These circumstances formed the prelude to negotiations about Yugoslavia’s post-War borders which remained unchanged until the 1990s.

The Birth, Life and Death of the Yugoslav Federation: 1945–1991
Four years of occupation and civil wars had hit Yugoslavia very hard. Material damage was assessed at US$47 billion; casualties were approximately 1.05 to 1.7 million 60. Reconstruction of the country was entirely in CPY hands. In spite of the already widespread support for the CPY among the people of Yugoslavia, its leaders aimed at complete control. Soon after the War, they killed a majority of the Ustasha, Slovene Home Defenders and Serbian Chetniks returned by the Allies from Italy and Austria. Mass terror continued as they tried to destroy dispersed Chetniks, Ustasha and Home Defender units and combat speculators, war profiteers and other real and supposed opponents of the regime. The authorities put many into criminal camps, confiscating their property as also that of mines, banks, insurance companies, railroads and factories which were ‘patriotically nationalized’ 61.

Initially, the authorities showed more leniency towards the peasants, recognizing the importance of agrarian production to feed the country. The first measure of the Temporary People’s Assembly was the Law on Agrarian Reform, adopted on 23 August 1945. Under the slogan ‘land belongs to the person who works on it’, the authorities seized without compensation the land of great estate owners, the Catholic and Orthodox churches, monasteries and other religious institutions 62. Together with the land of Wartime collaborators among the ethnic Germans, around 1.5 million hectares were nationalized. By a 1946 law, half of the nationalized land was united in cooperatives which supposedly formed the basis for future socialist farming 63. The communists also aimed at complete control over intellectual life and organized their propaganda accordingly 64. These activities had their positive side: for example, the communist goal of popular literacy raised literacy levels from 50.5% in 1921 to 81.0% in 1961.

The third AVNOJ convention, called in August 1945, renamed itself the Contemporary People’s Assembly. It quickly accepted ten basic laws that completely changed Yugoslav society and, even before the new constitution was adopted, legalized CPY supremacy 65. One law dealing with ‘activities against the people and state’ decreed harsh punishment for any nationalist propaganda and/or agitation. Though justified as a means of damping down nationalist passions, particularly in nationally-mixed territories, it was, in reality, reminiscent of the 1929 decree of King Alexander aimed at creating an ‘integral’ Yugoslavia. The idea of ‘brotherhood and unity’ was again top down, and also concealed a characteristically suspicious attitude to all ideas not deemed ‘Yugoslav’, with the more or less open neglect of Albanians, Hungarians and other national minorities. It also inhibited discussion of inter-ethnic relations and tensions, so precluding solutions to the problems 66.

In spite of CPY’s leading role, the Tito-šubašic Agreement required free elections. Without elections, the Western powers would not recognize the CPY as the only representatives of the peoples of Yugoslavia. Accordingly, the CPY and its allies united into the People’s Front of Yugoslavia (PFY) and chose Tito as their leader. Since the Communists controlled the police, judiciary and media, the opposition refused to participate in the elections in November 1945. PFY candidates got almost 90.5% of the vote, so confirming the legitimacy of the ‘new Yugoslavia’ 67. The convincing PFY victory enabled the Communists, who controlled the Constituent Assembly, to introduce a Soviet-style Constitution and so enacted a socialist political and economic order. The Constituent Assembly met on 29 November. It first deprived the Karadjordjevic dynasty of all rights and then proclaimed Yugoslavia a Federated People’s Republic (Federativna narodna republika Jugoslavija; FNRJ) consisting of the People’s Republics of Serbia (with the autonomous province of Vojvodina and the autonomous authority (oblast) of Kosmet), Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia. In January 1946, the Constituent Assembly passed the Constitution of the FNRJ, so enabling the CPY to implement those principles which it had proclaimed even before World War II 68.

After the Communists gained complete political control, they started to reshape economic and social development along Soviet lines. Because the basis for a planned economy was social ownership of the majority of the means of production, transportation and communication, the 1946 Constitution proclaimed as the people’s property ‘mines and other wealth of the land, water resources, natural power, railways, air transport, mail, telegraph, telephone and radio’. Laws passed from 1946 to 1948 then nationalized all other important economic activities — except farming — so that by 1948 over 90% of private property had become state property. Changes to the economic system achieved their final form in a fiveyear economic plan (petletka). In accordance with the Plan, Yugoslavia’s more developed republics were to progress more slowly and wait for the less developed republics to catch up. Industrialization and electricity development became a real dogma, transforming the state into one huge building site and causing, inter alia, the migration of 1.2 million people from the countryside into industrial centres 69.

Understandably, this period was still one of turmoil and conflict with the regime’s opponents or enemies. In March 1946 the authorities caught Chetnik leader Draža Mihailovic, who was sentenced to death on 16 July 1946. A few weeks later in Ljubljana, a process was started against General Leon Rupnik, leader of the Slovene Home Defenders 70 and, in absentia, also against the bishop of Ljubljana, Dr. Gregorij Rožman, and the leader of the Slovene People’s Party, Dr. Miha Krek. The proceedings against Rožman and Krek aimed at the Catholic Church, condemned for collaboration with occupation forces during the War. Individual priests, the Catholic Church and the Vatican were all targets. One victim was the archbishop of Zagreb, Alojzij Stepinac: the authorities accused him of collaboration with the Ustashe, arrested him in September 1946, and sentenced him to sixteen years in prison 71. Concurrently, prosecutions continued against the Ustashe, Chetniks, Macedonian nationalists, profiteers and bribed functionaries. We should also mention proceedings against spies in this period of so-called ‘mature Stalinism’: those accused were mostly personalities from intellectual and ‘bourgeois’ circles who in the past had cooperated in the resistance movement but now represented for the new rulers the possibility of ‘bourgeois’ opposition 72.

As regards foreign policy, post-War Yugoslavia became an ally of the Soviet Union. The Yugoslav Army was Europe’s fourth strongest military power in the anti-Hitler coalition, but Yugoslav Communists felt threatened, and the CPY leadership led Yugoslavia into an aggressive foreign policy 73. Tito’s policy inside the Soviet bloc aimed to make Belgrade the centre of the people’s democracies and the ideological competitor of Moscow. Tito did not hide the fact that his vision of socialism was different from Stalin’s. Instead of the monolithic structure of an International Workers Movement under Stalin’s control, Tito’s idea was an open and dynamic socialist society 74. For the United States, however, Yugoslavia remained one of the Kremlin’s ‘satellite police states’, assisting the Soviets in their ‘drive toward world conquest’. The U.S. Administration viewed Tito accordingly, President Truman informed a group of businessmen in April 1948 that Tito had allegedly ‘murdered more than 400,000 of the opposition in Yugoslavia before he got himself firmly established there as a dictator’ 75. Within this context, no one appreciated the signs of trouble surfacing there in early 1948. In January, Stalin suddenly summoned the leadership of both Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to the Kremlin. When he met them, Stalin criticized the independent behaviour of both countries and called for the formation of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation. He had previously promised that Yugoslavia could absorb Albania, but he now declared that that could only occur after the federation’s creation. In addition, Stalin later insisted that the Yugoslavs sign an agreement with the USSR calling for consultation on foreign policy issues. Kardelj, whose ‘blood boiled’ at this insult, signed only at Molotov’s insistence 76.

By March, the Yugoslavs had decided to resist Stalin’s demands. Within a few weeks, the Soviets notified Tito that they intended to withdraw all military and civilian advisers and technicians. The two countries’ Communist Party Central Committees then exchanged letters: the Soviets charged the Yugoslavs with various ideological errors and anti-Soviet actions; the Yugoslavs proclaimed their innocence. This exchange underlined the CPY’s unwillingness to subordinate its activities to Stalin’s vision of socialism and culminated in Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Inform-Bureau, a consulting body, in June, and Stalin’s call on the Yugoslav people to overthrow Tito 77. The Cominform also gradually imposed a blockade on trade with Yugoslavia to deprive it of goods vital to reconstruction and economic development. A proclamation about Yugoslavia’s expulsion was adopted by the Inform- Bureau members at its meeting in Bucharest, and was published in the Prague newspaper Rude Pravo on St. Vitus Day, 28 June. Its aggressive tone surprised the international community. Tito’s ‘claim to independent leadership’ raised ‘a basic issue’ for the Kremlin: he was ‘master in his own Communist house and Stalin cannot oust him quickly without war’ 78. In this ideological battle most Yugoslavs accepted and supported the policy of their leaders.

During the 1949–1952 period, Yugoslav politicians started to reform all spheres of the society. In May 1949 Edvard Kardelj introduced to the Yugoslav parliament the Law on People’s Committees, which again gave autonomy to the local authorities at the expense of the federal authorities. Instead of the Soviet model of state socialism, they introduced a new self-management socialist system. They also introduced a model of ‘social property’ instead of state property, handing administration of industrial enterprises over to workers’ committees (elected after 1950). They also mitigated political pressure towards non-communists, abandoned forced collectivization of farming and allowed private enterprise in regard to farm products. CPY fears of capitalist-style domination by large enterprises in the countryside prompted a second agrarian reform in May 1953 which limited the size of farms to 10 hectares of arable land. In the name of socialist democracy, party leaders decentralized even the CPY and renamed it the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY). Officially, the party abandoned direct administration of the state; the party was only to give directions. The life of the state was to be in the hands of communes. The republics and the state should only be coordinators 79.

These changes did not differ very much from the Soviet socialist system. The LCY still had all power in its hands. Tito remained the untouchable Yugoslav leader with the rights and divinity of an Emperor. Other important political leaders were Edvard Kardelj, Milovan Djilas and Aleksandar Rankovic 80. Yugoslavia built economic and political relations with the West and was able to survive the political isolation that followed the split with Stalin in 1948. Its foreign policy from the 1950s onwards was that of equidistance from both West and East. Its allies came primarily from less-developed states of the so-called Third World. Yugoslavia intensified contacts with these countries during the mid-1950s when state visits started in Asia. It became the cornerstone of the movement of nonaligned countries, and played a leading role in this movement 81 until the state’s dissolution in the 1990s. After Stalin’s death in 1953, relations with the Soviet Union and other East European countries (also hitherto strained) were normalized. Inside the LCY, Bolshevist ideology was again revived. The policy’s first victim was Milovan Djilas, who criticized LCY privileges and politicians and demanded freedom of speech. Defeat of Djilas’s ideas spelled defeat for this first attempt at reform of the socialist system in Yugoslavia 82. Despite the increased role for state and party, the leading Yugoslav politicians were not united in their vision for Yugoslavia’s further development. Edvard Kardelj emphasized the reform of the state and system, but the Serbian politician Aleksandar Rankovic, leader of the secret police, demanded the continuation of the politics of party control.

In spite of these divisions, social reforms during the 1950s did contribute to development. Yugoslavia’s economic growth in the decade 1952–1962 was one of the fastest in the world. Livings standards increased, as did some civic freedoms, and levels of education among the population. In culture, science and humanities, new possibilities emerged 83. And yet, despite all these changes, Yugoslavia’s basic characteristics remained a one-party system and a planned economy. State socialism was still the main hallmark of the system. The republics had no say in state politics, and they got their money from federal funds. This led to continual conflicts with the centre but also between developed and undeveloped parts of the state. The undeveloped republics of the south condemned the ‘policy of colonial thinking’ in Slovenia and Croatia, accusing them of enriching themselves through the favour of the regime 84.

The constitutional changes of the 1950s brought new problems. Communes became the new basic administrative units. Some politicians from the southern republics thought that, with the communes and the state as political units, the republics had become unnecessary. This attitude caused Slovenia to become very reserved towards any territorial and political redefinition of Yugoslavia. Slovenes and Macedonians were also angered by the lack of respect for their languages and cultures; they were unable to use their languages in the army or in dealing with the federal authorities and embassies and consulates abroad. New disagreements among Yugoslav nations occurred in the late 1950s when conservative circles started to develop ideas of state integration both in the fields of economics and politics and with regard to culture. In reaction, the feeling for autonomy of the republics strengthened. There were also suggestions about dissolving the republics. This idea did not work; but it prompted the insertion of a special category of ‘Yugoslavs’ among the ethnic categories in the Census of 1961 85. Tendencies towards cultural integration caused unexpected resistance in Croatia and Macedonia, and especially among Slovenians, who resisted unitarist and centralist tendencies with polemics – so reopening the national problem in Yugoslavia 86.

At the end of the 1950s conflicts arose within the top Yugoslav leadership between defenders of centralist and of self-management models. Neither faction questioned socialism and the party’s leading role. Defenders of self-management demanded more rights for republics and economic reforms that would enable the republics to maintain a more stable economic policy and enterprises and freely to decide how to apply their profits. On these questions Kardelj (self-management faction) and Rankovic (defender of centralism) promoted Slovene interests, on the one hand, and Serbian interests, on the other. Kardelj was convinced that Slovenia’s future lay in the community of Yugoslav ethno-nations and that it was therefore necessary to promote Slovene interests within the system of socialist selfmanagement. Rankovic favoured centralization in accordance with traditional Serbian fears that the ‘Catholic North’ would otherwise get too much at the expense of the ‘Orthodox South’ 87.

One controversial issue was the concept of an economic plan for 1962, according to which the federal administration again tried to secure a decisive role in dealing with the state economy. Slovene and Croatian enterprise managers resisted, trying rather to inject some elements of a market into the socialist economy 88. Macedonians also joined, since they were still under the influence of Serbian rule in inter-War Yugoslavia. Tensions were exceptionally high, and Tito even threatened resignation. This encouraged moves by Aleksandar Rankovic, who coveted the position of secretary general of the LCY, on the pretext of the need to reduce Tito’s burden. Edvard Kardelj opposed Rankovic and threatened that Slovenia would secede from Yugoslavia if Tito resigned. According to the Croatian politician Vladimir Bakaric, it was difficult to convince Tito not to resign, but Tito did not like Rankovic’s demand. Tito long hesitated between the two concepts for Yugoslavia’s future development. Initially, he favoured centralism as propagated by Aleksandar Rankovic; leaving Kardelj in disgrace. Later, however, he supported Kardelj, and Rankovic had to withdraw from Yugoslav politics 89.

In the 1960s, disputes about the future of Yugoslavia in politics and economics and the question of future interethnic relations were aggravated by social unrest. The Yugoslav authorities tried to introduce economic reforms and began to prepare a new compromise constitution which would, on the one hand, stress socialism and, on the other, attempt to democratize society and power structures in Yugoslavia. The new constitution was endorsed by the Yugoslav parliament in April 1963. The state was renamed the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia. There were six socialist republics and two socialist autonomous provinces inside Serbia 90. The republics lost no authority. Quite the contrary, they were strengthened. Slovenes and Macedonians demanded an enhanced role for their languages at federal level. In 1967 Macedonians got their independent Macedonian Orthodox Church, hitherto subordinate to the Serbian church. Beginning in 1968 Muslims were acknowledged as a nation (narod), and Kosovo and Vojvodina gained more autonomy. Old Serbian politicians opposed this, believing that these changes neglected Serbian interests 91. The new constitution also permitted some changes in the economy which reduced the state’s authority. The role of the banks in monetary matters was strengthened. Profits no longer went to the state but were retained by individual enterprises. Taxes on imports were lowered 92 so bringing new items (washing machines, TV sets, small kitchen appliances like mixers) onto the market and raising living standards. In 1967 the Yugoslav authorities opened state borders with Italy and Austria: the authorities issued passports, so giving Yugoslav citizens the opportunity to travel to the West. Open borders promoted tourism, especially along the Adriatic shore and in spas. The state was also very successful in social matters, extending social, health and pension benefits to most of the people. All citizens could afford treatment. The pension system was so effective that people had no worries about their wellbeing in old age.

These reforms enabled Yugoslavia to become part of the world economy. For socialist enterprises, accustomed to a privileged position in home markets protected by customs barriers, competition with highly developed economies came as a real shock. Opening the economy to free enterprise economics, forced numerous enterprises — especially those in the undeveloped southern republics — to lay off workers, a practice hitherto unknown to socialism 93. With unemployment rising, people started to look for employment in the West; the opening of the borders also promoted Western values in Yugoslavia, especially human rights and political pluralism. These values became part of the value system of younger LCY members who took over important posts in the Yugoslav economy, politics and culture in the early 1960s. The older generation of communists accused them of accepting Western capitalist values and named them ‘liberals’ 94: they feared that these ‘liberal’ ideas would in the long run permit the restoration of a multiparty system, and so decided to purge the political newcomers. In the 1965-75 decade, Tito led a purge of liberal leadership in the republics, beginning with Croatian liberals who had even demanded Croatian independence, later expelling party liberals from the leadership in other republics. This spelled the final defeat of defenders of economic and political reforms in the framework of a one-party socialist system 95. After 1971 purges were a fact of life, and not only in politics. Instead of professionals, politically-correct people, lacking the necessary education, assumed leadership. The state again started to direct the economy, and the army’s role in society was strengthened. Those criticizing the state could be called before the court of justice. Yugoslavia returned to the path it had left in the late 1950s. Once again power rested with the defenders of centralism, who saw the future of Yugoslavia and its republics in a special type of ‘association of free producers’.

The ideas of ‘democratic centralists’ were enacted in a new constitution. With its 406 articles, this was the longest in the world apart from the Indian one. It gave Yugoslav society only one leading authority, the LCY. At the same time the constitution aimed to prevent a convergence between the League of Communists of Serbia and traditional Serbian hegemonistic tendencies. Tito and Kardelj were fully aware of the dangers of such a ‘meeting’ 96. To curb Serbian influence, under the new constitution the Yugoslav parliament was divided into two houses (the Federal Assembly and the Assembly of Republic and Autonomous Provinces), operated on the basis of a parity system. The new constitution gave each of the republics and autonomous provinces the right of veto, so forcing them to look to consensus. Yugoslavia gained the status of an unofficial confederation. The status of the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, which were part of Serbia, was also strengthened, so prompting Serbian politicians to demand constitutional change, but Slovene communists, who had gained a relatively high degree of independence for Slovenia, defended the 1974 constitution in every way possible 97.

The constitution of 1974 also established a collective presidency. In addition to the president of the LCY, one member of the presidency was drawn from each of the republics and autonomous provinces. Tito was leader of the presidency for life (after his death, the presidency rotated, as provided for in the constitution), and so was concurrently president of the LCY and president of the presidency of Yugoslavia. Power was again concentrated among a few leaders, leaders both of the party and of the state 98. Army officers were increasingly present: the army, it was anticipated, would stand for law and order after Tito’s death.

The most important law of this period was the Law of Associated Labour, adopted in November 1976. It introduced the principle of discussion and arrangement into the economy. All the relatively independent economic units were organized in the Basic Organization of Associated Labour, in which the workers, in accordance with self-management principles, decided what and how much they would produce and how the money they earned would be spent. This arrangement replaced the market economy: the price of the final product would be as calculated and arranged, not according to principles of supply and demand 99. Republics and communes, which became responsible for their own development, were forced into extensive investments. The system promoted production of technologically less demanding products, allowing for a work force with minimal education: it provided for full employment, but its effects were deleterious. Old technology and poor quality products and performance meant that failure was inevitable 100. The catastrophe that threatened the Yugoslav economy was postponed by international loans. Yugoslavia became one of the world’s most indebted countries 101. Money was spent on housing, infrastructure and investment in undeveloped regions (Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro) instead of on production investments that would realise the money to repay the loans.

Despite this, people appreciated the rise in living standards (private and social) and the absence of unemployment. This situation lasted until the end of the 1970s when, because of the world energy crisis, the flow of foreign capital stopped. By then, the situation was catastrophic: the state’s external debt was US$20 billion; inflation and unemployment were rising; productivity and living standards were declining 102. In the shops there were fewer and fewer articles for general consumption.

Tito’s death in 1980 spelled the beginning of the end for Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav leadership tried to continue the internal and external policies of his regime under the slogan ‘Also after Tito – Tito’. Retaining the old system in Yugoslavia was impossible, however, because the state now had no leader who could, with his charisma, paper over regional differences in the state and in interethnic relations. After Tito’s death, Yugoslavia found itself in a process of dissolution which ended in the conflagration of the 1990s. Help from the West initially postponed debt crises, but eventually exacerbated the situation. Fundamental economic change was needed to help the economy out of crisis, but the communist old guard was not ready for that. Political crisis exacerbated the deepening economic crisis; and interethnic relations deteriorated, beginning with worsening Serb- Albanian relations. This was the prelude to the bloody demise of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

Notes
1 Aleksandar I Karadjordjevic (1888-1934), educated in Geneva, St Petersburg and Belgrade. In 1909 he became crown prince and in 1914 regent of Serbia. During World War I he was supreme commander of the Serbian Army. From 1 December 1918, he was regent, and from 17 August 1921, king of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. He tried to establish good relations between Yugoslavia and western European democratic states; in internal Yugoslav politics he was a staunch defender of a centralist regime, opposing democracy and national autonomy within Yugoslavia. In foreign policy he sought help above all from France. He was assassinated by Croatian and Macedonian nationalists during a state visit to Marseilles in 1934.
2 Josip Broz-Tito (1892-1980). As an Austro-Hungarian soldier, Tito became a prisoner of war in Russia and in 1917 became a soldier in the Red Army. In Russia he became a communist and until 1928, after returning from Russia, was a leading Yugoslav communist. From 1928 to 1934 he was imprisoned in Yugoslavia for communist activities. After his release he went to Vienna and Moscow. Following the Stalinist purges in the CPY, in 1937 Tito formally became secretary general of the party. During World War II he organized and led the Partisan Army against the occupiers. In November 1943, at the second session of AVNOJ, he was named president of the Temporary Revolutionary Government. After the signing of the Tito-Šubašic Agreement, he became president of the unified Yugoslav Government. During the period of 1945-1953 he was prime minister; from 1953 president of Yugoslavia, and from 1963 president for life. After conflict with the Cominform and a period of forced collectivization and purges of the followers of the Cominform, national communism (Titoism, Self-Management) was developed and Yugoslavia became the first socialist country to open its borders to the West. Tito was also one of the founders of the non-aligned movement. He became the symbol of the Yugoslav multinational state. Yet he was unable to establish a firm foundation for the new Yugoslavia, which would have enabled its survival.
3 J. Pirjevec, Jugoslavija: Nastanek, razvoj ter razpad Karadjordjeviceve in Titove Jugoslavije [Yugoslavia 1918-1992, Conception, Development and Dissolution of Karadjordjevic’s and Tito’s Yugoslavia], Koper 1995, pp. 12-13.
4 S. Žuljic, Narodnostna struktura Jugoslavije i tokovi promjena [The Ethnic Structure of Yugoslavia and Currents of Changes], Zagreb 1989, pp. 6-7.
5 R. Bicanic, Ekonomska podloga hrvatskog pitanja [The Economic Foundations of the Croatian Question], Zagreb 1938.
6 J. Petricevic, Nacionalnost stanovništva Jugoslavije [The Ethnic Structure of Yugoslavia], Brugg 1983, p. 56.
7 Žuljic, Narodnostna struktura Jugoslavije cit., p. 149.
8 V. Klemencic, Spreminjanje nacionalne strukture prebivalstva Jugoslavije v novejšem razdobju [The Changing of the Ethnic Structure of Yugoslavia during the last period], “Geografija v soli”, 1, 1991, pp. 7-22.
9 M. Klemencic, Prostovoljne in prisilne migracije kot orodje spreminjanja etnicne strukture na obmocju držav naslednic nekdanje Jugoslavije [Forced and voluntary migrations as a tool for changing the ethnic structure in the territories of the successor states of the former Yugoslavia], “Razprave in gradivo”, 36/37, 2000, pp. 145-172.
10 V. Djuric, S. Curcic, S. Kicošev, The Ethnic Structure of the Population in Vojvodina, in D. Hadži-Jovanovic (ed.), The Serbian Question in The Balkans, Belgrade 1995, pp. 211-226.
11 M. Klemencic, Im Lichte der sprachlichen Statistik: Slowenisch- und Deutschsprachige in der Süd- und Untersteiermark 1830-1991, in Stenner C. (ed.), Slowenische Steiermark: verdrängte Minderheit in Österreichs Südosten, Vienna, Cologne, Weimar, 1997, pp. 69-105.
12 Petricevic, Nacionalnost stanovništva Jugoslavije cit., p. 55.
13 R. Petrovic, Migracije u Jugoslaviji i etnicki aspekt [Ethnic Aspects of Migrations in Yugoslavia], Beograd, 1987; Žuljic, Narodnostna struktura Jugoslavije cit., pp. 109-121.
14 V. Klemencic, Jugoslawien - Zerfall und Bildung neuer Staaten, in K. Ruppert (ed.), Europa: neue Konturen eines Kontinents, Munich 1993, p. 220.
15 Petricevic, Nacionalnost stanovništva Jugoslavije cit., p. 53.
16 D. Djordjevic, Vojvoda Putnik: The Serbian High Command and Strategy in 1914, in B.K. Kiraly, N.F. Dreiszinger (eds.), East European Society in World War I, New York 1985, pp. 569-589.
17 F. Bister, Anton Korošec, državnozborski poslanec na Dunaju; Življenje in delo 1872-1918 [Anton Korošec, Deputy of the Reichsrat in Vienna; Life and Work 1872-1918], Ljubljana 1992.
18 G. Stokes, The Role of the Yugoslav Committee in the Formation of Yugoslavia, in D. Djordjevic (ed.), The Creation of Yugoslavia, 1914-1918, Santa Barbara 1980, pp. 51-72.
19 I. Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics, Ithaca and London 1984, pp. 115-140; A.N. Dragnich, Serbia, Nikola Pašic, and Yugoslavia, New Brunswick 1974.
20 J.R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History. Twice there was a country, Cambridge 1996, pp. 102-104; D. Jankovic, Jugoslovensko pitanje i krfska deklaracija 1917 godine [The Yugoslav question and the 1917 Corfu declaration], Beograd 1967.
21 F. Šišic, Dokumenti o postanku Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca, 1914-1919 [Documents on the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 1914-1919], Zagreb 1920, p. 26.
22 F. Gestrin, V. Melik, Slovenska zgodovina od konca osemnajstega stoletja do 1918 [Slovene history from the end of the 18th century till 1918], Ljubljana 1966, p. 331.
23 Bister, Anton Korošec, državnozborski poslanec na Dunaju cit., p. 200.
24 B. Krizman, Raspad Austro-Ugarske i stvaranje jugoslavenske države [The fall of Austria-Hungary and the creation of the Yugoslav state], Zagreb 1977, pp. 67-89; Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia cit., pp. 127-128.
25 W.S. Vucinich, The Formation of Yugoslavia, in D. Djordjevic (ed.), The Creation of Yugoslavia, 1914-1918, Santa Barbara 1980, pp. 183-206; D. Jankovic, Ženevska konvencija o stvaranju jugoslovenske zajednice 1918. godine, “Istorija XX veka: zbornika radova”, 1963, 5, pp. 225-262
26 Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia cit., pp. 135-140.
27 V. Cubrinovic, A. Mitrovic (eds.), Stvaranje jugoslovenske države 1918 (The creation of Yugoslav state in 1918), Beograd 1989; D. Živojinovic, America, Italy and the Birth of Yugoslavia, 1917-19, Boulder 1972.
28 A.N. Dragnich, The First Yugoslavia: Search for a Viable Political System, Stanford 1983, pp. 9-13.
29 M. Ekmecic, Serbian War Aims, in D. Djordjevic (ed.), The Creation of Yugoslavia, 1914-1918, Santa Barbara 1980, pp. 19-36.
30 V. Melik, Izidi volitev v Konstituanto leta 1920 [The results of the elections into Constituent Assembly in the year 1920], “Prispevki za zgodovino delavskega gibanja”, 1962, v. 2, n. 1, pp. 3-61.
31 Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia cit., pp. 387-392.
32 B. Petranovic, M. Zecevic, Jugoslavija 1918/1984. Zbirka dokumenata [Yugoslavia 1918/1984. Collection of documents], Beograd 1985, pp. 142, 183; Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia cit., pp. 395-404.
33 M. Žagar, Yugoslavia: what went wrong? Constitutional aspects of the Yugoslav crisis from the perspective of ethnic conflict, in M. Spencer (ed.), The Lessons of Yugoslavia (Research on Russia and Eastern Europe, 3), Amsterdam 2000, pp. 65- 96.
34 Z. Kolundžic, Atentat na Stjepana Radica (Assassination of Stjepan Radic), Zagreb 1967.
35 Dragnich, The First Yugoslavia cit., pp. 52-56.
36 Pirjevec, Jugoslavija 1918-1992 cit., pp. 49-50.
37 Žagar, Yugoslavia: what went wrong cit., pp. 77.
38 L. Boban, Zagrebacke punktacije, “Istorija XX veka”, 1962, 4, pp. 309-366.
39 Macek, In the Struggle for Freedom, University Park 1957; Lampe, Yugoslavia as History cit., pp. 164-168.
40 Dragnich, The First Yugoslavia cit., pp. 104-105.
41 T. Stojkov, Vlada Milana Stojadinovica, 1935-1937 [The Regime of Milan Stojadinovic 1935-1937], Beograd 1985.
42 J.B. Hoptner, Yugoslavia in crisis, 1934-1941, New York 1962.
43 L. Boban, Sporazum Cvetkovic-Macek, Beograd 1965.
44 M. Žagar, Yugoslavia: what went wrong cit., pp. 77-78.
45 F.C. Littlefield, Germany and Yugoslavia, 1933-1941, New York 1988, pp. 62-130.
46 V. Teržic, Slom Kraljevine Jugoslavije [The fall of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia], Beograd 1981.
47 Pirjevec, Jugoslavija 1918-1992 cit., pp. 113-115.
48 F. Jelic-Butic, Ustaše i Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, 1941-1945 [Ustasha and the Independent State of Croatia], Zagreb 1977.
49 Pirjevec, Jugoslavija 1918-1992 cit., pp. 116-119.
50 Lampe, Yugoslavia as History cit., pp. 202-203.
51 Pirjevec, Jugoslavija 1918-1992 cit., pp. 118-119.
52 J. Tomasevich, The Chetniks, Stanford 1975 cit., pp. 113-131.
53 M.J. Milazzo, The Chetnik Movement and the Yugoslav Resistance, Baltimore 1975, pp. 48-80, 96-106.
54 W.R. Roberts, Tito, Mihailovic, and the Allies, 1941-1945, New Brunswick 1973.
55 F. Trgo , The National Liberation War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-45: Selected Documents, Beograd 1982.
56 Steiberg, All or Nothing cit., pp. 28-84.
57 Pirjevec, Jugoslavija 1918-1992 cit., pp. 132-133.
58 M. Djilas, Der Krieg der Partisanen. Jugoslawien 1941-1945, Vienna, Munich, Zürich, Innsbruck 1977.
59 D. Biber (ed.), Tito-Churchill: Strogo tajno, Ljubljana, Zagreb 1981, p. 243.
60 Lampe, Yugoslavia as History cit., pp. 229-230, 234-236.
61 Pirjevec, Jugoslavija 1918-1992 cit., pp. 156-158.
62 R.M. Brashich, Land Reform and Ownership in Yugoslavia, 1919-53, New York 1954, pp. 44-71.
63 N. Gacesa, Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Jugoslaviji, 1945-48 [Agrarian Reform and Colonization in Yugoslavia, 1945-48], Novi Sad 1974.
64 C.S. Lilly, Agitprop in Post-war Yugoslavia, ‘Slavic Review’, 1994, v. 53, n. 2, pp. 395-413.
65 V. Koštunica, K. Cavoški, Party Pluralism or Monism? Social Movements and the Political System in Yugoslavia 1944-49, New York 1985, pp. 80-97.
66 P. Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question, New York 1968, pp. 101-142.
67 Koštunica, Cavoški, Party Pluralism or Monism cit., pp. 80-97.
68 Lampe, Yugoslavia as History cit., pp. 230-232.
69 N.V. Gianaris, Geopolitical and Economic Changes in the Balkan Countries, Westport, London 1996, pp. 91-95.
70 Pirjevec, Jugoslavija 1918-1992 cit., pp. 160-161.
71 S. Alexander, Church and State in Yugoslavia since 1945, Cambridge 1979, pp. 178-231.
72 M. Milivojevic, The Role of the Yugoslav Intelligence and Security Committee”, in J.B. Allcock, J.J. Horton, M. Milivojevic (eds.), Yugoslavia in Transition, New York 1992, pp. 204-207.
73 E. Barker, Mednarodni položaj Jugoslavije ob koncu druge svetovne vojne” [International Position of Yugoslavia at the end of World War 2], in D. Biber (ed.), Konec druge svetovne vojne v Jugoslaviji [The end of World War 2 in Yugoslavia], Ljubljana 1986.
74 S. Clissold (ed.), Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 1939-1973, London 1975.
75 L.M. Lees, Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War, University Park 1997, pp. 46-47.
76 M. Djilas, Conversations with Stalin, New York 1962, pp. 172-183; E. Kardelj, Reminiscences, the Struggle for Recognition and Independence: The New Yugoslavia, 1944-1957, London 1982, pp. 110-111.
77 R.H. Bass, E. Marbury (eds.), The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-1958: A Documentary Record, New York 1959.
78 Lees, Keeping Tito Afloat cit., pp. 51-52.
79 D. Wilson, Tito’s Yugoslavia, Cambridge 1979, pp. 73-85; Lampe, Yugoslavia as History cit., pp. 250-253.
80 R.A. Johnson, The Transformation of Communist Ideology: The Yugoslav Case, 1948-53, Cambridge 1972.
81 A.Z. Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Non-aligned World, Princeton 1970.
82 M. Djokovic, Djilas, vernik i heretik [Djilas, Believer and Heretic], Beograd 1989.
83 V. Dubey, Yugoslavia: Development with Decentralization, Baltimore 1975.
84 D. Pleština, Regional Development in Communist Yugoslavia, Boulder 1992, pp. 38-57.
85 S.P. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991, 2nd edn., Bloomington 1992, pp. 50-53.
86 B. Repe, Historical consequences of the disintegration of Yugoslavia for Slovene Society, “Österreichische Osthefte”, 2001, v. 43, n. 1-2, pp. 5-26.
87 Pirjevec, Jugoslavija 1918-1992 cit., p. 245.
88 D. Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948-1972, Berkeley 1977, pp. 120-133; D. Milenkovitch, Plan and Market in Yugoslav Economic Thought, New Haven 1971.
89 Pirjevec, Jugoslavija 1918-1992 cit., pp. 247-249.
90 Petranovic, Zecevic, Jugoslavija 1918/1984 cit., pp. 928-1993.
91 Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question cit., pp. 205-213.
92 R. Bicanic, Economic Policy in Socialist Yugoslavia, Cambridge 1973, pp. 211-238.
93 S.L. Woodward, Socialist Unemployment: The Politcal Economy of Yugoslavia, 1945-90, Princeton 1995, pp. 191-221, 273-275.
94 Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991 cit., pp. 92-97.
95 Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991 cit., pp. 83-135; S. Burg, Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia, Princeton 1983, pp. 88-99.
96 Pirjevec, Jugoslavija 1918-1992 cit., pp. 139-140.
97 L. Sekelj, Yugoslavia. The Process of Disintegration, New York 1993, pp. 45-51.
98 Lampe, Yugoslavia as History cit., pp. 306-308; Pirjevec, Jugoslavija 1918-1992 cit., pp. 338-341.
99 B. Ferfila, The Economics and Politics of the Socialist Debacle, Lanham 1991, pp. 115-121.
100 S. Estrin, Self-Management: Economic Theory and Yugoslav Practice, Cambridge 1983, pp. 81-126.
101 B. McFarlane, Yugoslavia: Politics, Economics, and Society, London 1988; H. Lydall, Yugoslavia in Crisis, Oxford 1989.
102 Lampe, Yugoslavia as History cit., pp. 315-316.

Selected Bibliography
Alexander S., Church and State in Yugoslavia since 1945, Cambridge 1979.
Banac I., The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics, Ithaca - London 1984.
Burg S., Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia, Princeton 1983.
Cubrinovic V., Mitrovic A. (eds.), Stvaranje jugoslovenske države 1918 [The creation of Yugoslav state in 1918], Beograd 1989.
Djilas M., Conversations with Stalin, New York 1962.
Djilas M., Der Krieg der Partisanen. Jugoslawien 1941–1945, Vienna, Munich, Zürich, Innsbruck 1977.
Djordjevic D. (ed.), The Creation of Yugoslavia, 1914–1918, Santa Barbara 1980.
Dragnich A. N., The First Yugoslavia: Search for a Viable Political System, Stanford 1983.
Dragnich A. N., Serbia, Nikola Pašic, and Yugoslavia, New Brunswick 1974.
Dubey V., Yugoslavia: Development with Decentralization, Baltimore 1975.
Hadži-Jovanovic D. (ed.), The Serbian Question in The Balkans, Belgrade 1995.
Hoptner J. B., Yugoslavia in crisis, 1934-1941, New York 1962.
Jankovic D., Jugoslovensko pitanje i krfska deklaracija 1917 godine [The Yugoslav question and the 1917 Corfu declaration], Beograd 1967.
Jelic-Butic F., Ustase i Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, 1941–1945 [Ustasha and the Independent State of Croatia], Zagreb 1977.
Kiraly B. K., Dreiszinger N. F. (eds.), East European Society in World War I, New York 1985.
Klemencic M., Prostovoljne in prisilne migracije kot orodje spreminjanja etnicne strukture na obmocju držav naslednic nekdanje Jugoslavije [Forced and voluntary migrations as a tool for changing the ethnic structure in the territories of the successor states of the former Yugoslavia], “Razprave in gradivo”, 2000, 36/37, pp. 145-172. The English version of the paper is available at http://human.ntu.ac.uk/im
Koštunica V., Cavoški K., Party Pluralism or Monism? Social Movements and the Political System in Yugoslavia 1944-49, New York 1985.
Lampe J.R., Yugoslavia as History. Twice there was a country, Cambridge 1996.
Lees L.M., Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War, University Park 1997.
Littlefield F.C., Germany and Yugoslavia, 1933-1941, New York 1988.
Lydall H., Yugoslavia in Crisis, Oxford 1989.
Macek V., In the Struggle for Freedom, University Park 1957.
Pirjevec J., Jugoslavija: Nastanek, razvoj ter razpad Karadjordjeviceve in Titove Jugoslavije [Yugoslavia 1918-1992,
Conception, Development and Dissolution of Karadjordjevic’s and Tito’s Yugoslavia], Koper 1995.
Ramet S.P., Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991, 2nd ed., Bloomington 1992.
Roberts W.R., Tito, Mihailovic, and the Allies, 1941-1945, New Brunswick 1973.
Rubinstein A.Z., Yugoslavia and the Non-aligned World, Princeton 1970.
Rusinow D., The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948-1972, Berkeley 1977.
Sekelj L., Yugoslavia. The Process of Disintegration, New York 1993.
Shoup P., Communism and the Yugoslav National Question, New York 1968.
Trgo F., The National Liberation War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-45: Selected Documents, Beograd 1982.
Woodward S.L., Socialist Unemployment: The Political Economy of Yugoslavia, 1945-90, Princeton 1995.
Žagar M., Yugoslavia: what went wrong? Constitutional aspects of the Yugoslav crisis from the perspective of ethnic conflict, in Spencer M. (ed.), The Lessons of Yugoslavia (Research on Russia and Eastern Europe 3), Amsterdam 2000, pp. 65-96.

Born in 1955, Matjaž Klemencic studied at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. He is professor of history at the University of Maribor and also teacher at the University of Ljubljana. He specializes in history of American immigration and history of nationalism. His books include Slovenes of Cleveland. The Creation of a New Nation and a New World Comunity and Jurij Trunk med Koroško in Združenimi državami Amerike ter zgodovina slovenskih naselbin v Leadvillu, Kolorado in San Franciscu, Kalifornija.

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