| 
The International Community and
the FRY/Belligerents II
by Matjaz Klemencic
The
Scholars’ Initiative: Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies
2001-2005
Matjaž Klemencic: Team Leader, Dušan Janjic: Team Leader, Vlado
Anzinovic, Keith Doubt, Emil Kerenji, Alfred Bing, John Fine,
Vladimir Klemencic, Sumantra Bose, Zlatko Hažidedic, Miloš Kovic,
Steven Burg, Marko Attila Hoare, Vladimir Petrovic, Daniele
Convers,i Constantin Iordachi, Nikola Samardžic, Dušan Djordjevich,
A. Ross Johnson, Brendan Simms
(Part I
| Part II
| Part III
| Part IIII)
The Explosion of War (Summer
1991)
Slovene politicians negotiated with the federal government
for peaceful separation from the rest of the Yugoslav republics,
but without success. Four days after U.S. Secretary of State
Baker’s visit (on June 25), Croatia and Slovenia carried through
with their intent to declare independence. This act was followed
by an attack of the JNA on Slovenia, with the goal to overthrow
the Slovene pro-independence government and gain control over
the territory, especially over the borders with Austria and
Italy. The JNA was trapped at barricades that the Slovene Territorial
Defense constructed out of buses and trucks. During the Slovenian
“Ten- Day War,” the JNA lost the international public relations
campaign. Hans Dietrich Genscher, Germany’s foreign minister,
accused the JNA of “running amok” in Slovenia. Evidence of how
much Germans were interested in solving the conflict is the
visit of Genscher, who accepted the invitation of Slovene foreign
minister Dimitrij Rupel to come to Slovenia. At 2 July he landed
at Klagenfurt Airport in nearby Carinthia, with the intention
of driving into Slovenia. But, because of the fighting he could
not enter Slovenia. Instead Slovene President Kucan and Minister
Rupel discussed the issues with Genscher in Klagenfurt. The
result was the ongoing support of Genscher for the Slovene cause
throughout the conflict.103 British Foreign Secretary Douglas
Hurd joined the fray. He told the British Parliament that the
JNA had hastened the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Italy said
it would “act in solidarity” (whatever that meant) with Croatia
and Slovenia, unless the JNA respected the cease-fire. In the
U.S.A., the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Claiborne Pell (D–RI), urged President Bush to support Slovene
and Croatian independence if Yugoslavia’s “renegade army does
not cease its wanton aggression.”104
In spite of these calls, the Bush, Sr., administration limited
itself only to criticizing the JNA’s actions. As the world’s
sole remaining superpower, the U.S.A. frowned on secessionism
as a threat to the hard-won status quo. Its leaders also retained
the Wilsonian preference for following Balkan violence from
as far away as possible. Hence, whereas there were discussions
among different desks of the Departments of State and Defense,
as there had been during the Wilson administration about different
options for the region,105 the conventional wisdom was that
Europe—that is, the EC—should lead attempts to resolve the Yugoslav
crisis. Ominously, some specialists in European affairs in the
State Department were already expressing doubts about whether
the EC could discharge this role successfully, fearful as they
were that the EC was already too dependent on the U.S.106
The EC, which tried for a long time to play a more significant
and independent role from the U.S. in foreign policy in general,
accepted the opportunity to mediate in the Yugoslav crisis.
EC politicians did not care too much whether they were qualified
to deal with so complicated a crisis.107 Already on 27 June
Genscher asked the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) to start the procedures that its member states
had accepted a week before in Berlin. The same demand was issued
also at the meeting of the presidents of the governments and
states of EC members in Vianden, Luxembourg. Austria, Italy,
and Norway demanded the next day from Yugoslavia that it “explain
the unusual operations of the JNA in Slovenia.” In accordance
with the mechanisms designed for “extraordinary circumstances,”
on Genscher’s demand the OSCE Committee of Senior Officials
met on 3 and 4 July 1991 and asked the fighting sides in Yugoslavia
to stop the fighting and offered to send a group of observers.108
Yugoslav diplomacy tried to prevent internationalization of
the problem, with the support of the Soviet Union. The most
important of the documents accepted by the meeting was a suggestion
for a negotiating mission of OSCE to Yugoslavia that would prepare
an international conference on Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav delegation
accepted the proposal but succeeded in inserting into it: “…
if and when it is accepted by Yugoslavia.” This was the “last”
attempt of the OSCE to solve the Yugoslav crisis; its activities
were hampered by the fact that it operated on consensus. The
OSCE therefore left the EC to deal with the Yugoslav crisis.
This decision was made especially in light of Soviet demands;
the Soviet Union was afraid of any external intervention in
the Baltic republics.109
In July 1991, the EC sent mediators to Yugoslavia, the foreign
ministers of the sitting EC “troika” (representing the state
holding the presidency, his predecessor, and his successor).
The EC troika made three visits to Yugoslavia, resulting in
a cease-fire between the Slovene Territorial Defense Force and
the JNA and, by 7 and 8 July, had convened a conference at Brioni
for the purpose of resolving the crisis. The Brioni Accord,
which was sponsored by the EC, prevented further air raids or
other military activity by the JNA on Slovene territory. Mediators
from the EC quickly negotiated the agreement between Slovenia
and the JNA because the EC did not want war on its borders,
and they still hoped to prevent the war. They also still hoped
that Slovenia might act as a democratizing force in Yugoslavia,
but they soon realized that this scenario was not possible.
Thus Slovenia has these circumstances to thank for emerging
victorious after the short war for its independence, and, economically
speaking, it was fortunately not a completely ruined state,
as is the case with Croatia and Bosnia.110 After its defeat,
the JNA decided to retreat from Slovenia with all its equipment
and machinery. The Brioni Accord, in effect, recognized the
Slovene military victory and also made Slovenia and Croatia
subject, de facto, to international law and cleared the way
for the eventual recognition of their statehood.111 With a mandate
from the CSCE to deploy thirty to fifty observers, named the
“ice-cream men” by Yugoslavs for the white uniforms they chose,
the EC began its first-ever effort at peacekeeping.112
Parallel to the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army from Slovenia,
the armed conflict in Croatia—where most of the troops retreated
from Slovenia—widened. While the war in Croatia intensified,
the EC’s General Council met in Brussels on 25 July 1991. Genscher,
then German foreign minister, recalled later that the session
“... appealed to the Collective Presidency in Belgrade to encourage
an immediate truce and to begin negotiations on the future of
Yugoslavia’s peoples ... (and) reaffirmed our earlier statement
that any change of internal and external borders of the country
achieved by force was unacceptable.”113 The presidency was already
then completely unable to function and could not do anything.
The August putsch in the Soviet Union was welcomed in Belgrade,
for two reasons: (1) for the roughly 10 days that the putsch
lasted, Western attention was almost totally diverted to Moscow
– and hence, not on developments on the ground in Croatia, and
(2) Miloševic felt ideologically comfortable with the putschists,
because, both were communists and because they were markedly
less pro-Western and hence, he calculated, more likely to assist
his campaign in Croatia. Once the putsch failed, the U.S. State
Department signaled a reorientation in American policy by issuing
a statement in mid-October supporting the principle of (national)
self-determination,114 but it took some time before the U. S.
policy of non-recognition changed. The fact that the attempted
putsch in Moscow in August failed made the leadership in Belgrade
even more determined to continue with their military operations.
So in the second half of August, the JNA intensified its attacks
on Croatia. The foreign ministers of the EC, who were facing
what they regarded as Serb aggression in Croatia, declared in
an extraordinary meeting in Brussels on 27 and 28 August 1991
that they would not accept and recognize the border changes
that were achieved through violence.115
The Changes in International
Public Opinion on Independence of Slovenia and Croatia
After Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence, most
of the world did not support the declarations and wanted Yugoslavia
to stay in one piece. All of the great powers—U.S.A., the Soviet
Union, China, Britain and France—remained united, as did EU
members Sweden, Denmark, Italy and Greece, and former Communist
bloc states Romania, Poland, and Hungary in their support for
the idea of a united Yugoslavia.
The governments of neighboring Austria as well as Germany extended
sympathies to the Croatian and Slovenian cause; however, they
did not recognize Slovenia’s and Croatia’s move. Perhaps they
were also influenced by their better knowledge of the situation
as well as by their historic affinities with them. As we have
already mentioned, during the summer of 1991, after the attacks
of Serb paramilitary units and the JNA on Croatia strengthened,
Germany started to consider the possibility of recognizing Slovenia
and Croatia and also started to press the other EC member states.
In debate of the German Parliament on recent events in Yugoslavia
on 4 September 1991, both Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister
Genscher used the occasion to emphatically warn the Serbs and
the JNA about the consequences of continued aggression. Kohl
argued that if engaging in dialogue and living together in peace
were no longer possible, this would pose for Germany—particularly
in the light of her understanding of the right to self-determination—the
question of recognizing those republics that no longer wanted
to be part of Yugoslavia. Genscher declared that there would
be no premium for those who prevented negotiations by the use
of force: “If those peoples of Yugoslavia who desire independence
cannot realize it through negotiations, we will recognize their
unilateral declarations of independence.” Addressing the JNA,
he said: “With every shot by your cannons and tanks, the hour
of recognition moves closer. We shall not be able to look on
further.” Thus, Genscher more explicitly than previously made
clear his view that the task of the negotiations would be to
ensure a peaceful parting of the ways. It was a view soon to
be adopted by Lord Peter Carrington, the former British foreign
secretary and secretary general of NATO, himself. 116 As the
fighting continued through autumn of 1991, after a long struggle
in the EU, Germany prevailed and the EU announced on December
1991 that it would recognize Slovenia and Croatia as independent
states. Numerous states opposed this action of Germany. With
the support of Great Britain and France, the U.S.A. even suggested
at the beginning of December 1991 a special resolution of the
UN Security Council (UNSC) demanding that Germany stop asking
for recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by the international
community. On the basis of evidence, Genscher succeeded in changing
the opinion of his French colleague, Roland Dumas; so that France
did not support the U.S. idea any more. At the same time Genscher
warned the U.S.A. not to “torpedo” European activities for peace
through the UN.117
The role of German Foreign Minister Genscher was important,
especially for the Slovenes and later for the Croats.118 The
Serbian press expressed misgivings about German intentions,
referring to alleged dangers of a “Fourth Reich.”119
The role of Yugoslavia’s other neighbors also caused controversy.
Hungary and Albania took precautions to defend their airspace.120
Albania placed its army in a state of alert.121 Both countries
had been interested in the destiny of their ethnic minorities
in Yugoslavia, of course. All the neighbors guarded their borders
with Yugoslavia. Because of its historical ties with Macedonia,122
Bulgaria hinted that it was prepared to recognize an independent
Macedonian state—which it did on 15 January 1992.
In the summer of 1991, under the pressure of public opinion
the policy of Austria and Italy towards Slovenia and Croatia
started to change also. In Austria 62% of those asked in public
opinion polls favored recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.123
In Italy public opinion changed in favor of Slovenia and Croatia,
after the media reported on the political games of the Serbian
delegation at the Geneva conference on Yugoslavia. Italians
started to believe that it would be a step forward in solving
the Yugoslav crisis if Slovenia and Croatia were recognized
as independent states. Therefore under pressure of its public
opinion, Italian official policy started to change.124
An attack by the JNA on the Croatian coastal city of Zadar,
which had belonged to Italy between the World Wars, influenced
Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis together with Genscher
to demand withdrawal of the JNA from Croatia, which bettered
the chances for international recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.125
In the late summer of 1991 French views also changed. At a
press conference on 12 September 1991 Mitterrand stated that
“… after the events of the last months, in the future it is
possible to think about independence of Slovenia and Croatia.”126
A week later he said in Weimar, that it is clear to him “that
the republics [of former Yugoslavia] can not live together in
one state anymore.”127 French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas
said in front of the French Assembly that fulfilling the wishes
of the two republics would really mean dividing Yugoslavia.
France and the EC needed to help Yugoslav nations to freedom
and independence within the limits of existing possibilities.128
Most of the other states still wanted Yugoslavia to be preserved
in any form but only as a democracy. The U.S. administration
did not even notice what was happening in the Yugoslav lands
in spite of the warnings of its diplomats.129 President Bush
visited Ukraine on 1 August 1991 and tried to discourage Ukrainians
from declaring independence, warning them, “Americans will not
support those who seek independence in order to replace a far-off
tyranny with a local despotism. They will not aid those who
promote a suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred.”130
This meant that the United States did not support the secessions
in Eastern Europe in general. Then the U.S.A. retreated from
attempts to solve the Yugoslav crisis and left it to the EC
states to solve the problem, including the question of recognition.
Baker did not want to involve the U.S.A. in the Yugoslav conflict.
As he wrote in his memoirs, vital U.S. interests were not at
stake in Yugoslavia. It is interesting to note how he reasoned
inaction of the U.S.A. in this crisis:
"Most important, unlike in the Persian Gulf, our vital
national interests were not at stake. The Yugoslav conflict
had the potential to be intractable, but it was nonetheless
a regional dispute. Miloševic had Saddam’s appetite, but Serbia
didn’t have Iraq’s capabilities or ability to affect America’s
vital interests, such as access to energy supplies. The greater
threat to American interests at the time lay in the increasingly
dicey situation in Moscow, and we preferred to maintain our
focus on that challenge, which had global ramifications for
us, particularly with regard to nuclear weapons. Moreover, in
the summer of 1991, we were already consumed by the Middle East
peace process and close to getting the parties to the table."131
So determined was Baker to keep the U.S.A. uninvolved that
he flatly rejected a proposal from Assistant Secretary of State
Thomas Niles to send an observer to the talks between the Yugoslav
parties sponsored by the EC, fearing that even such a minor
action might imply a possible American role.132 As Baker wrote
in his memoirs:
"After all, ‘EC92’ was less than a year away, the Soviet
Union was in decline, and the talk in Brussels, Paris, Bonn,
Rome, and other European capitals was of an emerging European
superpower. By this line of reasoning , if Europe was going
to assume its place as a great power, then the Europeans, not
the Americans, should take the lead in managing the Yugoslav
crisis, which after all was occurring on Europe’s doorstep.
The Europeans wanted the lead and welcomed the chance to deal
with the problem through the EC. ”133
On 9 October 1991, when the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia
as independent states was still uncertain, Otto von Habsburg
emphasized in the European Parliament that Yugoslavia did not
exist any more and that the legal rights belonged to the individual
republics, which had freely elected parliaments. He condemned
Serbia as guilty of the bloodshed, because Serbian volunteers
and the JNA were involved in all the fighting in Croatia. He
even condemned the Council of Foreign Ministers of the EC, saying
they bore part of the responsibility. Otto von Habsburg was
also convinced that the indecisive reactions of the Council
of Foreign Ministers to the crisis had lasted until the beginning
of 1992. After Portugal assumed the presidency of the EC on
1 January 1992, Portuguese Foreign Minister Joao de Deus Pinheiro
changed the policy and more energetically condemned the Serb
activities.137
In the second half of 1991, Otto von Habsburg finished most
of his speeches in the European Parliament by saying: “Ceterum
autem censeo Croatiam et Sloveniam esse reconoscendam” (Otherwise,
I think that Croatia and Slovenia ought to be recognized).138
Otto von Habsburg did everything he could to get BiH recognized
also. In April 1992 he visited Morocco and interceded on behalf
of recognition of all three states with Islamic states. It is
interesting to note that Moroccan King Hasan extended the time
for conversation with von Habsburg, who explained the situation
in former Yugoslavia to him and let Yassir Arafat wait. Von
Habsburg was engaged in sharp discussion with Greek deputies
to the European Parliament when they were united in opposing
recognition of Macedonia as an independent state.139
The Socialist faction of the European Parliament was the largest
and until September 1991 it represented one of the main opponents
to the diplomatic recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. In October
1991, the press representative of the Socialist faction, Jannis
Sakellarion, declared that if Croatia were to be recognized
as an independent state, then also the Serbs of Croatia would
have to have the right of self-determination because Serbs in
some parts of Croatia represent a majority of the population.
Motives for such pro-Serbian standpoints of European Socialists
could be explained by their inclination towards Yugoslav selfmanagement
as a “third way” between capitalism and communism. Especially
German Social-Democratic leader Karsten Voigt had a special
affection for the Yugoslav system of self-management. This could
be explained by the tradition of special friendly relations
between Tito and the leader of German Socialists Willi Brandt
and German Social democrats remembered those days.
These pro-Yugoslav views of the European Left transformed in
the course of events to pro-Serbian positions. The views of
the Socialist faction played a decisive role in the decision
of the European Parliament not to support a proposal by the
Christian-Democrats, who suggested to the governments of EC
states that they should recognize Slovenia and Croatia if the
Serbs violated the cease-fire and the UN would be forced to
carry out its warning of military intervention.140 Socialists
thought that the main reason for the war in Croatia was self-defense
of the Serb minority in Croatia against the Tudjman regime.
Therefore the Socialists supported the right of the Serbs in
the Krajinas to secede from Croatia. This would mean only “enforcement”
of the already achieved “changes of borders.”141
In the second half of 1991 NATO also started to deal with the
Yugoslav conflict, in spite of the fact that Secretary General
of NATO Manfred Wörner asked at the beginning of November 1991
for a passive role for NATO.142 Already on 7 June 1991, the
foreign ministers of NATO declared that the security of the
NATO states depended on the security of all other states in
Europe. NATO changed its views after the international recognition
of Slovenia, Croatia, and BiH.143 Member-states of NATO on 4
June 1992 accepted in the Oslo Declaration that NATO, on demand
of the OSCE or UN, can militarily intervene also outside of
its member-states.144
Among international organizations that dealt with the Yugoslav
crisis, we have to mention also the UN. From the beginning of
the Yugoslav crisis it called for non-interference into Yugoslav
internal affairs. Therefore, until Slovenia and Croatia were
internationally recognized, the organization could not send
peace-keeping missions into Yugoslavia until all the involved
parties agreed.
UN Secretary General, Pérez de Cuéllar opposed recognition
of Slovenia and Croatia and condemned the German intention to
recognize their independence as an “insane step.” Because the
Germans did not react to his statements, de Cuéllar on 12 December
1991 sent a letter to the presiding minister of the EC Council
of Foreign Ministers, van den Broek, and asked him to send this
letter also to other EC member-states. Genscher answered de
Cuéllar the next day and wrote that de Cuéllar was with this
letter to van den Broek “encouraging those forces in Yugoslavia
who were already then fighting against a successful end of the
peace process in Yugoslavia.”145 Genscher also emphasized that
the Serbian leadership and the JNA were the most responsible
for violations of cease-fires and the fact that the peace conference
was unsuccessful.
De Cuéllar then wrote to Genscher and expressed his concern
over the “untimely selected and unvoted recognition.”146 De
Cuéllar also wrote that the presidents of BiH and Macedonia
asked him not to act in favor of recognition of Slovenia and
Croatia and that if Slovenia and Croatia were recognized, there
would be danger of spreading the war into BiH and Macedonia.
De Cuéllar also wrote to Genscher that, in its meeting in Rome
on 8 November 1991, the EC decided that Slovenia and Croatia
should be recognized as part of a “complex solution” of the
Yugoslav crisis. According to de Cuéllar, the Yugoslav crisis
would not be solved by recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.
Genscher explained in an interview with German radio that de
Cuéllar was against selected and un-coordinated recognition.
This was in accordance with the views of the German government,
which for some months tried to reach consensus on this issue
within the EC.147
De Cuéllar’s letter started new discussions. U.S. President
George Bush, Sr., criticized again the plans for recognition
of Slovenia and Croatia. He asked the U.S. Ambassador to the
UN, Thomas Pickering, to ask the German government to reconsider
its standpoint on recognition of both former Yugoslav republics.
Also, the U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Zimmermann, declared
that the U.S.A. was against recognition, especially in the case
of Croatia.148
Europe Tried to Save What It
Was Possible to Save: Yugoslavia ŕ la Carte (September 1991–
October 1991)
In spite of the fact that the fighting in Croatia ceased, the
EC on 7 September called a peace conference that, on Genscher’s
advice, was presided over by Lord Carrington.149 Carrington
picked up where the failed Izetbegovic-Gligorov Plan had left
off: He recognized six republics as the constituent units of
the former federal state and produced a plan that would give
each of them as much sovereignty as it wanted.150
In spite of all the different views of the EC states on how
to solve the Yugoslav crisis, Tudjman and Miloševic on 12 September
1991 signed a statement that they would respect minority rights
and renounce violence as a means of changing borders.151
On the proposal of Austria, Hungary and Canada, the UN Security
Council (UNSC) on 25 September 1991 dealt with the Yugoslav
crisis. In one of the discussions, U.S. Secretary of State James
Baker condemned the Serb government and the JNA as guilty of
bloodshed in Yugoslavia. As he stated, the aim of the Serb leadership
and the JNA was “to form ‘little Yugoslavia’ or ‘great Serbia,’
which would oust Slovenia from this state and make Croatia smaller.”152
The same day, in a speech in front of the UN General Assembly,
Genscher condemned JNA operations and demanded the introduction
of economic sanctions against Yugoslavia.153
Invoking Chapter 7 of the UN charter, that the Yugoslav conflict
had became a “direct threat to international peace and security,”
the UNSC, on 25 September 1991, passed the first of sixty-seven
resolutions that would be passed by January 1995. Resolution
713/1991 imposed a general and complete embargo on all deliveries
of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia.154 This resolution
still dealt with the fights in Yugoslavia as if they were an
internal affair of a UN member-state. The acceptance and fulfillment
of the resolution did not have any serious consequences for
the JNA, which had stocks of weaponry in its arsenals; but it
had serious consequences for the Croatian side.155
The weapons embargo on Yugoslav republics made it possible
for Miloševic to strengthen his own power in rump Yugoslavia;
on the other hand it made it possible also to strengthen the
offensive against Croatia. In the midst of the fights in Croatia,
on 4 October Lord Carrington succeeded in gathering Tudjman,
Miloševic, and Federal Defense Secretary Veljko Kadijevc to
the negotiating table in The Hague. They agreed to divide the
peace conference into two working groups: the first would work
on the constitutional future of the country and the second would
concentrate on bringing about an end to fighting in Croatia,
which in early September had escalated dramatically.156 The
new JNA attacks in Croatia convinced the EC that it had to act
more aggressively. On 6 October the EC foreign ministers condemned
the JNA actions and demanded a ceasefire until midnight the
next day. To those “who were responsible for these formidable
acts of violence” they threatened economic sanctions and legal
action in accordance with international rules. In spite of everything,
the war in Croatia continued. According to Zdravko Tomac, Croatian
intelligence services intercepted a communication originating
at Supreme Headquarters in Belgrade. It was an order “... for
an all-out attack on Croatia, which was intended to break Croatia
politically and economically, and compel it to capitulate and
stay in Miloševic’s Yugoslavia, (and which) outlined in detail
attacks on industrial facilities, with the aim of causing an
ecological catastrophe.”157 The Croatian cabinet considered
the U.S., U.K., and France to be inflexibly attached to the
illusion of Yugoslav territorial integrity, and therefore decided
to appeal to the Russians to intercede with the Serbs. Late
in the night of 6 October, the Croats contacted Soviet Consul-General
in Zagreb Girenko in a state of high agitation, and Girenko
in turn telephoned Gorbachev, waking him out of his slumber.
Gorbachev in turn telephoned Kadijevic, rousing him from his
nocturnal respite, and advised the general against rash totalistic
military moves. Gorbachev also made Washington acquainted with
the events, which, according to Zdravko Tomac, convinced “drowsy
Washington” to interfere in the diplomatic game and prevented
the plans of JNA from being fulfilled.158
The Vance Plan—Defeat of the
Peace Policy of the European Community (October 1991–June 1992)
At this point UN Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar tried to
intervene. In spite of the fact that he still considered the
fighting in Yugoslavia as an internal affair which therefore
did not deserve UN intervention, on 8 October 1991—after he
consulted the U.S. Department of State—he decided to send Cyrus
Vance, former Secretary of State in the Carter administration,
to the Balkans as his personal envoy. De Cuéllar did this because
in his view the EC could not be neutral in imposing peace just
because some EC member-states had different historic and economic
contacts with different sides in the Yugoslav conflict.159 In
cooperation with Lord Carrington, Vance was authorized to start
a negotiating process that they hoped would be fruitful, under
the auspices of the EC and the UN.160 On 11 October, Vance began
a series of missions to assess the situation that would soon
involve him in fullscale efforts to negotiate a cease-fire,
separately from—but in full consultation with—Lord Carrington
and the EC.
A series of cease-fires in the war between Croatia and the
JNA and some Serb insurgents, brokered by the EC, fell through.
The eighth such cease-fire, negotiated on 9 October, was violated
within a few hours, when the JNA and Croatian units resumed
exchange of artillery fire. The following day, Germany’s Martin
Bangemann, vice president of the EC Commission, called for Bonn
to extend diplomatic recognition to Slovenia and Croatia without
any further delay. His initiative seemed to be ignored, but
it reflected the increasingly frantic fears among some Western
diplomats about the dangers that this war held. At the same
time, Dutch Foreign Minister van den Broek announced that after
five hours of discussions with Presidents Miloševic and Tudjman
and Defense Minister Kadijevic, all present had agreed that
all units of the JNA would be withdrawn from Croatia within
a month. The following day, however, the Defense Ministry indicated
that it considered the agreement non-binding and null because
it had not been officially signed. By then, the Yugoslav Army
was building bunkers and digging trenches in Croatia, to defend
areas they had captured (Krajinas)–specifically, the Knin littoral,
Kordun, Banija, Baranja, and the Papuk Mountain. In response
to the siege of the walled city of Dubrovnik, the U.S. State
Department issued a protest on 24 October 1991.161 A statement
by France’s Mitterrand from the periods of Serb attacks on Dubrovnik
is of interest: “As far as I know, history of Serbia and Croatia
is full of such dramas. Especially during the last World War
in Croatian concentration camps many Serbs were murdered. As
you know, Croatia and not Serbia was part of the Nazi-block.
Since the death of Tito hatred must have erupted anew between
Serbs and Croats.”162 In spite of everything, French politics
did not support the viewpoint put forth by Serbian propaganda
that the war in Croatia was a continuation of the Serb fight
against Nazi-Germany and the Ustaša of Ante Pavelic.163
An offensive against Croatia was also a reminder for Bosnian
president Alija Izetbegovic, who until then tried to play the
role of negotiator among the fighting sides in the Yugoslav
crisis. On 15 October the republican assembly of BiH adopted
a memorandum declaring the republic a sovereign and independent
state within its existent borders. Seventy-three Serbian deputies
had already left the Parliament building, and BiH found itself
on the verge of war. In the first half of October Mikhail Gorbachev
also personally got involved in trying to solve the crisis.
He was sure that the events in Yugoslavia only “mirrored the
horrors” that would be possible in the Soviet Union, and so
he invited Tudjman and Miloševic to Moscow on 15 October 1991.
During their visits to Moscow, both Tudjman and Miloševic pleaded
that they would, in the course of November and with the assistance
of the Soviet Union, U.S.A., and EC, find an honest solution
to end the fighting.164 Very soon the international community
found out that the promises were not kept.
On 18 October, the EC’s Hague conference proposed a draft for
a general settlement, which was issued on 24 October 1991 and
would have authorized the demilitarization of all ethnic enclaves
and guaranteed autonomy for Kosovo and Vojvodina. The proposal
also identified the “new relations between the Republics as
(1) sovereign and independent republics with an international
status for those that wish it; (2) a free association of the
Republics with an international status as envisaged in this
Convention; and (3) comprehensive arrangements, including supervisory
mechanisms for the protection of human rights and special status
for certain groups and areas.”165 Miloševic said the proposed
changes would have “opened the way to new instability and tension.”166
As an answer to the Carrington plan, the Serbs boycotted the
conference in The Hague. Therefore on 4 November the EC prepared
a new version of the plan that did not mention Vojvodina and
Kosovo any more; it talked only about territories with special
status, in general.167 This proposal did not fulfill the wishes
of the Serbian leadership either. They still wanted a Yugoslav
federation that would remain the only heir of SFRY and that
would unite “all those republics and peoples” that would wish.168
This was, however, a fig leaf for a Greater Serbia desired by
the Serb leadership. The Hague conference threatened sanctions
against any party that did not accept the “Carrington plan”
by 4 November. The basis for a new settlement was a legal opinion
requested from the Arbitration (Badinter) Commission: that since
8 October, Yugoslavia was a “state in the process of dissolution.”
Nonetheless, the EC proceeded with its strategy, imposing trade
sanctions on and threatening isolation of Yugoslavia on 8 November
to press Serbia into accepting the plan and both Croatia and
Serbia to sign a cease-fire.169 Compensatory measures for “parties
which do cooperate in a peaceful way towards a comprehensive
political solution on the basis of the EC proposals,” such as
BiH and Macedonia, were discussed.170
In spite of the fact that the JNA did not reach the planned
Karlobag-Karlovac-Virovitica line, Miloševic decided to change
tactics. A more careful analysis of Miloševic’s policies suggests
that he had already divorced himself from the notion of a “Greater
Serbia” as outlined above (and suggested by Šešelj) and was
focusing on Serb majority areas as part of a future Yugoslav
federation.171 Miloševic accepted a cease-fire on 23 November
in Geneva under the auspices of the UN and welcomed the Vance
proposal to station UN blue helmet units on occupied Croatian
territories. The Croatian Government also agreed because it
was aware of the fact that its armed forces would not be able
to fight the Serbs on occupied territories while at the same
time defending its compatriots in BiH. The Croatian Government
demanded, however, that the UN troops be stationed at the border
with Serbia (ex-republican border between Croatia and Serbia)
and not at the front line, as Miloševic demanded. The Croatian
Government was afraid that if the UN troops were stationed at
the front line, circumstances similar to those in Cyprus would
occur.172 This Croatian demand provoked a lively quarrel with
Belgrade.
While the EC member states got actively involved in the crises,
the UN remained passive. German Foreign Minister Genscher talked
about that in a speech he gave on the occasion of a German –Italian
meeting in Venice on 22 and 23 November 1991. He stated that
it was not a civil war that was going on in Yugoslavia but,
“... an attack on Croatia and therefore it does not concern
only the EC and OSCE, but it should be above all the business
of the UN Security Council to deal with the problem..”173 On
the demand of the government of the SFRY, the Security Council
finally discussed the situation in Yugoslavia on 27 November
1991. The UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution No. 721, proposed
by the UK, France, and Belgium. This resolution empowered Vance
to prepare the diplomatic terrain for UN peacekeeping forces
on the territory where the fighting had occurred, and asked
all the parties to the conflict to observe a cease-fire and
to fulfil UNSC Res. Nr. 713 of 25 September 1991.174 This resolution
sent an additional message, i.e., that the Soviet Union had
unified its views on the use of UN peacekeeping forces with
those of the Western powers, and that the EC accepted its “defeat”
in its attempts to solve the Yugoslav crisis. In spite of all
this, the UN asked Lord Carrington to keep trying to negotiate
between Serbs and Croats, although it was clear from the very
beginning that it was fruitless.175Especially the Germans were
convinced about that as they decided to meddle directly in the
Yugoslav crisis. On November 27, in an address to the Bundestag,
German Chancellor Kohl set a date for German recognition of
Slovenia and Croatia—24 December 1991.176 This provoked many
opposing views within the international community. An example
for this are differing statements of Kohl and Mitterrand at
a joint press conference on 15 November 1991 in Bonn. Mitterrand
emphasized that this question could not be solved under the
pressure of time and without due caution. He thought that it
was first of all the question of guaranteeing minority rights
as well as the question of frontiers. He was not worried about
minority protection in Slovenia. He worried, however, about
minority protection in Croatia, Kosovo, BiH, and Macedonia.
He also emphasized that the EC would continue to be engaged
on the territories of Yugoslavia and that it must find further
solutions without time pressures and on the basis of consensus
of all members of the EU.177 In the view of the Maastricht conference,
on 10 December France tried to delay recognition of Croatia.
France suggested creation of a catalogue of criteria, and every
land that tried to get recognition would have to accept those
criteria. A special court would then decide whether this or
that land had fulfilled the criteria.178
The EC peace plan and EC policy, however, accepted the French
position that recognition could only come after arrangements
for human rights and common relations had been settled, as a
reward. The JNA had begun the withdrawal from Croatia on 28
November, five days after a promising cease-fire negotiated
by Vance had been signed at Geneva. On 2 December 1991 Genscher
demanded that the UNSC meet and discuss a possible UN peacekeeping
operation in Yugoslavia. The UNSC dealt with the crisis in Yugoslavia
again on 15 December 1991 and adopted UNSC Resolution 724 to
send a group of observers to Yugoslavia, to prepare the terrain
for a peacekeeping mission and report on how UNSC Resolution
713 was fulfilled. All UNSC member states were asked to establish
a body to ensure that the weapons embargo would be fulfilled.
The UN Secretary General, together with the Red Cross, UN High
Commissioner for Refugees, and other humanitarian organizations
were chosen to be responsible to coordinate activities in Yugoslavia.179
It is important to mention that this resolution did not mention
the question of recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. It did,
however, demand from all the states and groups of states that
they abstain from any activities that would further worsen or
sharpen conditions in Yugoslavia. However, in his speech in
Brussels on 16 December 1991, Genscher stated that this resolution
gave enough maneuvering space for recognition of Slovenia and
Croatia.180 Although UN Resolution 724 said conditions were
not yet ready for peacekeeping forces, Vance had by 15 December
made enough progress that the Security Council agreed to send
an advance team to prepare the way. So opposed to the German
logic were the negotiators, Britain and the U.S.A., that they
took the unusual diplomatic step of putting their protests into
writing. In letters to van den Broek, as chair of the troika,
and to Genscher, Lord Carrington, UN Secretary General Pérez
de Cuéllar, Cyrus Vance, and the U.S. administration pleaded
with Germans not to spoil the genuine progress toward a settlement.
In Carrington’s letter to van den Broek on 2 December 1991,
he warned that premature recognition of Slovenia and Croatia
by the EC “would undoubtedly mean the break-up of the conference”
and “might well be the spark that sets Bosnia-Herzegovina alight.”
Even President Izetbegovic made an emotional appeal to Genscher
in early December to not recognize Croatia prematurely, for
it would mean war in his republic.
Despite all this, at the all-night EC meeting of foreign ministers
in Brussels on 15–16 December, Chancellor Kohl refused to budge.
Although accused of locking the door and using bullying tactics,
Kohl in fact obtained the agreement of Britain, France, and
Spain by a compromise to preserve unity among the twelve EC
members on Yugoslavia: that all six republics of Yugoslavia
were eligible for recognition. The conditions required that
the republics request recognition formally by 23 December and
meet the criteria established by the Badinter Commission, including
a commitment to continue working toward an overall settlement
by 15 January 1992, and UN, EC, and CSCE criteria on the rule
of law, democracy, human rights, disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation,
regional security, the inviolability of frontiers, and guarantees
for the rights of ethnic and nationality groups and minorities.”181
Lord Carrington was unable to reconcile himself to this development,
and he and others criticized Germany.182 Germany’s success in
its campaign for recognition of Croatia and Slovenia was, as
Carrington warned in his letter to van den Broek, the death
knell to the peace negotiations. This view is disputed by Marko
Hoare in his comments, where he wrote:
“…In fact, it was precisely the "even-handed" approach of the
European powers, their unwillingness to take sides or to intervene
in force, that had encouraged the apparently stronger side—Serbia
and the JNA—to exploit this vacillation and attack. There were
many faults on the Croatian side – above all the demotion of
the status of Serbs in Croatia from 'nation' to 'minority',
something which could also be mentioned - but ultimately this
war involved an attack by one side against the other. Withholding
recognition from Croatia, the side that was attacked, 'as a
reward for a peaceful settlement', could not have worked because
it was not Croatia that was blocking a peaceful settlement.
On the contrary, Western pressure on Croatia to desist from
military actions against JNA forces had the unfortunate result
of aiding the latter—the very force that was responsible for
the war. Thus, as General Tus has stated in an interview, President
Tudjman cancelled a Croatian offensive to relieve Vukovar because
of Western pressure—the fall of Vukovar was therefore the result
of Western 'peacemaking.' Furthermore, the Geneva Agreement
of November, negotiated by Cyrus Vance, enabled the JNA to "withdraw"
from Croatia into Bosnia, while Croatian forces were not to
obstruct their withdrawal. This merely enabled Miloševic and
Blagoje Adžic to assemble their forces for the assault on Bosnia.
In other words, Western diplomacy during the war in Croatia,
based on the mistaken premise of arranging cease-fires and bringing
about a "compromise," simply paved the way for the worse conflagration
in Bosnia. Peace could only have come about if the Western powers
had been prepared to deliver a genuine check to Miloševic and
the JNA. Kohl's insistence on recognition for Croatia was a
diplomatically sensible effort to correct the balance in favor
of the side that was attacked, as only by bolstering Croatia
and Bosnia could Miloševic's expansionist ambitions be contained.
Insofar as Kohl's policy derailed Western diplomatic efforts,
this was potentially beneficial to peace, as Western "peacemaking"
was part of the problem. Following on from this, both Norman
Cigar and Martin Špegelj have written about how the JNA was
on the verge of military collapse in Croatia by late 1991. It
was the cease-fire resulting from the diplomatic efforts of
Vance and others that allowed the JNA to survive the war in
Croatia, technically undefeated, and to regroup to attack Bosnia.”
As Vance implored in his letter to Genscher in December 1991,
recognition had to be held out as a reward for a peaceful settlement.
To give up that weapon before such a settlement was reached
would mean more war. The EC decision in December to recognize
Croatia (and Slovenia) addressed neither the status of Serbs
in Croatia nor the fate of the population in the remaining four
republics. The internationalization of the crisis, most visibly
manifested in the belated announcement by the EC member states
in mid-December of the imminent recognition of Slovenia and
Croatia, also affected Miloševic’s calculations. Miloševic became
convinced, due to unfavorable currents of events, that Serbia
should look for help from the UN, where the idea of “Yugoslavia”
was still alive. Therefore the federal Government of Yugoslavia
on 25 December 1991 demanded intervention of the UN blue helmets
on occupied Croatian territories and asked de Cuéllar to personally
intervene in favor of the peace process “because the EC is acting
in favor of secessionists and violates international law.”183
However, this was mainly propaganda because de Cuéllar already
on 11 December had formally asked the UNSC to fulfill Vance’s
proposal to station UN troops in Croatia. The plan accepted
with Resolution 724 of 15 December was only finalized on 2 January
1992, signed at Sarajevo by military representatives of Croatia
and Yugoslavia. This so-called Vance Plan differed on many issues
from EC plans, which tried in vain to keep Yugoslavia intact.
The essence of the plan was to cease fighting on those territories
of Croatia that were occupied by the Serbs, and to restore mutual
respect and understanding between both quarreling nations as
the cornerstone for peaceful resolution of the conflict. In
addition to an arms embargo, the Vance plan called for the setting
up of four areas to be known as United Nations Protected Areas
(UNPA): East, West, North, and South. These would coincide roughly
with the three chunks of territory held by Serb and/or JNA forces
(the Krajina, western Posavina, and eastern Slavonia). Upwards
of 10,000 UN troops would be deployed in the UNPAs, for the
protection of the people there. In return, the JNA would withdraw
entirely from Croatia, and the Serb paramilitaries would be
disbanded and disarmed, surrendering their weapons either to
the JNA before withdrawal, or, if they preferred, to the UN
force, who would store them, intact, at locations inside the
UNPAs.184 The Vance plan also determined that in UNPA zones
the peace would be controlled by police units composed in accordance
with the ethnic structure that was in place before the fighting
started. It also guaranteed the return of refugees to their
homes. The Serb and Croat sides would agree to a cease-fire
that would, in effect, freeze the existing frontlines. The UN
Protection Force (or UNPROFOR, as it was to be known) would,
therefore, form a thin blue line separating the Serb-held areas
from the rest of Croatia. In spite of some deficiencies (e.g.,
no timetable for return of refugees to their homes was set),
the Vance plan inspired optimism that UN troops would be able
to calm the situation in Croatia.185 Tudjman proclaimed the
entrance of blue helmets into Croatian territory as an important
victory for Croatia. He was ready to fulfill the Vance plan
to please the international community, which demanded this to
recognize Croatia as an independent state.186
Miloševic acted similarly to Tudjman, accepting blue helmets
in Croatia. We presume that he believed that it meant the first
step towards the plebiscite to annex ethnically Serb parts of
Croatia to Serbia.187 The other possibility is that he thought
that coming in of blue helmets would freeze the existing lines
of confrontation, which would, in time, transform themselves
naturally into new, de facto international borders.188 Not all
of Serbia’s leaders shared his optimism. This became clear on
7 January 1992, when two jet planes of the Yugoslav army shot
down an EC helicopter above Varaždin, killing the French pilot
and four Italian observers.189
The leaders of the Krajina Serbs also opposed the peace plan.
Milan Babic, the leader of the Krajina Serbs (“president” of
the Republic of Srpska Krajina), was convinced that the withdrawal
of the Yugoslav army, the disarmament of local armed forces,
and the introduction of UN troops would lead to the eventual
restoration of Croat control.190 The Belgrade regime acted also
against the leadership of the Serbs of Knin. Miloševic and his
collaborators believed that Vance and the new UN Secretary General,
Boutros Boutros-Ghali from Egypt, were “realists,” i.e. pro-Serb,
and that it was worth engaging in polemics with the EC to support
their policy. Vance and Boutros-Ghali still treated the Yugoslav
wars as civil war and not as an international war that could
threaten international peace. UN Resolution 727 of 8 January
1992 was also in accordance with this approach, authorizing
sending 50 military liaison officers to promote maintenance
of the cease-fire, as if this were a fight between two armed
factions and the crisis stemming from it would not be problematic
to solve.191 In general, the international community dealt with
the conflict in the early stages of the war as if it were a
civil war. On the other hand Slovenes and Croats considered
the acts of the Yugoslav Army and Serb insurgents as acts of
aggression on the newly established states of Slovenia and Croatia.192
United Nations tended to be pro-Yugoslav or pro-Serb at the
beginning of the war. Yugoslavia as a state and Tito as co-founder
of non-aligned movement was after all one of the staunchest
supporters of the United Nations and its’ Secretary General
Boutros Gali used to serve as Egyptian foreign minister during
the period when non-aligned movement reached its’ peak. Also
Ghali was raised by a pro-Yugoslav Slovene girl from the Coasttland
region which suffered under Italians in the period between the
two World Wars. Pro-Yugoslav sentiments are also expressed in
general Mackenzie Memoires193
The first days of January 1992 were quite interesting in the
reactions of the international community towards the Yugoslav
crisis (preparations for the international recognition of Slovenia
and Croatia) as well as because Miloševic’s regime also declared
its (war) aims. Miloševic’s (war) aims were to create a rump
Yugoslavia that would also be the only lawful successor of the
former SFRY, in which all those who wanted to keep their Yugoslav
citizenship would live. It was an open call to arms to create
Great Serbia and the introduction to new wars.
On 13 January 1992, the Vatican recognized Slovenia and Croatia,
and the next day the Badinter Commission submitted its expected
evaluation of the candidates for recognition. The commission
recommended immediate recognition of Slovenia and Macedonia;
recognition of Croatia conditioned on certain assurances concerning
democratic principles, national minorities, and border protections;
and a referendum for Bosnia, which, crucially, was to be valid
only if all three communities (Serb, Croat, and Muslim) participated
in significant numbers. (The application from Kosovo was considered
invalid because it did not come from a recognized republic.)
In the cases of Croatia and Macedonia, the EC chose to be influenced
by political expediency rather than legal advice.194
As it occurred later, the commission’s opinion did not have
great influence on decisions of the EC states that had demanded
it. When they recognized Croatia and Slovenia on 15 January
1992, those states demanded that Croatia incorporate the necessary
corrections into its constitution. Croatia gave them then only
a written promise to do so (and the international community
had to wait until the change of regime in Croatia in the year
2000 for full compliance with this demand). Macedonia had to
wait for international recognition because the Greeks opposed
it on the grounds that the international community should not
recognize a state that had irredentist demands. This, in spite
of the fact that the EC demanded from the Macedonian government
that it ask for recognition and that the Badinter commission
wordily excluded any connection between the name of “Macedonia”
and irredentist demands towards neighboring lands.195
The problem of Macedonia
Macedonia had, however, to fight many problems in the international
arena. Although it got a positive recommendation for international
recognition from the Badinter Commission, it had to wait for
international recognition for some more time. Greece was most
opposed to the international recognition of Macedonia because
the Greeks did not like the Macedonian state symbols (especially
the flag) and the name “Macedonia.” Greece believed that the
name of Macedonia is exclusive property of the Greeks, and that
even the use of this name by a new state showed the irredentist
plans of this former Yugoslav republic towards Aegean Macedonia.
Because both states were not able to solve these problems, Greece
(the only ally of the Serbs in the Balkans) in 1992 introduced
economic sanctions against Macedonia and in fact stopped the
formation of the EU policy towards Macedonia.196
In 1992, the UN intervened, and the foreign ministers of Greece
and Macedonia met in New York and signed an agreement (on September
13, 1992) with which Greece gave up economic sanctions, but
Macedonia had to change its state flag because it contained
Greek symbols. By 1993 they were able to some extent to solve
disagreements on the name of the new state. Greece accepted
a temporary name for Macedonia – the “Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia,” and Macedonia became a member of the UN in April
1993 under this name.197
There were also quite a few unsolved questions in the new Macedonian
state’s relationship with the FRY. The question of the border
of the new state was especially burdensome. At the request of
the Macedonian government, because of the spread of the war
in Croatia and BiH, the NATO peacekeeping forces of 1,000 American
soldiers were stationed at the border of Macedonia with the
FRY to prevent spreading of the war to Macedonian territories
(UNSC Resolution 795, 9 December 1992). The USA and Western
European countries were aware of the fact that the eruption
of military fighting in Macedonia could provoke a wider crisis
in Southeastern Europe, in which Serbia, Albania, Bulgaria,
and the NATO members Turkey and Greece could get involved due
to historic circumstances. Therefore, the international community
could not allow destabilization of Macedonia.198 The international
community was also aware of the unrest and dissatisfaction of
the Albanians of Macedonia, who were making the Macedonian government
unstable and unhappy with new demands that included primarily
questions of the status of the Albanian language. The growing
ethnic distance between the Macedonians and Albanians in the
second half of the 1990s erupted later into a conflict.199
Endnotes
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