
Changing Interests and Identities
in European Border Regions:
A State of the Art Report on the Italo-Slovene Border
by Jeremy Faro
The Italo-Slovene Borderland:
An Introduction to the Frontier, its Population, and EU Led
Cross-Border Cooperation
The ‘natural’ boundary between Italy and Slovenia-the
summit line of the Julian Alps-arrives suddenly, just north
of metropolitan Trieste, amidst the morphologically non-linear
Karst: those classical, jagged limestone hills, caves, and pits
created over millennia by underground rivers which have given
their name to similar geological formations around the world.
The ‘precise’ boundary thus transforms into what
political geographers would call a ‘frontier’-an
imprecise borderland into which settlements expand, where territories
begin and end, and wherein civilisations have historically clashed
and enmeshed.1 The Italo-Slovene frontier-which, from its origin
at the two nations’ mutual border with Austria, describes
what many have deemed the meeting-point of Europe’s three
great, historic civilisations and ethno-linguistic groups, the
Romance, Germanic, and Slavonic-has also been one of European
history’s most violently fraught, most famously so in
the 20th century. Yet, the degeneration of that frontier at
the end of the Second World War into a genocide area was not
due to the region’s historic and enduring multicultural
composition, but rather the impossibility of dividing it along
ethnic lines (Gross 1978).
Competing, ‘self-completing’ nationalist projects
in Italy and the emergent Yugoslavia had incited both to fight
against the Habsburgs for the liberation of their brethren in
the frontier in World War One, and thus to lay simultaneous
claim thereafter to a frontier which had been and multilingual
and multicultural since the 6th century AD. The addition of
an ideological struggle for the frontier-incorporated into Italy
after the First World War-fought largely (though not without
exceptions) along nationalist lines exacerbated the conflict
over to which nation the frontier ‘belonged’ as
World War II came to its conclusion. It is the memory of Italian
fascism’s brutal oppression of the region’s Slovenes
and Croats, and the ‘retribution’ for it which came
in the deportation, summary execution, and ultimate exodus of
the bulk of the Istrian Italophone population, which continues
to fuel contemporary skepticism of the ‘other’ community
between the majority Italophone and minority Slovenophone populations
on the Italian side of the border.2
While the Italian and Slovene minorities’ protections
within Italy and the former Yugoslavia were legally described
in the 1975 Osimo Treaty (which fixed the border between the
two states), the legal protection of the estimated 80-100,000
Slovenophones in Italy continues to evolve to this day. Rights
to Slovene-language education, public address, and toponomastic
signage vary between the three provinces in which the Italian
Slovenophones live-Udine (Videm), Gorizia (Gorica), and Trieste
(Trst). The latter two, post-war provinces provide the greatest
de jure (if not de facto) protection due to their being subject
to the Allied-coordinated post-WWII Peace Treaty between Italy
and Yugoslavia. Though the region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia has
been officially autonomous since 1967 due to its multicultural
nature, much of the interpretation and implementation of the
various minority protections has been left at the discretion
of the municipal level; indeed, the Italian parliament only
formally recognised the Slovenophones (and those of the province
of Udine among them, having been resident in Italy since 1866)
as a ‘national’ minority in 2001. In comparison,
the roughly 3,000 Italophones of the Slovene littoral-who live
within four officially bilingual municipalities, Portoro-Portorose,
Piran-Pirano, Izola-Isola, and Koper-Capodistria-are constitutionally
guaranteed the full protection and permanent representation
as an autochthonous minority. The lack of a regional administrative
level in Slovenia, however, has meant that the bilingual ‘littoral’
has had far less freedom to act on a bilateral basis than the
Italian region across the border.3
The evolving nature of the Italo-Slovene border-and the politico-economic
identity it initially helped frame as southernmost portion of
the ‘Iron Curtain’-continues to impact upon the
populations it circumscribes and divides, most dramatically
so in the latter half of the 20th century. With the accession
of Slovenia to the EU in May 1994, many observers believe that
the rift between the communities would finally be healed; nevertheless,
the persistence of historical memory among segments of the population-and
those they elect to represent them-potentially threatens to
be a barrier to socio-economic integration, as it has been in
the past, as well as to the ability of the Triestine economy
to resuscitate after a half-century of stagnation.
The EU, meanwhile, has made a substantial investment in cross-border
cooperation as a means of enhancing socio-economic integration
across its internal and external borders since the early 1990s.
This has occurred primarily through the Interreg Community Initiative,
financed since 1991 through the Structural Funds. Along the
EU’s internal borders, such investment has been made due
to its recognition that the frontiers between the member-states
should function as the Union's connective tissue, rather than
remain developmental gaps. Along its external borders, investment
in borderland integration processes have provided one means
of adapting and bringing what are now the new member states
closer to the EU. At the same time, cross-border regional policy
has been seen as a means of building networks-economic, cultural,
infrastructural, inter-personal-among ethno-linguistically heterogeneous
populations who remain skeptical of one another due to the legacies
of fascism and the Second World War. This report will examine
the impact of EU-led financial intervention upon the Slovenophone
minority in Italy through looking at the potentially mobilizing
effects of the socio-economic initiatives Interreg supports,
the infrastructural linkages it creates, the incentives it provides
for bilateral and inter-ethno-linguistic-community cooperation,
and the person-to-person networks it aims to create among and
across the region’s border.

An
Overview of Italo-Slovene Borderland and Minority Relations,
1918-2004
The Ethnicity and Geography of the Italo-Slovene Borderland,
1918-1945
In 1918, at the conclusion of the First World War and upon the
collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Duchy of Görz,
most of the province of Carniola, and the entirety of the Karstic
littoral or ‘Julian March’-including the great Austrian
port at (then) Triest-were awarded to the Kingdom of Italy.4
Italy’s entrance into the war on the side of the Triple
Entente, indeed, had been predicated upon such territorial redistribution
at the conclusion of a successful campaign, as secretly agreed
in the 1915 Treaty of London. In the eyes of Italian irredentists,
the Great War had been ‘the last war of the Risorgimento,’
(Roberts 1996:448).5 Italy’s territorial claims, however,
had been economically and strategically defensive, in addition
to nationalist, ones, insofar as the Austro-Hungarian territory
it requested aimed to ensure Italian politico-economic hegemony
over the entirety of the Upper Adriatic, and to geographically
hinder, insofar as possible, any future Germanic invasion of
Italy. Locally, the move sought to consolidate power among the
urban, coastal Italian population-who, though in greatest concentration
in Trieste, also dominated the civic life of Capodistria (Koper
in Slovene, Kopar in Croatian), Pola (Pulj/Pula), and Rovigno
(Rovinj), among other cities-which had previously been one among
several, regional minorities within Austria-Hungary. This consolidation
of politico-economic and territorial power among the Italophone
community was to the disadvantage of the region’s substantial,
but primarily rural-agricultural, Slovene and Croatian populations
(both of which had been rapidly adding to their historic presence
in metropolitan Trieste throughout the late nineteenth century
during the Habsburg-led development boom in the city-region)
in terms of their increasingly limited abilities to develop
a middle class and representative cultural and economic institutions.
At the 1919 Peace Conference both the Italians and the then-Kingdom
of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes presented competing demographic
and geopolitical arguments to support their respective claims
to the Julian March.6 Finally, in 1920, the Treaty of Rapallo
confirmed roughly the eastern third of present-day Slovenia
as part of Italy, bringing 300,000 Slovenes into the kingdom-a
quarter of the total Slovene population in Europe at the time
(Pirjevec and Kacin Wohinz 1988:30).7 The ‘relocation’
of such a substantial portion of the small nation’s population
to a larger state still contributes to Slovenia’s sense
of cultural peril at the hands of its larger neighbours: ‘the
tendency to feel like a small nation, divided between three
diverse states, with an very high percentage of its co-national
inhabitants outside the territory of the national “hearth”
in relation to the total population….This is a political
and psychological reality that often escapes the Italian side,’
(Ara 1997:xiii). The fact that the Rapallo Treaty required the
Yugoslav government to protect the Dalmatian Italophones, but
neglected to require the Italian government to undertake the
same towards its Slavonic populations-insofar as it was then
considered ‘insulting’ to make such a requirement
of a victorious Great Power-only contributed to Slovenia’s
sense of powerlessness to protect the cultural development of
its brethren newly abroad (Sluga 2001:42). Despite growing cultural,
social, and economic strength, the Slovene minority in Italy
at the time ‘politically had not matured the request for
an autonomous and independent state [and thus] remained on their
own part internally divided and indecisive with respect to the
possibility or the necessity of recognizing as a state of reference
the just-born Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and
to support, as a result, adhesion to it,’ (Bratina 1997:128;
translation mine).
With the onset of the Fascist era in the early 1920s, the Slovenophone
community in Italy was subjected (along with the Istrian Croatophones
and Tyrolean Germanophones) to a concerted, often brutal, Italianisation
campaign, which increased in its intensity throughout the 1930s.8
Activities to this end spanned the demise of non-Italian ethno-cultural
institutions, a ban on speaking and publishing in Slovene, encouraged
resettlement of Italians within the region and non-Italophones
without, as well as the ‘aesthetic improvement’
of Slovene place names and surnames, all of which resulted in
heavy Slovenophone out-migration.9 Fascist political discourse
justified these actions on the basis that ‘the ideal nation
was culturally homogenous by virtue of its ability to absorb
and assimilate other cultures, and that the Balkans was the
antithesis of this idea,’ (Sluga 2001: 47). The visual
and rhetorical erasure of extant, alternative cultural histories
in the ‘new’ territories of ‘Venezia Giulia’
(known as the Julijska Krajina, ‘Julian March,’
in Slovene) sought to consolidate Italy’s geopolitical
control over the territory. Indeed, the region’s seamless,
functional commercial Italophonia until the rise of 19th-century
nationalism and irredentism was a reality which Italian fascism
rendered permanently politicized through its efforts to enforce
what came naturally in the marketplace within school, church,
and home, and which furthermore only served to further Slovene
and Croatian national consciousness in the wider region (Novak
1970).
Fascist Italy invaded Yugoslavia in 1941 with the intention
of seizing the Dalmatian coast; by 1942, it had seized and incorporated
most of Dalmatia into Italy, and also occupied Slovenia as far
east as Ljubljana. The Allied landing in Sicily in July 1943
and the arrest of Mussolini two weeks later suddenly called
Italy’s pre- and intra-war territorial gains into question,
and ennobled the partisan forces fighting under Tito-who would
in November of that year declare the foundation of the Socialist
Republic of Yugoslavia at Jajce in Bosnia-to make plans to claim
Trieste and Istria. The Nazis, meanwhile, prepared for the worst,
and seized the Julian March and Istria in anticipation of an
Italian collapse; these were transformed into the Reich province
of Adriatisches Küstenland, and were thus substantially
isolated from Italian national life for the remainder of the
war. During the final course of the war, the towns and valleys
of the Julian March changed hands several times, seeing bitter
partisan warfare, largely coordinated by the Communist Sloveno-Italian
Liberation Front, against the Fascist and, later, Nazi occupiers.10
Indeed, the utter volatility of the area, and the success of
the partisan attacks against the Nazi occupying forces after
Italy’s volte-face in the war, led the Nazis to create
the only extermination camp on Italian soil, at the Risiera
(rice mill) of San Sabba in Trieste, where an estimated 3,000-5,000
persons lost their lives, the majority of whom were Slavic antifascists
(Ballinger 2003a; Sluga 1996; Fölkel 1979; Bon Gherardi
1972).
On 1 May 1945, Trieste was liberated from Nazi control (or,
according to some of the Italian historiography, re-occupied)
by Yugoslav forces led by Tito, and the diplomatic struggle
for the annexation of the (never-realised) ‘Free Territory
of Trieste’-which was to last for nearly a decade-began.
While residual contemporary mistrust of the Italians among some
Slovenophone factions relates primarily to the Fascist Italianisation
campaign-and is symbolised in historical memory by the Risiera-contemporary
Italian extremism toward the Slovenes relates to the consolidation
of Yugoslav comunist-partisan power in Istria and the harsh,
42-day Yugoslav occupation of Trieste, during which an unknown
number of Italians in Trieste and Istria were thrown to their
deaths in the Karst foibe.11 The exodus of the majority of the
Italophone population of the Slovene littoral and Istria (estimated
at between 200,000 and 350,000 people) during and after the
war-due to the witnessing of deportations of Italians and rumours
of further infoibati-ultimately resulted in a magnificent change
in the region’s ethno-cultural composition, as as as a
massive and difficult population shift toward refugee camps
in Trieste and Gorizia, resettlement elsewhere in Italy, and
migration abroad.12 Land in the primarily Slovenophone Triestine
upland was expropriated to provide temporary shelter for the
esuli or ‘exiles,’ which further contributed to
local ethnic hostility.13 Meanwhile, several thousand Italian
communist workers from the shipyards of Monfalcone, meanwhile,
relocated to Yugoslavia (and, according to some Italian accounts,
were then executed), whilst the Italian Communist Party (PCI)
welcomed their brethren in the Yugoslav army as they occupied
Venezia Giulia; in doing so, the PCI were left ‘hopelessly
exposed’ to attacks from the Italian right wing that they
were merely pawns of Stalin and Tito (Ginsborg 1990:104). The
Istrians who left, as well as those who remained in what was
to become communist Yugoslavia, were, regardless of their relative
innocence or guilt, collectively stained with the ‘excesses’
of fascism, and as such they were destined to pay for fascism’s
crimes; the PCI’s labeling of the exiles as such indeed
led to their lending their electoral support to the revanchist
and ‘post-fascist’ Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI),
who were to dominate the Triestine and Gorizian political scene
for decades in the guise of the exiles’ protector (Ballinger
2003a:202). As one exile from Pula-Pola noted, ‘Those
who pretended to be our defenders were those very fascists who
started the war, lost it, and for while, and for which we paid
[with our land], (cited in Ballinger 2003a:202).
The obsessive remembering of the tragedy of the foibe by the
Triestine right-wing-which, combined with their revanchist territorial
aspirations, ultimately resulted in the city being viewed as
an extremist liability to be rendered politically marginalized
as the international political environment attempted to reconstruct
itself and its interconnections in the post-war era-was, in
essence, a response by the periphery to a conscious ‘forgetting’
which took place at the nation’s centre (Favretto 2003;
Valdevit 1999). As early as 1945, Istria ‘had become an
embarrassing theme,’ (Spanò 1995:152). Indeed,
the silence regarding the foibe was intricately tied to the
nation’s collective lapse of memory regarding the Fascist
era and its aftermath (akin to Austria’s, for instance,
in direct contrast to Germany’s own process of Vergangenheitsbewältigung).
Italy’s refusal to accept responsibility for the crimes
of fascism in the former Yugoslavia link variously to its national
embarrassment that its war-time occupation had been a resolute
failure, to its insistence that it had behaved nobly in contrast
to the Germans and the Croats, and more broadly to its national
conviction that it had been opposed to fascism and thus firmly
aligned with the partisan and Allied struggle against it at
the end of the war-with the direct conclusion that it should
not be subject to war-crimes tribunals and excessive reparations
(cf. Rodogno 2003; Rodogno 2004; Petrusewicz 2004; Pavone 2004).
The debate over the pre- and post-war history of Trieste was
thus one increasingly confined to historiography, wherein a
flood of nationalist historians and journalists-with many exiles
among them-published mostly one-sided accounts of the conflict
over the region, and which, in later accounts, began to link
the foibe to a ‘Balkan’ predilection for ethnic
cleansing.14 Slovene historians, meanwhile, have recently begun
to reply with the ‘equation’ of the abuses of fascism
(with the Risiera being their apotheosis) and the retributions
enacted against the populations’ tormentors in the foibe
in the brutal, final days. This, in turn, has engendered its
own response: the Italian historian Giampaolo Valdevit had argued
that the ‘tit-for-tat’ construction employed in
Slovene historiography is inaccurate, insofar as both the Risiera
and the foibe must be seen as linked to the violent processes
of state formation occurring on both sides of the nascent Cold-war
border; as fascism inexorably led to concentration camps, the
deportations and summary executions seen in Istria are by the
same process inextricably linked to Tito’s extermination
of the Slovenian Germanophones and the foundation of the notorious
Yugoslav gulag for co-national ‘enemies of the people’
on Goli Otok (cf. Valdevit 1999).
The debates regarding suffering and loss in this period are
thus almost by nature mutually exclusionary ones (although balanced
accounts do exist), with the Risiera and the foibe (the latter
far more obsessively, as noted by RAI’s 2005 national
broadcast of the foibe-themed drama Il Cuore nel pozzo, ‘The
Heart in the pit’) demarcating opposite identities, histories,
and memories for the region’s population (cf. Ballinger
2004; Ballinger 2003a; Sluga 2001; Sluga 1996). Such relentless
rhetorical exclusion of the mutual culpability has, in turn,
produced its own political implications; for some Italian factions
in Trieste, ‘the historical ‘crime’ of the
foibe deprives contemporary Slovenes of any basis for demanding
that Italy honor its international treaty agreements concerning
minority protection,’ (Ballinger 2004:149; cf. Spanò
1995). That ‘conclusion’ on the part of the Triestine
right, indeed, was one which was both firmly juxtaposed with
the reality that advances in minority protection were an international
litmus test for post-war Italy’s democratic credentials,
and nefariously prevented the full implementation of local minority
protections due to local obstructionism (Favretto 2003:179).
As noted above, the relative protection of the Slovenophone
minority had remained firmly linked to territory, and yet, as
will be discussed subsequently, is a process that has further
been subject to localised efforts at promoting and obstructing
its full implementation.
The Ethnicity and Geography of
the Italo-Slovene Borderland, 1945-2004
The Allies assumed control of urban Trieste, the smaller port
of Muggia (Milje in Slovene) to its south, and a narrow, coastal
corridor linking them with Monfalcone and Gorizia, on 12 June
1945, an area thereafter demarcated as ‘Zone A.’
‘Zone B’, which comprised the Triestine hinterland,
the Slovene littoral below Muggia, and northwestern Istria,
came under Yugoslav administration at the same time.15 Several
attempts were made by the delegations of Yugoslavia and Italy
with the other Great Powers to divide the region along ethnic
lines, despite the fact that no ‘ideal’ line existed.
Such extensive, high-level negotiations took place because ‘the
Julian problem’ had become a microcosm of ‘global
negotiation and of relations between East and West,’ (Valussi
1972:200, translation mine).16 Outside of the so-defined ‘Free
Territory of Trieste,’ the 1947 Peace Treaty between the
Allied Powers and Italy eventually employed the French delegation’s
cartographic proposal to assign the Resia, Canal, and Natisone
valleys, as well as the urban Gorizia and Monfalcone, to Italy;
the remainder of the territory of the former Italian province
of Venezia Giulia was assigned to Yugoslavia.17 In addition
to isolating Trieste geographically from both Italy and Slovenia
(then within Yugoslavia), the post-war demarcation of the border
also isolated it commercially. Indeed, despite insistence during
the negotiations that the division of the region avoid its economic
ruination, Trieste’s new ‘location,’ compounded
by chilly relations between Italy and Yusgolavia, resulted almost
immediately in the profound disruption and stagnation of the
entire regional economy; the rural hinterland of Trieste lost
its commercial centre and outlet, while Trieste lost its sources
of agricultural production as well as its transport routes into
the Danube basin. Slovenia, meanwhile, would remain without
an Adriatic port until the enlargement of Koper-Capodistria
beginning in 1957.
This time cowed by its wartime volte-face, Italy eventually
agreed to be signatory to minority protection agreements with
both Yugoslavia and Austria. While these provisions were largely
ones which had already been informally agreed to after World
War I (and thus far never implemented), Italy now understood
in signing them the precedent they would set in protecting its
own minorities remaining in territories now ‘abroad’
(Alcock 1970:143). As noted above, the precise interpretation
of the agreements’ terms still, however, remained open
to domestic interpretation in Italy’s perspective; the
largely ignored provisions regarding the Slovenophone minority
were, indeed, once again reinserted into the 1975 Osimo Treaty.
A variety of reasons stood behind Italy’s long-standing
non-implementation of the full-extent of its protection commitments
to its Slovenophone minority: its ‘victor’ status
and ‘moral’ capital versus communist Yugoslavia
(and the Slovenes in Italy by association) during the Cold War;
its lack of acceptance of its (mutual) culpability for the ‘loss’
of the historic Italophone communities in the Slovene littoral
and Istria (which coincided with its pressure for protection
toward the rimasti, or ‘those who remained); its relative,
practical lack of experience with the legal and institutional
development of regional autonomy and minority protection; its
fears of secessionist movements in the autonomous regions; lack
of mobilization on the part of the Slovenophone minority (unlike
the terrorist acts perpetrated by Germanophone factions in South
Tyrol, which aimed, however violently, toward furthering discussion
regarding their autonomy statute); Yugoslavia’s lack of
initiative in internationalizing the minority issue (as Austria
did with the Germanophones), likely due to their reluctance
to jeopardize preferential foreign aid and trade agreements
following their ejection from the Soviet bloc; and, the local
power of the Triestine right-wing to block implementation of
bilingual signage, et al., on the ‘understood’ basis
of Italy’s failures to deliver on its promises to its
Istrian refugees. One further, obstacle for harmonizing the
minority protection in Friuli-Venezia Giulia was the historic
lack of protection afforded the ‘frozen’ Slovenophone
communities of ‘Venetian Slovenia’; an inability
to agree upon the terms and geographical extent of minority
protection in the province of Udine stalled discussion of further
developments in the neighbouring provinces and toward a regional
(or ‘global’) norm (Bratina 1997:129, 139).
The zonal demarcation of Trieste became the de facto international
boundary following the 1954 London Memorandum. Considerations
of the formation of a multi-ethnic free state centred upon Trieste
and the rights of communities in the region to ethnic self-determination
had been quickly overshadowed, as noted above, by the politico-economic
polarisation of Europe and Allied fear of a potentially Communist
Italy. Control of Trieste had been believed to be critical in
Yugoslavia due to its strategic economic location vis-à-vis
Slovenia, the size of its working-class population, and ‘its
role as a stronghold of the Communist camp against western influence
and the starting-point for the expansion of communism to the
West, especially to northern Italy,’ (SIHCC 2001:146).
While the emerging Cold War thus ensured that Trieste returned
to Italy, the looming split between Belgrade and Moscow (in
large part due to the Yugoslavia’s continued claim to
Trieste) rapidly altered the relationship between the West and
Yugoslavia.18
Beginning in the latter half of the 1950s, political relations
between Italy and Yugoslavia began to normalize-though mutual
minority protection, per se, was never the stated or decisive
factor for doing so (Bratina 1997:130)-leading to the beginnings
of regional and borderland economic re-integration. Citizens
of both nations began to cross the local border to visit relatives
and on errands-Slovenes to shop for household goods unavailable
in Yugoslavia and Italians to purchase cheaper petrol-with increasing
frequency following the signing of bilateral agreements on the
movement of borderland residents in 1955. Indeed, Slovenia’s
burgeoning economic success relative to the other republics
of Yugoslavia provided ever-increasing opportunities for heightened
economic relations with Italy. The divide between the Allies’
original geo-political strategy behind the borderland demarcation
and the daily socio-economic reality of the Italo-Yugoslav borderland
widened throughout the 1960s and 1970s: ‘In the spring
of 1945, the Yugoslavs were willing to risk war with the U.S.
and Great Britain in order to claim territory given to Austria
or Italy at Versailles with substantial Slavic populations and
in particular Trieste itself. Thirty years later, ordinary Yugoslavs
would remark that, ‘“had we gotten Trieste, we would
have had to drive all the way to Milan to shop”,’
(cited in Zimmerman 1987:15).19 At the same time, relations
between the Slovenophone minority in Italy with Slovenia (within
Yugoslavia) began to normalize, and, in some ways, ‘institutionalise’
through economic and cultural support mechanisms (Bratina 1997:130).
The era saw the formation of the first, post-war Slovene community
association in Italy, the Slovensko kulturno gospodarska zveza
(SKGZ, ‘Slovene cultural-economic union’), which
maintained ties with the Slovenian socialist party, and, in
the 1970s, Italy’s first Slovene political party, the
Catholic/Liberal Slovenska skupnost (SSk, ‘Slovene Union’)
(Bratina 1997:130). Due to its unique ethno-linguistic composition
and the frontier-related political problématique it faced,
Friuli-Venezia Giulia was subsequently granted its own regional
parliament and autonomous status within the Italian republic
in 1964.20 The Triestine historian Elio Apih notes that, by
the mid-1960s, ‘greater and more equitable Slovene participation
in civic life stabilized, even if the effects were limited and
transitory, and one can say that this fact, together with the
institution of the [autonomous] region, signaled the definitive
exit of [majority] Triestine political life from the period
of post-fascism,’ (Apih 1988:189).
De jure sovereignty over the existing border, sanctioned by
the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, was finally formalised in the subsequent
1975 Treaty of Osimo. Negotiation over the Osimo Accords involved
substantial discussion-if little subsequent implementation-of
cross-border, economic-integration-related measures throughout
the borderland region. The extensive economic cooperation foreseen
in the accords was by and large never pursued, however, due
to what is widely (and perhaps ‘politely’) perceived
to be lack of interest among local political and economic actors.21
The additional stipulations in the accords regarding the enhanced
protection of minority linguistic rights and culture in both
countries were, indeed, only fully implemented by Yugoslavia
(and continued by the Republic of Slovenia) until the Italy
Parliament finally ratified the Osimo-era legislation on the
protection of its Slovenophone minority in February 2001-after
a delay of three decades. This delay was due to both to resistance
by politicians representing some of the municipalities in Friuli-Venezia
Giulia, and primarily due to disagreement over the geographical
extent of its minority protections within the province of Udine
(where the Slovenophone community, which has resided within
Italy’s borders since 1866, is scattered across dozens
of mainly sparsely-populated municipalities).
The minority-protection provisions of the Osimo Treaty concerned
the right to Slovene-language education and press, to Slovenophone
political, cultural, and recreational organizations, and a commitment
to the community’s overall equitable socio-economic development-obligations
which in retrospect were among ‘the non-realised or dropped
Osimo Agreement stipulations, (SGPRMO 2000).’ Furthermore,
the educational provisions were limited to the provinces of
Trieste and Gorizia, and, critically, did not include a reciprocal
provision mandating courses in Slovene language and culture
in Italian schools; this was in direct contrast to the Slovene
littoral, where each resident of the bilingual communities is
educated to native fluency in both languages in order to ensure
the equal civic participation of the minority. As a result,
knowledge of the Slovenophone community and its history in Friuli-Venezia
Giulia has generally remained isolated within the community
itself.
Attempts by the Italian Communist Party (PCI) in 1970 to introduce
Slovenophone minority-protection legislation into the Italian
Senate for the first time were ultimately unsuccessful. Attention-primarily
academic but also to some extent civic-in borderland region
in the 1970s, meanwhile, turned the threat of assimilation in
light of this reality, noting that the stability of the Slovenophone
minority was potentially endangered by the increasing rate on
inter-cultural marriages, the continuing ‘expropriation’
of territory in Slovenophone municipalities for industrial purposes
as well as by Italophone re-settlement within them, sub-average
higher-educational enrollment and qualifications within the
community, minimal average capital accumulation in local financial
institutions, the continuing, commonplace perspective of their
culture being a ‘subaltern’ one (Apih 1988:195;
cf. Provincia di Trieste 1981). Furthermore, cultural development
in and of itself was obstructed by the absence of a ‘culture
of cohabitation,’ the lack of educational administrative
autonomy, and the continuing, seemingly endless legal debate
over a ‘global protection’ statute for the region-which
would, in particular, ‘officialise’ public use of
the Slovene language (Apih 1988:196). Indeed, a ‘Catch-22’
presented itself, in which the extent of official Slovene language
protection needed to be determined (in the province of Udine
in particular), but wherein the ‘ethnic’ census
required for doing so was refused for differing reasons on both
sides of the debate, i.e., for fear of increasing/decreasing
the estimated number of Slovenes in Italy (Apih 1988:196).22
In reality, the overall debate became one over whether all of
the region’s Slovenophones (i.e., including the ‘historic’
population of Venetian Slovenia) should be seen as Italian citizens
who spoke Slovene, or rather as Slovenes of Italian citizenship
(Apih 1988:196). All of these factors ultimately threatened
the wider development of a distinctly Slovene middle class in
the region, and this despite the fact that Trst remained-and
would continue to retain vast potential for becoming-the de
facto (if not de jure) seat of capitalist economic power of
the wider region’s Slovene population (Sapelli 1988:259-260).
The late 1980s and early 1990s saw fundamental change in the
Italian political environment, with the end of the Grand (anti-Communist)
Coalition between the Christian Democrats (DC) and the Socialists
(PSI) due to several factors: the end of the Cold-War removing
the ideologically and geopolitically ‘protective’
need for their coalition within the Italian Republic; the national
exposure of widespread and hopelessly incriminating corruption
by senior members of both parties alongside their collusion
with the Mafia and other Italian criminal organizations, as
revealed in the Tangentopoli (‘Bribesville’) investigations
undertaken by an emboldened Italian judiciary and ultimately
leading to the utter demise of both parties; and, the rise of
new political parties simultaneously and in their places, in
particular the separatist (and often xenophobic) Lega Nord (LN,
‘Northern League’).23 While Lega Nord’s rhetoric
was frequently racist, its targets were the economic migrants
from the Italian South resident in the North (and indeed, the
entire economic ‘abyss’ of ‘Rome and below’),
alongside the new generation of excomunitari (non-European Community)
immigrants within Italy generally. The Slovenes themselves remained
the preferred target of the MSI, rechristened as the ‘new,
no-longer-post-fascist’ Alleanza Nazionale (AN, ‘National
Alliance’) in 1994.24
Within Friuli-Venezia Giulia, the fundamentally altered Italian
electoral climate saw the PCI’s voters divided between
the PDS and Rifondazione, with some movement toward LN, while
the PSI’s electorate remained faithful to the local Slovene
left, with some defections toward the Catholic SSk (Bratina
1997:141). The Istrian exile/right-wing community, meanwhile,
continued its support for MSI through AN, with much of the remaining
local vote going toward Lega Nord and Silvio Berlusconi’s
new centre-right party, Forza Italia. Despite its xenophobic
rhetoric, Lega Nord’s calls for separatism (later merely
enhanced federalism) appealed across the board in the autonomous
regions, gaining it substantial support in both Friuli-Venezia
Giulia and Trentino-Alto Adige (cf. Tambini 2001). Lega Nord
even opened an office in Slovenia, but ultimately proved to
have an incoherent strategy towards both independent Slovenia
and the Slovenes (Sema 1996:81).
Meanwhile, despite the Osimo Treaty, the Italo-Slovene border
once again became a ‘contestable’ one beginning
with Slovenia’s independence from Yugoslavia in 1991.
The incipient disintegration of Yugoslavia ‘allowed’
several issues which had been formally settled at Osimo to resurface:
beyond the central issue of Slovenia’s succession in treaties
concluded between Italy and Yugoslavia, political actors in
Italy specifically raised the issues of compensation for, and
recuperation of, property abandoned by Italians in the Slovene
littoral, as well as the level of protection afforded the Italophone
minority within Slovenia and in relationship to its counterpart
in Croatia in the context of the two nations’ secession
from the federal Yugoslav state.25 Indeed, Slovenia’s
relationship with Italy ‘was probably the single factor
that could have destabilised the country internally and thwarted
its European ambitions,’ (Gow and Carmichael 2000:204)
insofar as the Italian government presented ‘essentially
bilateral problems as European ones’ and in doing so ‘did
not hesitate to put pressure on Slovenia to prove its “Europeanness”’
in resolving them to its satisfaction (Šabic 2002:105).
Amidst the rapidly evolving Italian political environment of
the early 1990s, the foibe, as ever, thus resumed their role
as ‘an obsession in moments of national and political
uncertainty,’ (Pupo 1996:35).
During the first Berlusconi administration, ‘Slovene’
issues appeared at the level of Italian foreign policy, most
directly in Italy’s insistence upon Slovenia’s harmonisation
of property rights prior to signing its Association Agreement
with the EU, alongside intermittent threats to veto its accession
if it did not comply.26 Indeed, within the governing coalition
of Forza Italia, Alleanza Nazionale, and Lega Nord, it was AN’s-and
Trieste’s own-Roberto Menia who personally interceded
with party leader Gianfranco Fini (who, infamously, had once
referred to Mussolini ‘the greatest statesman of the century’)
to block Slovenia’s accession process (Manzin 1997:56,162;
Statera 1994). Italy’s actions-on behalf of the Triestine
right wing-were ‘a challenge to the EU’s Common
Foreign and Security Policy’ as well as its enlargement
policy regarding a prime candidate for accession, (Gow and Carmichael
2000:206). Such robust support for continued Italian intransigence
toward Slovenia among AN voters and other factions in Trieste
(and elsewhere) thus continued to sour local inter-ethnic relations
generally on the eve of a potential rapprochement between the
borderland minority communities and ‘their’ nations
and a new, geopolitical dawn. Indeed, bilateral relations between
Italy and Slovenia-and protests by the Istrian exile community
in support of a hard-line stance toward the newly independent
state-frequently set the tone for local minority-majority relations
within the provinces of Trieste and Gorizia in the early 1990s.
Slovenia, in turn, defensively-and somewhat justifiably, as
Italy still then offered its Slovenophone minority far more
limited linguistic rights than Slovenia did its Italophones-formally
raised the question of the level of protection afforded the
Slovenophone minority across the border. Meanwhile, in Article
64 of it Constitution of December 1991, Slovenia had enshrined
the protection of its Italophone minority (3,064 persons, according
to the 1991 census) guaranteeing it, among other provisions,
the right to free use of its national symbols, material and
moral support from the state for the community’s development,
compulsory bilingual education in the communities wherein the
minority resides, and permanent representation in the Slovene
Parliament-in short, in a manner considered exemplary within
Europe (Roter 2003).27
While a majority within the Italian Camera dei Deputati had
passed a resolution in October 1991 demanding recognition of
Slovenia, this, significantly, was not acted upon by the Italian
state in an individual capacity. Within that particular debate,
both MSI and the extreme-right (by some accounts, openly racist)
Lista per Trieste had argued for revision of the Osimo Treaty
prior to Slovenia’s recognition (Sema 1994:218-219). Italy
only recognized Slovenia in conjunction with the other member-states
of the EU on 16 January 1992, following Germany’s unilateral
decision to recognise Slovenia (and Croatia) on 23 December
1991. Indeed, according to former Slovenian Foreign Minister
Dimitrij Rupel, ‘Italy and its Foreign Minister De Michelis
were really hard to persuade. Together with the Americans, they
were our severest critics,’ (Rupel 1994:191). Following
(indeed, because of) the collapse of the first Berlusconi government
in autumn 1994, the Spanish Presidency of the EU, under Javier
Solana, was in December 1995 finally able to broker an intergovernmental
compromise to the property-claims issue-and thus to find a path
toward the ratification of Slovenia’s Association Agreement,
insofar as Italians’ ability to (re)purchase property
in Slovenia was Italy’s pre-condition for ratifying it.28
During the brief Dini administration, Italy proved more willing
to cooperate with Slovenia, and the Prodi administration, which
came into power in May 1996, finally signed Slovenia’s
Association Agreement the following month. Given the amount
of attention the issue has garnered, it is ironic that more
Germans and Austrians made use of the Spanish Compromise during
its period of applicability than Italians did.29 In amending
its constitution in 1996 in order to allow property to be purchased
by non-resident non-citizens from 1 July 2003, Slovenia, for
its part, seems to have chosen to view the matter ‘not
as an act of Italian hostility, but as a mark of its advanced
position as a candidate for full membership,’ (Gow and
Carmichael 2000:207; cf. Šabic 2002:115); Slovenia was
finally admitted as a member-state of the EU on 1 May 2004.
Ethno-Linguistic Minority Issues
in the Italo-Slovene Frontier, 1994-Present
According to the Italian Ministry of the Interior, in 1994 there
were an estimated 80,000 Slovenophones resident in Friuli-Venezia
Giulia (Ministero dell’Interno:1994).30 Though its approach
varies widely across its territory, Italy has-despite the in
part repressive and obstructive history described above-occasionally
proven itself capable of highly enlightened minority protection
policies; Italy’s treatment of its Germanophone population
in South Tyrol is on par with Slovenia’s treatment of
two of its autochthonous minorities, the Italophones and Ugrophones-with
Belgium’s Germanophones and Finland’s Suecophones,
they are, by most accounts, the best-protected small ethno-linguistic
minorities in Europe. Roughly 2.5 million people in Italy (4.5%
of the population) belong to 14 officially acknowledged minority
groups, making Italy home to more minorities than any other
EU country in absolute size (Ministero dell’Interno 1994).
The variance in protection afforded derives from the fact that
affirmative minority rights are primarily connected to territory
in Italy rather than to the inhabitants themselves (similar
to the connection of autochthonous minorities to their municipalities
in Slovenia). The partial exception to this rule is South Tyrol,
due to the Germanophone minority’s decades long (and occasionally
terrorist) campaign for equality in the province of Bolzano,
which was staunchly supported and eventually internationalised
by Austria. As a result, the most fully protected minorities
in Italy are the large communities living near the state’s
land borders.
Nevertheless, in the absence of a general law on minority protection,
the officially recognised minorities enjoy differing statuses;
Italy is thus ‘at the same time one of the most advanced
countries [in respect to] minority protection,’ as well
as ‘a state in which many small minority groups are in
danger of being definitively assimilated in the near future,’
(Palermo 2004)-and among them may be listed, as discussed earlier,
the Slovenophones of the province of Udine. Though they are
present within 36 communities in Friuli-Venezia Giulia, the
Slovenophones of the provinces of Trieste and Gorizia have been
the longest and best protected due to the fact that they, unlike
the province of Udine, had been subject to the post-war negotiations
over the Free Territory of Trieste (which, as noted earlier,
resulted in Italy taking on commitments to minority protection
in the area concerned), and are presently provided with, among
other rights, education in the Slovene language at the nursery,
primary and lower- and upper-secondary levels, the right to
address the local and provincial public administration in Slovene,
bilingual identity cards, and bilingual toponomastic signage
in their communities (though the latter is being implemented
at a painfully slow rate).
Italian Law 38 of 2001 officially recognised the Slovenophone
community in 32 communities in Friuli-Venezia Giulia, and among
them in several municipalities in the province of Udine, thus
in principle making the latter equal in terms of rights with
those resident of the provinces of Gorizia and Trieste for the
first time.31 Previously, the Slovenophones of Udine had no
clearly defined linguistic rights, though they were technically
covered by the generalised protective measures within the Osimo
Treaty. Law 38 will, however only apply in those municipalities
of the province which specifically request it. As such, state
funds destined for its fulfilment remain at present unassigned
and/or unavailable to the province’s municipalities; in
large part, the present blockage in applying the law overall
is due to political resistance within the local government in
Trieste, which does not want the law applied to all six of the
province’s municipalities.32 Though the law contains educational
provisions, thus far the only application of the law has been
the transformation of a private, bilingual elementary school
in San Pietro al Natisone (Špeter Slovenov in Slovene,
and previously known as San Pietro degli Slavi in Italian) into
a state-financed one; there are at present no further plans
to expand bilingual education.
As it had presumably been preoccupied with its own entrance
into the European Union, the government of Slovenia had not
confronted Rome on the law’s application as of May 2004.
the elementary or secondary levels, or to introduce Slovene-language
schools, in the province of Udine.33
Socio-Economic Development and
EU Regional Policy in the Italo-Slovene Borderland
The EU has sought to enhance cross-border development within
and at the edges of the Union since 1991 both in order to increase
the transactional efficency of the internal market and as part
of its commitment to balanced territorial development. The Italo-Slovene
border was one of the first targets of the Interreg programme
due to Friuli-Venezia Giulia’s own regional developmental
needs, the extant groundwork for cross-border institutional
cooperation in the region due to the Alpe Adria regional-cooperation
initiative begun in the 1970s (as discussed below), the priority
given by the EU to politico-economic stabilisation alongside
the former Yugoslavia as it began its wars of succession as
well as to post-communist Central and Eastern Europe generally,
as well as due the tragic history of this particular frontier
and the desire to facilitate better relations across it.34
The first Interreg programming period, which ended in 1995,
was an experimental ‘familiarisation’ exercise for
this new Community Initiative financed through the Structural
Funds, and as such, the initial programming period saw little,
actual cross-border impact or participation from the Slovenian
side of the borderland. The EU’s Phare external assistance
programme began operating in Slovenia in 1992, and a cross-border
cooperation (CBC) component within it was formalised in 1994,
though its interventions also took place entirely upon Slovene
territory.35 The second phase of EU-led borderland integration,
Interreg II Italy-Slovenia was finally approved in 1997.36 From
the outset, the Interreg II programme was committed to enhancing
the cross-borderness of its interventions beyond the (very limited)
achievements of the earlier Interreg programme; its interventions
were divided into three ‘axes’: upgrading the region,
local resources and environmental protection (e.g., projects
included joint environmental monitoring of the Upper Adriatic,
the creation of a transfrontier hiking/biking path in the Karst,
improvements at the Romas d’Isonzo water purification
plant); improvements in institutional cooperation and communication
(e.g., feasibility studies on cross-border energy and transport
networks, studies and events related to bread-making in the
frontier region, exhibitions of Slovene art in Italy); and,
entrepreneurial cooperation (e.g., financing for cross-border
joint ventures, information and service provision for regional
SMEs, trade exhibitions) (Ambrosi 2001). The specific objective
of the loosely coordinated Phare CBC (cross-border cooperation)
Slovenia-Italy programme was stated simply as to assist ‘Phare
areas bordering the EU to overcome their developmental problems’
whilst promoting cross-border co-operation ‘according
to the Interreg programme principles,’ (JPD:243-244).
Interventions through Phare were particularly necessary on Slovenia’s
border with Italy almost immediately, as substantial delays
to cross-border traffic were occurring due to outmoded border
crossings, and were further exacerbated by the transport disruption
brought on by the Yugoslav wars of secession occurring to the
south (OMAS 1997:1).
As Phare’s programming was annual (unlike multi-annual
Interreg), further CBC programmes were begun each year beginning
in 1995. In addition to land and maritime border crossings,
early initiatives focused on cross-border or frontier environmental
issues, which were coordinate insofar as possible with Interreg
in Italy once the programme got off the ground in 1997. One
major consequence of the resolute focus on physical infrastructure,
however, was that person-to-person networks barely developed
(OMAS 1997:15). Interreg II and Phare CBC began in different
years, and that lag had a significant impact upon programming,
institutional cooperation, local-partnership development, and
project implementation generally, as well as the overall programme’s
ability to achieve its aims. Meanwhile, the legal and administrative
discrepancies between Interreg and Phare had vast implications
for level of cross-borderness in its interventions.
For the purposes of the 2000-2006 Interreg IIIA Italy-Slovenia
programme, the Italo-Slovene border is once again defined as
both a land and maritime one; it includes on the Italian side
the provinces of Udine, Gorizia, and Trieste (region of Friuli-Venezia
Giulia), as well as the province of Venice (region of the Veneto),
and on the Slovenian side the statistical regions of Obalno-kraška
and Goriška as well as the municipality of Kranjska Gora
(see Map I). The 232 km-long land border connects 24 Italian
municipalities with 13 Slovenian ones; a maritime border, meanwhile,
connects Venice with Slovenia’s Italophone municipalities.37
The programming area covers an area of 11,400km2 and a population
of 1.9m (as of 1998; JPD:12).38 Financing was initially set
at €93m for Interreg IIIA (43% of from the ERDF, the remainder
from national/regional sources), and €5m annually for Phare
CBC. Following enlargement, the programme budget was reset at
€56m, with Slovenia’s Interreg receipts as a member-state
for the 2004-2006 period remaining under discussion.
The Interreg IIIA Italy-Slovenia programme is the first to
have a truly joint programming document-created and approved
through the involvement of regional-policy actors and local
experts from both sides of the border, as well as from Brussels-as
well as joint steering committee from the outset. Nevertheless,
several factors still potentially compromise institutional cooperation:
the cross-border partnership ‘continuing’ into this
programming period initially involved new actors in Friuli-Venezia
Giulia, the Slovenian regionalisation debate remained (and remains)
unresolved, and the political environment in Trieste still encompassed
several nationalist factions (though this issue has, to some
extent, recently been mitigated somewhat by Illy’s presence
at the region’s helm).
Table One
|
NUTS III Areas
|
Agricultur
|
Industry
|
Services
|
Trieste
|
0.0%
|
22.2%
|
77.8%
|
Gorizia
|
2.5%
|
32.5%
|
65.0%
|
Udine
|
2.0%
|
41.4%
|
56.6%
|
Venice
|
3.8%
|
36.7%
|
59.6%
|
Obalno-kraška
|
0.7%
|
21.8%
|
77.5%
|
Goriška
|
1.6%
|
44.9%
|
53.5%
|
Average
|
2.4%
|
38.2%
|
59.4%
|
Sources: ISTAT & Statistical Office of the Republic of
Slovenia
|
Though the Interreg programme does not specifically target
the borderland minority communities within its development priorities,
specific objectives within the programme have an implicit minority
‘focus’ (e.g., those geared toward cross-border
cultural and vocational cooperation, or toward economic development
at the border itself between similar linguistic communities),
and minority organisations are among the many eligible to apply
with projects for funding. Furthermore, minority representatives
are invited to certain committee meetings as experts involved
in project elaboration or preliminary evaluation.
With the exception of the Slovenian littoral, all of the provinces
involved in Interreg III experienced a slight population decline
in the 1990s, with Trieste’s being the most dramatic at
-4.9%; Trieste further has the highest old-age index among the
provinces involved, as well as in Italy overall, at 225.9% (JPD:18).
Between 1995 and 1998, the workforce resident in the provinces
of Trieste and Udine decreased slightly, whilst it grew in the
others (JPD:22-23). The unemployment rate, meanwhile, decreased
by 1.5% in the overall area, with most gains in the provinces
of Udine and Gorizia; the highest regional unemployment rate
was recorded in the Slovenian littoral, at 11.2% in 1998.39
The distribution of labour in the programming region is described
in Table I; the tertiary sector is the predominant source of
employment in the region. The Italian provinces maintain per-capita
GDP at among the highest levels in Italy, while the Slovenian
regions have levels of gross added value per inhabitant on roughly
the national.40 Entrepreneurship remains higher in the Italian
regions, with roughly 25% of the working population self-employed,
whereas in Slovenia the self-employed comprise only about 12%
of the working population-though this is in large part due to
the fact that Slovenia has only had a full market economy since
1989 (JPD:30,116). The Slovene programming regions, meanwhile,
rank above the national average in terms of SME development.
There are an estimated 5,000-7,000 Slovenian ‘daily migrants’
working on the Italian side of the border, many of whom work
in Trieste, attracted by better wages in Italy (or conversely
attractive to the Italians due to their lower wages) as well
as by the availability of household and care posts in this increasingly
elderly city.41 Given the delay in the application of the free-movement-of-persons
principle imposed by the EU upon Slovenia, only borderland Slovenes
are presently allowed to work in Italy without special permits,
cross-border labour movement for borderlanders having been bilaterally
agreed in 1955.42 A 1999 survey conducted by Friuli-Venezia
Giulia among a total of 2,400 residents of its region, Carinthia,
and the Slovene borderland revealed that only 3% of Italians
and 7% of Slovenes surveyed crossed the border for work (though,
given that much day-migrant labour is ‘untaxed’,
the actual number may be higher).43
Table Two
|
|
Frequency of
border crossing
|
% of Italians
|
% of Slovenes
|
|
Several times a week
|
2.1
|
10.3
|
|
Weekly
|
5.9
|
7.9
|
|
Several times a month
|
9.5
|
19.3
|
|
Monthly
|
8.7
|
16.0
|
|
Several times a year
|
27.6
|
21.1
|
|
Rarely
|
22.7
|
16.2
|
|
Never
|
23.5
|
9.2
|
|
|
|
|
At the same time, politicians and the media in Italy are frequently
vitriolic about the ‘permeability’ of the Slovene
border to labour-seeking immigrants-an argument as pitiful as
it is spiteful, given that it is Italy which remains responsible
for the EU’s external/Schengen border in the region, as
well along all 7,600 kilometres of its own infamously permeable
maritime border.44 Indeed, the ‘test-drive’ of the
Schengen border with Slovenia in 1997 (viz., after the EU conceded,
following substantial deliberation, that Italy was capable of
fully implementing the Schengen acquis itself) resulted in widespread
complaints regarding the substantial hindrance to traffic; this
led soon after to a looser level of control and the creation of
‘fast-tracks’ for Italians and Slovenes. (Anderson
and Bort 2001:61; Skok 1998).
Table Three |
Reason for border crossing |
% of Italians |
% of Slovenes |
For holidays |
79.6 |
24.1 |
For shopping |
22.3 |
86.9 |
To purchase petrol |
26.8 |
0.3 |
For work |
3.1 |
7.2 |
To visit friends/relatives |
7.6 |
19.2 |
In the 1999 survey, Slovenes were overall seen to be far more
cross-borderly mobile than Italians (see Table II). Nearly 75%
of Italian respondents crossed the border less frequently than
once a month, and about a quarter among them never did so at
all. More than half of the Slovene respondents, in contrast,
did so at least monthly, with nearly 20% of those doing so on
a weekly basis or more often. Yet, while cross-border mobility
and the openness of the border between Italy and Slovenia has
been on the increase for decade after decade, inter-ethno-linguistic-group
contact has remained limited. Slovenes were nearly three-times
more likely to cross the border to visit relatives than Italian
respondents, especially in the vicinity of Trieste (DRAE 1999:
22-23). When those who did so were asked why they crossed the
border, 80% of Italians said they did so for holidays (see Table
III). More than 85% of Slovenes did so for shopping, in part
because of the types of goods available, the relative savings
Italy offered versus Austria, and the proximity of Italian borderland
cities in comparison to Ljubljana.45
An Overview of the Institutional
Geography of Italo-Slovene Cross-Border Cooperation
Inter-regional planning collaboration related to the frontier
began with the formation of Trigon by Friuli-Venezia Giulia,
Austrian Carinthia, and Slovenia in 1965. This informal, sub-national
arrangement became the Alpe-Adria Working Community in 1978,
and gradually increased its number of member regions, technical
capacities, and level of institutionalisation throughout the
1980s. Indeed, in its day, Alpe Adria provided one of the ‘most
compelling examples of the relative unimportance of the EC/EU
as the essential impetus of transfrontier co-operation’
at the Union’s edge (Anderson and Bort 2001:70).46 Decentralisation,
increasing economic liberalisation, and rapprochement with its
north-westerly neighbours within the Yugoslav federation during
this decade-with substantial implications for Slovenia-further
contributed to the circulation of people, publications, and
ideas in the decades before Slovenia’s secession. Italo-Slovene
cooperation following a 1976 earthquake in Friuli also heralded
improvement in both interregional and international relations
(Strassoldo and Cattarinussi 1978).
Nevertheless, in their exhaustive discussion of transfrontier
cooperation in Europe in the past decade, Anderson and Bort
conclude-regarding the difficulties regional and national institutions
face in achieving the ambitious objectives of such initiatives-that
‘transfrontier institutions or associations lack real
political weight and influence’ due to a ‘lack of
impact among the populations in the frontier regions, political
divisions, lack of resources, lack of a sense of transfrontier
solidarity, constitutional obstacles and reticence or indifference
of central governments,’ (Anderson and Bort 2001:72).
While this is, in part, due to lack of public awareness of the
‘often mundane’ achievements of transfrontier initiatives,
it is often also the result of ‘sharp differences of view
between different levels of government in the same country,’
divergent national administrative and constitutional structures,
and disparate levels of resources and budgetary powers accorded
to regions trying to cooperate (Anderson and Bort 2001: 66,
72). These issues were reflected precisely in the experiences
of Italian and Slovenian institutions during Interreg II.
While Phare CBC sought to ‘match’ Interreg II-thereby
attempting to achieve transfrontier programming continuity where
possible-the mutual realisation of true cross-borderness faced
several hurdles: Italy’s total Interreg II funding was
roughly 30 times larger than Slovenia’s yearly Phare CBC
allocation, thereby affecting the size and scope of projects
which could be undertaken on a transfrontier basis annually;
a significant lack of legal and procedural complementarity existed
between the Interreg II and Phare CBC programmes, resulting
in difficulty or impossibility in realizing truly joint actions
as well as partnership at the implementation stage;47 fully
formed, pre-existing regional institutions in Italy-experienced
in programming and implementing the earlier Interreg programme
as well as other interventions financed through the Structural
Funds-were required to work with the still-centralised and relatively
new Slovenian National Agency for Regional Development (NARD);
pre-existing cultural and economic transfrontier networks upon
which to build the projects were still lacking, despite the
institutional ones remaining from past initiatives; and, finally,
differences in history and institutional culture between the
two Italian regions (e.g, the Veneto’s lack of negative
recent history with Slovenia; Friuli-Venezia Giulia’s
autonomous regional competencies) had an impact both upon their
relative ability (or willingness) to build institutional partnerships
with their Slovenian counterparts, as well as to sustain networks
created during programming and implementation (Faro 2003; IZI
2001). Overall, the legal incompatibility of Interreg and Phare
CBC and the problems repeatedly faced in locating Slovene project
partners were among the most frequently cited complaints among
Interreg beneficiaries, as will be discussed in later sections
of this report.
The Interreg IIIA Italy-Slovenia programme, which concerns
the period 2000-2006, is the first to have a truly joint steering
committee from the outset. Given the perceived institutional
‘learning-by-doing’ achieved by both the Commission
and the Italian and Slovene actors in the last two programming
periods, the creation of a new Joint Technical Secretariat in
Trieste oversee Interreg IIIA Italy/Slovenia overall, and the
procedural and legal harmonization which will come in the wake
regarding the financial instruments involved with Slovenia’s
eligibility for Interreg funding itself from May 2001, officials
on both sides and in Brussels have been optimistic about the
potentiality for Interreg to achieve greater cross-border impact
than it has in the past.
Overall Assessment
Despite a repeatedly tragic history of intercultural and political
relations between the two ‘kin’ states, and in particular
regarding Italy’s past treatment of the Slavonophones
resident within its territory, and current lack of truly ‘positive
discrimination’ regarding its Slovenophone population,
the EU-negotiated settlement of the property-restitution issue,
recent developments in the political environment in Friuli-Venezia
Giulia which have moved the administration further outside of
the decades-old, obstructionist right-wing deadlock, the recent
accession of Slovenia to the EU, the formal (if still in areas
stalled) protection of the global Slovenophone population within
Italian national legislation after a delay of half a century,
and the continuing profound economic lure of Trieste for the
Slovene littoral economy, all provide indication that socio-economic
relations in the Italo-Slovene frontier should improve in the
course of the coming decade.
Nevertheless, Bratina notes that the region’s minority
presence must strive for ‘formal and institutional recognition’
for its continuing absence presents ‘perhaps the principal
obstacle to productive cohabitation between the two communities
and to the development of integration processes,’ (Bratina
1997:140). The fact that prior to 2001 aspect of minority protection-such
as educational provision and cultural-organisational support-were
primarily managed by individual provincia (province) (rather
than the regione, ‘region’) in Friuli-Venezia Giulia,
and that the implementation of other aspects-such as toponomastic
signage and fulfillment of bilingualism in official public settings-was
left up to the discretion of the sub-provincial comuni (municipalities),
confused the recourse to institutional recognition which the
Slovenophone community might take. Meanwhile, ‘new’
institutional avenues may now be ‘open’ to the Slovenophones
of Italy at the supranational level, insofar as Slovenia qua
member-state (rather than strategically directed applicant)
is now in a stronger position to press for their protection,
and their simultaneously doing so on their own behalf will be
free of constraints for Slovenia in the form of irritating a
member-state (i.e., Italy) with veto power over their membership.48
‘Cohabitation,’ meanwhile, per se, remained (and
remains) only one model of majority/minority relations among
the multi-ethnic Italian autonomous regions. The situation in
Francophone/Italophone Valle d’Aosta (Vallée d’Aoste
in French) is one based upon a pervasive, seamless bilingualism
grounded in ‘complete and symmetrical integration’
between the two ethno-linguistic communities, while that in
Germanophone/Italophone South Tyrol (Südtirol in German,
Alto Adige in Italian) is based upon legally enforced parity
and almost complete cultural separation between the communities
which has ultimately produced two parallel, linguistic ‘realities’
in the presence of otherwise bilingual education and civic participation
protections (Bratina 1997:136; cf. Palermo 2004). The relative
dispersion of the Slovenophone population amidst the Italophones
of their region remains a differentiating factor vis-à-vis
other the other ‘models’ Italy provides, which,
among other factors, has had distinct implications for ‘ethnic’
participation and representation in regional politics and cultural
affairs in Friuli-Venezia Giulia when seen in comparison with
Italy’s other multi-ethnic autonomous regions. As such,
while the Triestines have to some extent experienced an ‘altoatesine’
reality toward the end of the 20th century, and while the groundwork
for an increasingly ‘valdostan’ reality is being
lain in Gorizia, the Udinese Slovenophones have been almost
entirely ‘vanished’ into the fabric of Italophone
life (Bratina 1997:138). Meanwhile, the South Tyrolese ‘cohabitation’
model has its own, obvious limitations, as will be discussed
in the next section of this report.
Examination of the experience of Interreg, and its contribution
toward facilitating intra-ethnic and cross-border linkages between
the frontier’s communities will be undertaken in the sections
to follow. While past analyses of the Interreg programme have
been lukewarm about successes in achieving true cross-borderness
in intervention, the seamlessness in intervention provided by
Slovenia’s participation in Interreg from 2004 should
remedy many of the earlier obstacles to EU-led cooperation.
Literature Review
In order to investigate and evaluate the process and effects
of cross-border cooperation, it is essential to understand the
historical as well as contemporary popular, political, and institutional
contexts of transfrontier socio-economic engagement. This section
provides a general, theoretical overview (primarily from the
fields of anthropology, sociology, and political science) for
borderland analysis. It reviews theories on the historical and
social development of borderlands before turning to the applicability
of the theory of social-capital development to frontiers.
An overview of the political economy and anthropology of borderlands
In his 1959 article, ‘The Nature of frontiers and boundaries,’
the Romanian-American geographer Ladis Kristof wrote that ‘a
boundary does not exist in nature or by itself’ but ‘always
owes its existence to man,’ and that the man-made division
of adjoining segments of the earth’s crust has been driven
by the fact that ‘sovereignty is territorial’ and
thus ‘must have a certain known extent,’ (Kristof
1959). While boundaries have, at least since the rise of the
Westphalian state in Europe (as countless have argued, and similarly
countless others have derided as Eurocentric inanity), demarcated
the fullest extent of the sovereign state, the rise of nationalism
in the 19th century questioned the continuing validity of some
sovereignties because they did not simultaneously describe both
a nation and a state with the same boundary line. As the Irish
geographer Gearóid Ó Tuathail has more recently
argued, ‘Geography is about power,’ and though it
is ‘often assumed to be innocent, the geography of the
world is not a product of nature,’ but ‘of histories
of struggle between competing authorities over the power to
organize, occupy, and administer space,’ (Ó Tuathail
1996:1; cf. Biggs 1999). Popular desire by ethnically awakening
peoples from Finland to Serbia-expressed through diplomacy,
poetry, riots, and symbols, critically including maps-demanded
a revision of European geopolitical terms in the wake of the
unifications of Italy and Germany.
Yet, even in the latter two cases-then ‘ideals’
in terms of a nation’s ability to ‘imagine’
itself into a sovereign state-the new state boundaries still
did not entirely encompass the evolving nation (Anderson 1991;
Bhabha 1990). The borderland or frontier-modern geographical
successor to the ancient Roman limes, or march-foiled the planned
coincidence of state and nation in a nationalising Europe with
its intrinsic ethnic hybridity. Centuries-old, liminal settlement
patterns confounded the convenience of natural barriers between
states, and, even more frustratingly for a new generation of
nationally visionary mapmakers, urban centres populated by one
ethno-linguistic group sat amidst rural hinterlands populated
by another. The frontier qua space wherein cultures enmesh proffered
a multilingual spectrum from High Savoy and South Tyrol to the
Sudetenland and Silesia, rather than the rigid, ethnic fault
lines which ‘national’ boundaries desired to be.
And thus, to this day, it remains in borderlands that ‘one
can best appreciate the acuteness’ of the ‘perpetual
struggle over space in global politics,’ (Ó Tuathail
1996:3).
Nearly a century after the onset of World War I, ethno-national
struggle in the Upper Adriatic and Adriatic Alps is one no longer
fought by means of arms, explosives, or genocide in search of
absolute territorial control, but is now one fought in constitutional
courts, at the ballot box, and at keyboards, in search of partial
territorial ‘use’ via means of minority-cultural
preservation and (incompatibly, in the minds of some) against
‘historical forgetting.’ In the midst of local and
regional efforts aimed at improved ethno-linguistic minority
protection in areas wherein another substantial minority rejects
the visual, aural, and institutional reification of an inclusive
multicultural existence, the EU has endeavoured to reintegrate
communities brutally divided by borders in the course of two
world wars.
It was the prevailing, 19th-century geographic logic of the
‘natural’ border between states which spurred later
Italian-nationalist claims to South Tyrol; at the time, it surely
seemed nothing short of perverse that one of Europe’s
oldest and most stable linguistic borders ran through the central
valley of soon-to-be-created Italian region of Trentino-Alto
Adige, rather than along the crestline of the Alps to its north.
While the geopolitical ‘dilemma’ of the Italo-Austrian
border was made possible by the rise of nationalism, and the
Italian nation collectively subsequently ‘imagining’
its extent, the rise of the border itself enabled those imaginings
in the first instance. The American anthropologist Peter Sahlins
has argued that conceptions of ‘French’ and ‘Spanish’
national identity cropped up at the periphery (amidst rural,
eastern-Pyrenean Catalan-speakers) before being ‘built
there by the centre. It appeared less as a result of state intentions
than from the local process of adopting and appropriating the
nation,’ (Sahlins 1989:9).
That border was ultimately meant to serve a military purpose
as a natural barrier, yet ended up being an border largely because
the politico-economic frisson created by the dividing line resulted
in newly ‘borderland’ communities conceptualising
‘differences of French and Spanish territory and nationality
long before these…became apparent to the two states’
(Sahlins 1989:286). These were concerns that were first and
foremost economic and legal, long before they were ethno-linguistic,
and only very rarely geographic: the ‘framing of local
economic interests in national terms produced a transformation
at both ends: a nationalizing of the local, and a localising
of the national. By voicing their local economic interests in
national terms, both peasants and nobles brought the nation
into the village, just as they placed themselves within the
nation (Sahlins 1989:165).
Sahlins’s thesis is a fascinating and useful one in the
context of post-Hapsburg borderland communities-like those located
between Italy and the former Yugoslavia/Slovenia-being ‘imagined’
out of one state and into another, for ‘in many ways,
the sense of difference is strongest where some historical sense
of cooperation and relatedness remains,’ (Sahlins 1989:271).
It is where the border is at its most arbitrary that the differences
between the ‘ideas,’ and nation-states, of ‘Italy’
and ‘Slovenia’ become most stark, and where the
erasure of the border-within the context of the EU’s recent
enlargement and its future integration-has become most politically
fraught. For, once delineated, the ongoing narrative of the
meaning of that border-for the community it bisects and the
nation-states it separates-began its inscription upon the lives
of those who lived alongside (and increasingly across) it, as
well as many countrymen who would never in their lives actually
see it. While for the Allies and the Yugoslav regime the border
had marked the line at which capitalism ended and communism
began, for the residents of the divided town of Gorizia, it
marked the utter transformation of civic life as they had known
it. The creation of the border demanded an introspective reassessment
of the local identities that pre-existed it: was one now italiano,
jugosloven, goriziano, bric, slovenec, furlan, and what did
those identifications now mean?49
In practice, an individual was several of these, and each had,
and still has (with the exception of Yugoslav, which has ceased
to exist), its own uses. While in the contemporary world a plurality
of individual identities is commonplace, borders play a powerful
and central role in the (de)construction of modes of identification:
Experiences of borders…simultaneously reinforce and disintegrate
social and political status and role, and structure and meaning,
by putting into sharp relief the full range of our identities.
This is especially true of national and ethnic identities, which
are configured at borders in ways that often differ from how
[they] are constructed in less peripheral areas of the state.
(Donnan and Wilson 1999:64)
The rhetorical and socio-political (de)construction of borders
is a ceaseless project, most frenetically so when a boundary
divides a still heterogeneously populated frontier, for the
boundaries thus ‘narrated’ too often collide and
conflict with intensely individual, and deeply enduring, narratives
of personal identity. Borders indicate who ‘can’
be what through circumscribing and delimiting citizenship and/or
nationality. For someone of Slovene nationality who became an
Italian citizen, or a coastal, historically Venice-orientated
Italophone who suddenly became a Yugoslav tovariš (‘worker,’
‘comrade’) in the Socialist Republic of Slovenia,
the nature and implication of one’s national and civic
identities, and their relationships to one another, were fundamentally
altered by the relocation of the border, whether the nature
of that alteration was one of celebration, protection, hybridisation,
persecution, forfeiture, or erasure.
If the ‘principal fiction of the nation-state is ethnic
racial, linguistic and cultural homogeneity, then borders always
give lie to this construct,’ (Horsman and Marshall 1994:45),
for narratives of national identity ‘imagined’ from
the centre all too often fray semantically by the time they
reach the very borders which describe and circumscribe them.
As a result, one of the primary characteristics of border life
is its very ambivalence, due to the often-competing influence
of the diverse linguistic, cultural, and economic factors present
(Strassoldo 1982:152). Indeed, ambivalence at the margin is
twinned with ignorance of the borderland at the nation’s
centre, despite its hazy, half-forgotten existence in the distance
delimiting every citizen’s perception and experience of
the nation (cf. Anderson et al. 2002:3). Those living near the
border always ‘experience’ the border in ways those
at the centre do not. For those living in the frontier, the
border-in addition to being a barrier, resource, or opportunity
at different times-has also been ‘a symbol of their role
in cultural value systems and in systems of economic value,
which are important to the daily functioning of the states in
which they live,’ (Donnan and Wilson 1999:127).
With the division of Gorizia, the Brici were left with no market
town, and Yugoslavia with no city to face and defend that border,
at least culturally, against Italy. Yugoslavia responded by
building one: Nova Gorica (‘New Gorizia’) was a
planned, visual demonstration to Italians and their allies of
the ‘utopian’ successes of the new, socialist world
they were creating. The physical construction of the border
thus coincided with its semiotic construction; as Paasi has
written, boundaries ‘do not embody any eternal truths
of places,’ but are socially constructed, wherein ‘power
relations are decisive for their construction,’ (Paasi
2001:23). The creation of the Italo-Yugoslav border was both
an act of defining the extent, as well as the project and world-view,
of the state, and thus served to expose the limit of each state’s
ability to (re)produce and control the divided frontier and
the concurrent, collective ‘master narrative’ of
national identity.
Borderlanders, insofar as they ‘work and play across
the borderline,’ are ‘frequently participants in
the formal and informal politics’ of both states; this,
in turn, results in the emergence of complicated political allegiances
and alliances, with ‘consequences for the relationships
between citizens and regional, state, and international bodies,
especially in their roles in constructing notions of territory
and sovereignty,’ (Donnan and Wilson 1999:57). Identity
narratives parlayed at the national level are thus locally compromised
by the increasing ‘transversality’ of the borders
that seek to define and delimit them (Glissant 1989:66). Borderlanders
‘live and function in several different worlds: the world
of their national culture, the world of the border environment,
the world of their ethnic group if they are members of a minority
population, and the world of the foreign culture on the other
side of the boundary,’ (Martínez 1994:20). Yet,
if ‘the activity of minorities and their movements effectively
de-territorialise the traditional state-centred territorial
order and challenge the roles and meanings of boundaries’
(Paasi 1999:15), will the increasing, daily flows and migrations
across Italo-Slovene, Austro-Slovene, and Italo-Austrian borders,
that perpetual deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation
shared by all frontier residents regardless of their primary
ethno-linguistic identity, suddenly confound the bipolarity
of ‘inside’ and ‘outside,’ of ‘same’
and ‘other,’ and generate a dynamic, transcendent
identity in their wake? (Deleuze and Guattari 1987)
If the realities of contemporary European borderland political
economy lived out poststructuralist theories of transversality
and de/(re)territorialisation as straightforwardly as their
proponents might suggest, there would be little need for the
EU’s intervention in the first instance. And in the midst
of this-despite the active, daily involvement of borderland
minorities in all of these processes-the EU still painstaking
endeavours to counter the reality that most small ethnic groups
‘are led to the dustheap of history by industrial civilization
without offering any resistance,’ (Gellner 1983).50
Ethnic-National Identities and
the Politics of Culture and Identity: Typologies of Borderland
Identity and Development
Identity is nothing if not individual and stubborn. Despite
the efforts of both states to narrate national identities otherwise,
Italy, and Slovenia harbour ethno-linguistic minorities who
identify closely with the majority ethno-linguistic group living
across the ‘national’ border. Linguistic identification
often supersedes locational identities because it has, since
the age of German Romantic nationalism, represented not only
a means of communication or information-exchange, but a means
of representing and defending oneself and one’s status
in society (Bordieu 1991). Among ethno-linguistically heterogeneous
populations, an individual’s affinity to those who share
one’s language (and/or one’s sense of difference
from those who do not) is enhanced in the presence of a border
(Donnan and Wilson 1999). To factor this into analysis of frontiers,
the anthropologists Hastings Donnan and Thomas Wilson have typologised
border populations as follows:
(i) those who share ethnic ties across the border as well as
with those residing at their state’s geographical core;
(ii) those who are differentiated by cross-border ethnic bonds
from other residents of their state; and,
(iii) those who are members of the national majority in their
state, and have no ethnic ties across the state’s borders.
(Wilson and Donnan 1998:14)
In addition, a fourth typology-overlooked in Wilson and Donnan’s
construction-should be added in order to include experience
of (some, according to their preference) Friulians in Italy,
and (possibly) the Roma in Slovenia:
(iv) those who are not members of the national majority in their
state, and have no ethnic ties across the state’s borders
The concurrent, proximate residence of borderland populations
of various types has implications for the way individuals interact
and identify with other members of their communities (or do
not), as well as for the manner in these diverse communities
are integrated, protected, or ignored on a national, regional,
and local basis over time. While their ‘usually sparse
numbers and remoteness from the centre of power’ generally
limits borderlanders’ political clout (Martínez
1994:23), this is frequently not the case when it comes to issues
wherein borderland identity and ethnically related historical
events can be figured as issues of national security.
The historically evolving politico-economic nature of borders
thus impacts upon the often multiple and diversely orientated
populations it circumscribes and divides insofar as they foster
or disallow contact between various types of frontier community
across periods of time. To facilitate understanding of the frontier
evolution in the wake of this process, Mexican-American social
historian Oscar Martínez has described a developmental
trajectory for borderlands: alienation, wherein tension or animosity
between neighbouring states or populations prevents cross-border
interaction; coexistence, wherein tensions between neighbouring
states have been reduced, allowing a modest level of cross-border
interaction; interdependence, wherein populations in neighbouring
states interact symbiotically, and wherein some bilateral systems
and policies are in place on an interstate or interregional
level, yet some policies remain separated by the boundary; and,
integration, wherein no barriers exist to interaction or flows
across the border, and both states and populations on both sides
enjoy a high level of mutual trust (Martínez 1994:5-10).
While one primary characteristic of borderland interdependence
is the diminishment or disappearance of location-related strife,
the attainment of that state does not preclude or eliminate
cross-border ‘conflict,’ per se; the latter, indeed,
can be directly (and ‘progressively’) ‘spawned
by the intrinsic contradiction of maintaining border restrictions
as then economies and societies of the two sides draw together,’
(Martínez 1994:15). This, frustratingly, often impacts
future development, for border economies ‘react instantly
to short-term policy changes, and constant adaptation lends
them a speculative, restive character,’ (Baud and van
Schendel 1997:231). Indeed, the incremental nature of the process
of borderland integration-and the concurrent political and identity
issues surrounding the maintenence and concession of specific
types and means of sovereignty-seems to have engendered such
conflict as a byproduct. While contemporary ‘transboundary
cooperation receives its principal stimulus from economic development,’
it is nevertheless a political/politicised process, and as such
‘autonomy may be regarded as more important than efficiency,’
(Hansen 1983:167).
The primary reasoning behind EU-led borderland integration
is that frontiers experience significant developmental disadvantages
due to the fact that ‘political boundaries represent artificial
barriers to the rational economic organisation of potentially
complementary areas and because both public and private sectors
tend to avoid investing in areas where conflicts are likely
to arise,’ (Hansen 1983:256). Nevertheless, while in some
cases economic cooperation begins ‘organically’
once cross-border flows become possible (whether for reasons
of market expansion or due to the existence of interested economic
actors on both sides of the border), in most cases economic
integration must be ‘jump-started’ via regional-development
policy interventions.
Meanwhile, the primary characteristics of a state of integration
are means (or ‘freedoms’) which are fundamental
to economic as well as cultural interactivity. Martínez
specifically defines the integrated borderland as one in which
neighbouring states have eliminated ‘all major political
differences between them and as well as existing barriers to
trade and human movement across their mutual boundary,’
allowing borderlanders to ‘merge economically, with capital,
products, and labour flowing from one side to the other without
restrictions,’ (Martínez 1994:9). One major ‘brake’
on borderland integration in this region over the coming decade
will thus result from the fact that the Slovenes, along with
the rest of the newly acceded states, will not enjoy free movement
of labour within the EU until 2010.51 Indeed, as Torpey has
argued, the modern state has expropriated from individuals-and
now monopolizes-‘legitimate means of movement’ across
international boundaries through having required the documentary
codification (in the form of passports and identity cards) of
national communities previously merely ‘imagined’
(Torpey 2000).
Martínez notes that, in integrated borderlands, nationalism
‘gives way to a new internationalist ideology that emphasizes
peaceful relations and improvements in the quality of life of
people in both nations through trade and the diffusion of technology.
Each nation willingly relinquishes a significant part of its
sovereignty for the sake of mutual progress, (Martínez
1994:9). While relinquishing aspects of national sovereignty,
as well as massive increases in multi-lateral trade and regional
development, have all been hallmarks of membership in the EU,
the denouement of extremist nationalism has not necessarily
been a ‘spill-over’ effect of European integration
or bi/multinational economic cooperation. The popularity of
‘post-fascist’ political parties representing the
Italian borderlands at the national and local levels, indeed,
increased at the same time as cross-border cooperation was enhanced
across their borders with Slovenia prior to its accession to
the EU.
The reasons for this phenomenon may be linked to the characteristic
borderland phenomena noted above-the ‘fraying’ of
the collective identity narrative at the nation’s borders,
and the relative economic underdevelopment of the frontier in
comparison to the metropole-in conjunction with the persistence
(or conscious ‘remembering’ by nationalist politicians)
of negative historical memory. As Jedlicki has written regarding
the Germano-Polish border the choice is one ‘between deliberate
stirring of memory so as to feed the dreams of retribution,
or letting the ever-recurring nightmare become finally a historical
recollection,’ (Jedlicki 1999:231). It is local and regional
debates over-and unwillingness to relinquish-‘cultural’
sovereignty (and thus the concurrent issues surrounding freedom
of cultural expression, and social and educational policies)
most frequently puts the brakes on the borderland’s-and
the EU’s-integration.
Minority-Majority Relations
in the Borderland: Toward a Theoretical Context for Cross-Border
Cooperation
A recent study of EU-led cross-border cooperation between Italy
and Slovenia in the late 1990s concluded that the Italo-Slovene
borderland had not progressed beyond a state of interdependence,
nor looked likely to do so following Slovenia’s accession
to the EU, due to the persistence of historic, intercultural
mistrust in the borderland, local political opposition to, and
subversion of, specific initiatives in regional economic integration
which had been motivated by xenophobia and economic nationalism,
and the more general failure of EU-led and coordinate national
efforts to create sustainable institutional and person-to-person
networks in the region (Faro 2003). The latter factor proves
most critical, insofar as network-creation generates immediate
socio-economic benefits in the form of ‘social capital,’
whose accumulation over time can have a mitigating effect on
local resistance to integration (cf. Morgan and Nauwelaers 1999;
Grix 2001; Grix and Knowles 2002).
Social networks have private ‘returns,’ in that
those included in them benefit from connections, referrals,
mutual support and the like, as well as public ones, insofar
as social interaction helps ‘resolve dilemmas of collective
action,’ (Putnam 2002:7). Collective-action problems are
endemic in transfrontier cooperation, as a major obstacle to
borderland integration remains the historic and persistent lack
of interest in borderlands themselves (beyond their existence
qua state borders) on the part of central governments (Hansen
1983:262). As a result, borderland integration within the EU
has for over a decade been the province ne plus ultra of the
European Commission, whose institutional remit includes representing
the collective interest of the member-states. The strength,
persistence, and deepening of local social networks over time
gives rise to ‘social capital,’ which the American
sociologist Robert Putnam has defined as ‘features of
social organisation, such as networks, norms, and trust, that
facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit,’
and which in turn enhance benefits deriving from investment
human and physical capital (Putnam 1995:66-67; cf. Putnam 1993a;
1993b; 2000). Civic engagement, in the form of the societal
trust, norms, and networks which contribute to local and regional
political culture (measured in terms of general interest and
participation in politics as well as per capita membership in
local associations), thus can facilitate and reinforce regional
economic growth through helping communities to overcome collective-action
problems and generating social capital in the process.52 In
Putnam’s analysis, this is because civic engagement facilitates
and improves local information flows (thus reducing uncertainty
and engendering mutual trust among participants), fosters robust
systems of reciprocity (thus effectively defining norms of locally
acceptable behaviour, and so increasing the potential costs
to defectors), and provides models for future cooperation (thus
generating sustainable networks and norms, which are, by nature,
path dependent) (Putnam 1993a; cf. North 1991). He concludes
that, since the 1970s, so-defined ‘civic’ regions
in Italy so defined have ‘grown faster than regions with
fewer associations and more hierarchy,’ and have enjoyed
more-democratic local and regional government (Putnam 1993a:197).53
Putnam nevertheless generally (and perhaps conveniently) disregards
the unique dynamics presented by the Italian border regions-though
this is perhaps due to their relatively recent incorporation
into Italy and/or their relatively sparse populations-and, critically,
fails to takes into account inter-ethno-linguistic group associationism
as a factor, despite extolling multi-ethnic Trentino-Alto Adige
specifically as a model, ‘civic’ region at one point
in his analysis.54 While it is true that Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol
is one of Italy’s more economically successful regions,
and while its legislative and administrative efficiency is both
palpable and renowned within Italy, the region functions as
two autonomous provinces, one monocultural and the other rigidly
bicultural rather than culturally hybrid. To praise civic engagement
in the region is to ignore the fact that robust levels of membership
in local associations occur, by and large, to the exclusion
of members of the region’s other ethno-linguistic groups,
and that, as such, dense human networks fostered at the provincial
level do not give rise to abundant, regionally ‘available’
social capital (cf., e.g., Kaufman 2002). This particular conundrum
arises in part from Putnam’s conflation of the region
and province as administrative and civic units in Italy, which,
in Trentino-Alto Adige, for one, are critically different.
As Putnam notes, ‘it is not the degree of political participation
that distinguishes civic from uncivic regions, but its character,’
(Putnam 1993a:109). While voters in provinces Trento or Bozen-Bolzano
may turn out in droves for elections or Rotary Club meetings,
and while their joint, regional parliament may in fact be among
Italy’s most effective, these present civic participation
patterns are grounded in the detached, linguistic détente
agreed in by and for region in the 1970s (similar to that of
the Belgian provinces) nor do they facilitate the ongoing creation
of robust ‘between-group’ or ‘bridging’
social capital in the region at large. In the wake of a flurry
of academic criticism, Putnam began to address the latter distinction
in later work, noting that ‘bridging’ networks (as
opposed to ‘bonding’ or ‘within-group’
ones, which bring together people similar in age, gender, ethnicity,
etc.) are more likely to generate external effects which are
positive, while bonding ones ‘are at greater risk of producing
negative externalities’ (Putnam 2002:11). This is more
or less a polite way of saying that Turkish economic migrants
do not necessarily receive the warmest of welcomes in small,
ethnically homogenous, politically conservative German or Austrian
towns, no matter how many people sing in the local church choir.55
Though the regional government of Carinthia under the right-wing
Austrian Freedom Party’s Jörg Haider may very well
be functionally efficient, it hardly serves as a model for socially
inclusive, participatory governance.
One central question that arises is whether the high transaction
costs related to transfrontier cooperation in ethnically-mixed
borderlands is due to the sheer inability of these communities
to generate bridging social capital in the first instance, or
to the destruction of such social capital due to the politically
motivated use of negative historical memory. Putnam makes a
nod in this direction in writing that history ‘is not
always efficient, in the sense of weeding out social practices
that impede progress and encourage collective irrationality.
Nor is this inertia somehow attributable to individual irrationality.
On the contrary, individuals responding rationally to the social
context bequeathed to them by history reinforce the social pathologies,’
(Putnam 1993a:179).
The political platforms of neo-fascist actors such as Italy’s
Gianfranco Fini and Roberto Menia-and the domestic and foreign
policies they formulate and enact in favour of ‘nationalist
social capital’ development (Máiz 2003)-have emerged
inextricably from the local and national contexts they represent.
Their agendas, however perversely, aim to represent ‘rationally’
nationalist/irredentist/xenophobic/racist social pathologies
which originated in the wake of the two world wars. Wars-at
least those that are won-‘foster and reinforce national
solidarity’ and ‘often create generationally defined
civic habits,’ (Putnam 2002: 411). At the same time, local
memory and current perception of a war’s outcomes-especially
if it is one in which the war did not end in favour of perceived
local interests-can generate similarly generationally defined,
uncivic habits. Meanwhile, in examining the political economy
of the borderland (if not every geopolitical space), it is critical
to understand first how its historical context has routed, affected,
and impinged upon its developmental trajectory. This is not
merely because, as discussed above, historical memories are
‘long’-as well as transmissible to new generations
who lack direct, if not ‘emotional’, experience
of the events ‘remembered’-but because socio-economic
development in and of itself is ‘path-dependent.’
As most supranational policy initiatives are not subject to
referenda, and as the EU’s popularly representative institutions
approve regional-policy initiatives only at the ‘grand
objective’ and budgetary stages, voters opposed to further
borderland integration lack opportunities to reject regional-development
goals directly (cf. Olsson 2003). While electing neofascist,
extreme-nationalist, or populist representatives will not halt
the arrival of regional-development funding in the frontier,
per se, these actors do provide a democratic ‘remedy’
to borderland integration conducted against the wishes of some
borderland voters.56 This is not to say that historically rooted
racism alone is the nemesis of cross-border cooperation’s
ability to facilitate bridging social-capital creation: even
in areas where regional affinity is high due to ‘cultural
coherency,’ internal divisions can still ensue-for example,
in borderland integration between France and Wallonia, where
cross-border cooperation has failed to achieve its desired effects
(Jouen et al. 2001), or as expressed in the rise of the intermittently
separatist Northern League in Italy, wherein ‘the demonstrably
volatile though ostensibly quite homogeneous Italians’
have been ‘able to construct a fundamental division between
north and south,’ (Robbins 1997:18). The onus for developing
more-efficient and more-locally motivating means of cross-border
cooperation in order to overcome local opposition to such efforts
and/or to inspire-through cooperation’s social-capital
generating effects-opposition to that opposition remains squarely
on the shoulders of the EU’s conscience, in the form of
the European Commission and the subnational institutions with
whom it coordinates these policies.
Both political and economic actors are ‘usually very
well aware that the rules established in the victory of an economic
idea constrains future choices (via path dependence),’
(Jacobsen 2003:50). The local economic and cultural actors in
whose interest the irrational idea is perpetuated all understand
this argument implicitly, and hence their virulent opposition
to, and internecine attempts to subvert, the processes of borderland
integration. For, once the economic logic of the European single
market proceeds and effectively surpasses the emotional logic
of revanchism or neo-irredentism, and with it the Slovenes enter
the EU to become ‘Europeans’ incontrovertibly (i.e.,
as political-economic, socio-economic, and cultural networks
begin to interlock more permanently and thrive), there is more
or less no going back. Thus, in the interim, what Jacobsen terms
the ‘élite manipulation’ of local and regional
politico-economic contexts ensues, and a power struggle between
local and supranational institutions commences; this dynamic,
in turn, will be examined in the case of the Italo-Slovene border
in the research to follow.
Conclusion
In the 1990s, the state of Slovene-minority participation in
politico-economic affairs in Italy was in great flux, as questions
that had been silenced on both sides of the post-war scenario
have been reopened, and as the Slovene nation-both within and
without its borders-has begun to raise its voice within a reuniting
Europe. Though recent political developments in the Italian
frontier have been largely positive and well-received ones-and
portend greater inclusion and participation by the Slovenophones
in local and regional affairs in the future, as well as expanded
socio-economic relations between Italy and Slovenia-the long-term
nature of the instruments and processes of European borderland
integration mean that a decade of less cordial relations-and
a half-century of political and ethnic détente-form the
background of this case study and still continue to influence
opinion and developmental direction within some sections of
the borderland population and economy. As such, though the Structural
Funds, via Interreg and Phare CBC, have been one driver of minority
mobilisation in the borderland, it is critical to note the impact
of Slovenia’s accession to the EU as a separate but coordinate
factor in this arena. For this reason, bilateral relations between
Italy and Slovenia, in the context of Slovenia’s accession
negotiations, have been introduced and will be considered, where
relevant, throughout.
It must also be noted that the lack of application of the free
movement of persons principle, and the continuing presence of
the Schengen frontier at the Italian border, following Slovenia’s
accession to the EU will have a dramatic impact upon transfrontier
relations and commerce, insofar as levels of contact will not
be seen to substantially increase. Though the process of accession
has substantially harmonised the differences in the legal framework
supporting cooperation and exchange between Italy and Slovenia,
systemic discrepancies still exist, and thus must be recognised
as a further factor limiting inter-ethnic and bilateral politico-economic
engagement. Further, differences in the minority rights regimes
between the two states have differed for the past decade, and,
as such, levels of minority representation on both sides of
the border vary significantly. As such, a fully transfrontier
view is essential here, insofar as developments on the Italian
side of the border must necessarily be understood alongside
to the deeply evolved and ingrained protections extant on the
Slovene side.
While extensive literature, as we have seen, exists on the
nature of borderlands and borderland identity, the role of social
capital in forming networks between individuals and communities
within nation-states, and on the origins and implications of
the Structural Funds for European integration, very little work
has been done to date on the intersection of these three areas.
This research will thus make significant inroads in this area.
Though the literature upon the European Union’s impact
beyond its own border has begun to expand in recent years, very
little of this has focused on Slovenia itself. One question
which immediately presents itself is whether the lack of decentralisation
in Slovenia impedes cooperation with Italy on a cross-border
basis, or conversely, whether the experience of the regional
policy-and Interreg and its successors in particular-will encourage
administrative devolution in Slovenia (cf. Marek and Baun 2002;
Anagnostou 2001). At the same time, the municipal level in Slovenia
will be compared with the provincial level in Italy-and inexact
match, but a necessary one, given the different administrative
models in the two states. Furthermore, analyses of the (then)
Italo-Yugoslav border were at their most popular in the 1970s,
i.e., at the time of the Osimo Treaty, and more recent analyses
of the borderland region have largely been journalistic or politico-historical
ones, largely centred upon the heyday of Trieste in the late-19th
century (Ballinger 2003b; for significant exceptions, see; Ballinger
2003a; Faro 2003; Favretto 2003; Valdevit 1999; Favaretto and
Greco 1997). This study and its research will thus make significant
inroads in updating contemporary academic discourse on the Italo-Slovene
border in the social sciences.
Moving forward, several questions arise regarding the intersection
of minority mobilisation and the Structural Funds: 1) to what
extent has/does the Slovenophone minority participate(d) in
the programming and implementation of Interreg interventions,
and how does this compare to the involvement of Italophones
in Phare CBC in Slovenia?; 2) to what extent are members of
the Slovenophone minority active or participant in the major
economic concerns in the frontier (and how is this evaluated
or monitored) and to what extent do they participate in (or
drive) the local SME sector; 3) following on from the latter,
to what extent has Interreg supported ‘indirect’
minority activities via SME interventions and thus mobilised
minority participation in regional economic integration; 4)
to what extent does bilingualism among the minority, and monolingualism
among the majority, impact the prospects for macro-regional
economic participation, and to what extent is this acknowledged
(or valued) within Italy; 5) how does the Slovenophone situation
compare with that of the region’s other ethnic minorities,
i.e., the Friulians, the Germanophones, and the Ladins, most
of whom live further away from the border; 6) following on from
the latter, to what extent do minority coalitions exist in Friuli-Venezia
Giulia, and to what extent does Interreg connect minorities
on a cross-border basis; 7) to what extent are regional minority
concerns reflected in the Italian national government today;
8) to what extent has the frequent turnover in the administration(s)
of Friuli-Venezia Giulia and its organs impacted the programming
and implementation of Interreg, and has this affected minority
participation in the programme, if at all; 9) what percentage
of the population/minority population knows of and/or participates
in/benefits from Interreg; and, 10) how does the contemporary
politico-economic experience of the Slovenophones in Italy compare
or contrast with that of other ethnic minorities resident amongst
an ‘exiled’ population from its own ethnic ‘kinstate,’
e.g. among Czechs or Poles in Germany, Austrians or Germans
in Slovenia, and/or Turks in Greece or Greeks in Turkey.
Endnotes
1 ‘The difficulty, arising from the geographical and
geological character of the Karst (il Carso in Italian, Kras
in Slovene), has been inherent in all boundary disputes in this
area, from Roman times down to the present day. The Julian Karst
is a particularly good example of a frontier zone, and no linear
boundary, unless artificially strengthened by military means,
has lasted very long in it,’ (Moodie 1945:58-59).
2 Many writers have described the ‘undivided’ remainder
of the population as suffering from what be called the ‘Triestine
condition’-as sense of placelessness and ambiguity brought
on by living in a city that is the historic capital of a region
that no longer exists; as Ivo Andric has written, ‘No
one can imagine what it means to be born and to live at the
border between two worlds, to know and comprehend both of them
and not to be able to doing anything to bring them close again,
to love them both and to oscillate from one to the other for
a lifetime, to have two nations and to have nothing of them,
to be at home wherever and to remain estranged from everything,’
(cited in Molinari 1996:7, translation mine; cf. Morris 2002).
3 The overall population of the Italian autonomous region of
Friuli-Venezia Giulia was 1.2m in 1999 (Source: Regione Autonoma
Friuli-Venezia Giulia offcial website); the overall population
of the Slovenian statistical region of Obalno-Kraška is
102,070 in 2002 (Source: Statistical Office of the Republic
of Slovenia). Amidst the two main ‘national’ ethno-linguistic
groups of the frontier reside speakers of Friulian (furlan)-which
some linguists consider to be an eastern variant of Rhaeto-Romansch
rather than a dialect of Italian-as well as sporadic Germanophone
settlements. The Italian Ministry of the Interior estimates
that there are 780,000 Friulians in Italy (all of whom live
in Friuli-Venezia Giulia; Ministero dell’Intorno 1994).
The small Germanophone population in the northeast of Friuli,
on the border with Austrian Carinthia and Slovenian Gorenjska.
The are an estimated 12,850 non-Tyrolean Germanophones and Walser
living throughout Friuli-Venezia Giulia, the Veneto, the Trentino,
Piedmont, and Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste
(Ministero dell’Intorno 1994).
4 ‘Triest’ is the name of the city in German. The
city is known in English by its Italian name, Trieste; in Slovene,
it is Trst.
5 The full extent of the former Hapsburg territory awarded to
Italy at the end of World War I further included: the Trentino;
cisalpine Tyrol (Tirol); the entirety of Istria (Istra), the
islands of Cres (Cherso), Lošinj (Lussino); the port city
of Zadar (Zara) and the island of Lastovo (Lagosta) and several
smaller islands in the Adriatic. Significantly, the largely
Italophone port of Rijeka (Fiume) became part of the Kingdom
of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes; while irredentist claims and
activity centred upon the rallying cry ‘Trento e Trieste’-both
of which were gained by Italy in the post-war settlement-Italian
nationalists deemed it la vittoria mutilata, a ‘mutilated’
victory, due to the fact that not all of Italia irredenta, ‘unredeemed
Italy,’ was won. Italy had requested the entirety of the
Dalmatian coast in the Treaty of London, and was initially authorised
to occupy the full extent of their pre-war claim at the 1918
armistice. The 1920 Treaty of Rapallo confirmed the territory
awarded to Italy while significantly reducing its extent in
Dalmatia. Slovene nationalists, meanwhile, had not been without
their own expansionist claims in the region; as early as 1853,
Peter Kolzer’s ‘nationally’ ground-breaking
(and later banned) map represented ‘the Slovene lands’
stretching well into present-day Austria and Croatia, and out
towards Udine in Italy.
6 The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was renamed
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (from jugo, ‘south’) in
1929.
7 That same year, the northern half of Carinthia, with its then
roughly 65,000-person Slovenophone population, joined Austria
by plebiscite. The territory of Slovenia, within the new South-Slav
kingdom, was thus substantially reduced from its Hapsburg-era
size, and two of the three historic seats of Slovene culture-Trieste
and Klagenfurt (Celovec in Slovene)-were thus removed behind
international borders (Gow and Carmichael 2000:23). Meanwhile,
the remainder of Slovenia was formally separated from Austria-and
Germanic culture-for the first time in its modern history.
8 For a cogent analysis of the Italian fascist ‘project’
generally cf. e.g., De Grand 1982.
9 Fascist decree 494 (27 April 1927) required non-Italian surnames
in the north-eastern border provinces to be ‘corrected’
to their ‘original’ Italian forms. The Germanophones
of South Tyrol were subject to a similarly brutal Italianisation
campaign.
10 The full extent of the ethnic mélange involved in
the fighting is, indeed, even more complex: in the 1943-45 period,
‘German units, Slovenian militia, Italian republican fascists
and, at the end, Serbian collaborationist troops battled against
the partisans,’ while the Croatian Ustaše acting
alongside the Nazis contributed to the ‘brutalisation
of human conduct’ in the area after 1943, which effectively
laid the sociological conditions for the subsequent atrocities
(Gross 1978:98, 103).
11 Foibe is the Italian name for the chasms or sinkholes of
the Karst; they are fojbe in Slovene. The actual extent of those
killed in the foibe and/or following deportation is the subject
of vigorous and continuing historical debate; the joint Slovene-Italian
Historical and Cultural Commission, indeed, cites the former
as ‘hundreds’ and the latter as merely ‘a
great number’ in their report to the Italian and Slovene
Ministries of Foreign Affairs in July 2000.
12 Estimates vary; as many as 350,000 Italophones (as well as
Slovenes and Croats) may have fled Istria and the Slovene littoral
in the aftermath of the war (cf. Donato 1997; Nodari 1997; Colella
1958).
13 Significantly in contemporary legal debate over abandoned
property, the Italophones who left present-day Slovenia and
Croatia are known as profughi (‘refugees’) or esuli
(‘exiles’) in Italian and as optanti (‘those
who opted to leave’) in Slovene.
14 On the diplomatic history of the Trieste question, cf. Rusinow
1969; Novak 1970; De Castro 1981; Valdevit 1986.
15 Zone A additionally included an enclave surrounding the port
of Pula-Pola in Istria until 1947. The remainder of Venezia
Giulia north of Trieste was merged with the region of Friuli
by the Italian government following the 1947 peace treaty. In
1954, the new province of Trieste was added to the region and
replaced Friuli’s historic capital, Udine, as the seat
of the new region. Bianchini notes that in the discussions preceding
the ‘final settlement in 1951, Tito initially indicated
that Yugoslavia was amenable to granting Zone B provincial autonomy,
or, alternatively, to transfer Koper-Capodistria (and possibly
also Piran-Pirano and Izola-Isola) to Italy in exchange for
several Slovenophone municipalities in Zone A (Bianchini 1995:15,
21).
16 Ballinger notes that ‘Trieste constituted an important
border both physically and metaphorically, becoming an early
and key point at which an emerging Cold War discourse began
to be articulated,’ (Ballinger 2003a:81).
17 Italy was made to give up claim to its colonies in Libya,
Somalia, and Ethiopia, the occupied Dodecanese and Albania,
as well as the ports of Pula, Rijeka, and Zadar along with its
‘new possessions’ on the Croatian coast. It was
further made to pay reparations of $360 million to Russia, Yugoslavia,
Greece, Albania, and Ethiopia. (Ginsborg 1990:100). Given ‘victorious’
Italy’s losses, the exclusion of Trieste from the new
republic was seen to add insult to injury, immediately drawing
support away from the DC in the first round of autonomous-regional
elections toward the Italian Left. This in turn threatened future
American reconstruction aid, premised on Italy (and Trieste)
remaining a bulwark against communism to the east (Ginsborg
1990:115; cf. Gambino 1975:446ff). The British and American
occupying forces (who remained in Zone A, given that the Free
City never came into being) promised that Trieste would return
to Italy a month before the crucial 1948 election, in an effort
to shore up support among the electorate against an Italian
Communist win (Ginsborg 1990:115).
18 NATO believed Trieste was essential for protecting Italy-and
the agricultural Po Valley in particular-from a possible Soviet
invasion, and Yugoslavia, as an anti-Soviet ‘partner,’
could prove essential in protecting Trieste (Bianchini 1995:17).
19 Daily cross-cultural contacts are critical in rebuilding
trust in many divided borderlands (cf. Donnan and Wilson 1999:122).
20 Friuli-Venezia Giulia joined four other Italian regions (Sicily,
Sardinia, Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste, and
Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol) which had previously been
granted autonomy for similar reasons.
21 Interviews with public officials in Ljubljana on 25 April
2002 and in Trieste on 6 May 2002.
22 Based upon data from the 1981 Italian census, some estimates
placed roughly 49,000 Slovenophones living in the province of
Trieste (roughly 19% of the provinicial population), 15,000
in the province of Gorizia (roughly 17%), and 21,000 in the
province of Udine (roughly 5%) (cf. www.istat.it; www.uoc.edu/euromosaic.org).
23 On the rise and vicissitudes of Lega Nord, its leader Umberto
Bossi, and its evolving political agenda, cf. Albertazzi 2004,
Chari et al. 2004; Favretto 2003, Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro
2002; Tambini 2001; Ginsborg 2001; Sema 1996; Albertazzi and
McDonnell (forthcoming). On linguistic nationalism in Italy
and Lega Nord, cf. Tambini 2001 and Ruzza 2000.
24 On the similar popularity of MSI among right-wing Italophone
voters in the province of Bolzano, see Tassani 1990. The end
of the Cold War, meanwhile, resulted in a loss of mission for
the PCI, much of which went on to become the Democratic Party
of the Left (PDS), and the remainder to the refounded Communists.
25 The post-secession division of Istria between Slovenia and
Croatia led Italy to query the level of protection which would
be afforded the overall Italophone community in the region,
given that that community would now be divided between two separate
states. Italy eventually prepared a trilateral memorandum on
the commitment of the two states to protect the Italophone minority,
which was meant to be signed just prior to Slovenia’s
diplomatic recognition. In order to obtain the necessary parliamentary
approval, Slovenia appended a proposal for a bilateral treaty
with Italy requesting equivalent, demonstrable commitment to
the latter’s Slovenophone community. Italy refused to
sign the documents simultaneously, and thus the Slovene Foreign
Minister was instructed not to sign the trilateral memorandum.
Cf. Manzin 1997; Bratina 1997:146.
26 Previously, the Slovenian constitution had expressly prohibited
the sale of land to foreigners. For an overview of the first
Berlusconi administration and its foreign policy objectives,
cf. Ginsborg 2001 and Katz and Ignazi 1996.
27 A further 14,284 Italophones live in Croatian Istria, having
previously formed the bulk of the Italophone population in the
former Yugoslavia (Source: 2001 census, Republic of Croatia
Central Bureau of Statistics official website). Slovenia’s
8,503 autochthonous Ugrophones (Hungarians)-who live in three
municipalities in Prekmurje, in the extreme east of the country-were
also protected under Article 64; Slovenia’s 2,293 autochthonous
Roma (although estimates range as high as 7,000-8,000) are treated
rather less well, but are also recognised by the Slovenian constitution
as an indigenous ethnic group (Source: 1991 Census, Statistical
Office of the Republic of Slovenia). The estimated 140,000 ethnic
Croats, Bosniaks, and Serbs in Slovenia-many resident for more
than a generation-are afforded no linguistic protection whatsoever;
their cultural associations are, however, supported by the Ministry
of Culture (Curin Radovic, 2002).
28 In the 1983 Treaty of Rome, Yugoslavia had agreed to pay
Italy US$110 million, in ten instalments, in compensation for
the abandoned Italophone properties in Slovenia and Croatia.
The first instalment fell due on 1 Jan 1990; Yugoslavia had
collapsed by the time of the third. Slovenia resolved to continue
the payments once it had confirmed its share of the total with
Croatia. The first Berlusconi government, however, refused to
accept further payments, demandeding restitution in kind-an
issue debated previously, and which it was known was not possible
in some cases as properties had been converted to other uses.
As a successor to the 1983 treaty, Slovenia objected, and continued
to pay the instalments into a separate bank account in Luxembourg.
In the ‘Spanish Compromise,’ Slovenia agreed that
four years subsequent to the ratification of its Europe Agreement,
anyone resident in Slovenia for three years would be given preferential
access to Slovene real estate market.
29 As of 1 May 2004, 180 applications for the purchase of Slovene
real estate by non-Slovenes had been filed; of these, 78 were
filed by Germans, 52 by Austrians, and 26 by Italians (Source:
Republic of Slovenia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, personal correspondence,
30 March 2004). The residency requirement within the Compromise
may, however, have played a part in this.
30 This number is disputed; the Republic of Slovenia estimates
there are 100,000.
31 Bratina notes that there were 17 comuni (municipalities)
in Friuli-Venezia Giulia with Slovenophone majorities in 1997,
namely: Dolina (formerly San Dorligo della Valle-Dolina), Monrupino-Repentabor,
Sgonico-Zgonik, Duino-Aurisina-Devin-Nabreina (all province
of Trieste); Doberdò del Lago-Doberdob, Savogna d’Isonzo-Sovodnje
ob Soci, San Floriano del Collio-Števerjan (all province
of Gorizia); and, San Pietro al Natisone, San Leonardo, Stregna,
Drenchia, Grimacco, Savogna, Pulfero, Taipana, Lusevera, and
Resia (all province of Udine) (Bratina 1997:131fn)
32 Interview with Italian official, 19 May 2004.
33 Interview with Italian official, 19 May 2004.
34 For an overview of Interreg’s pilot phase of Italo-Slovene
cross-border cooperation, cf. Zago 2000; Ambrosi 2001.
35 Phare CBC initially focused on the municipalities of Tolmin,
Nova Gorica, and Koper-Capodistria. All three municipalities
are situated in areas where a Slovenophone minority exists across
the border in Italy, and the latter of the three is the seat
of the Italophone minority in Slovenia.
36 Though the operative programme was not approved by the Commission
until 24 July 1997 due to difficulties in negotiation, its validity
encompassed the programming period from 24 November 1994 to
31 December 1999. The provinces of Udine, Gorizia, Trieste and
Venice were included from the outset; the former three provinces
have Slovenophone minorities. The total funding for the Interreg
II Italy-Slovenia programme was €31.350 million, of which
Friuli-Venezia Giulia received €20.772 million and Veneto
€10.474 million. Of Friuli-Venezia Giulia’s funds,
€10.386 was contributed by the Structural Funds, with the
remainder provided by Italy and the region. Phare CBC Slovenia-Italy
funds amounted to €18 million for the same period, but
were allocated on a year-by-year basis at approximately €2.5-4
million per year; Phare required a national contribution of
at least 25% of the total allocation.
37 CBC with Veneto is not detailed here, as there is no Slovenophone
minority in that province. Further Structural Fund interventions
take place in Friuli-Venezia Giulia under Objective 2, which
supports socio-economic conversion in regions facing structural
difficulties; as these interventions are not of a cross-border
nature, they, too, are not examined.
38 In terms of population distribution across the frontier,
the province of Venice comprises 41.9% of the total population
and 21.6% of the surface area; the province of Udine 23.5% of
the population and 35.8% of the area; the province of Trieste
12.8% of the population and 1.1% of the area; the province of
Gorizia 7.1% of the population and 4.1% of the area; the statistical
region of Goriška 6.2% of the population and 20.4% of the
area; the statistical region of Obalno-kraška 5.3% of the
population and 9.2% of the area; and, the municipality of Kranjska
Gora 3.2% of the population and 7.8% of the area. Trieste’s
population density is the highest, at 1,176 inhabitants/km2(Source:
JPD:13-14). The Italian provinces of Rovigo (region of Veneto)
and Pordenone (region of Friuli-venezia Giulia) have associate
status in the Interreg III programme.
39 The Interreg IIIA Italy-Slovenia Joint Programming Document
estimates the unemployment rate in the province of Trieste at
roughly 9%, versus roughly 5% in the provinces of Gorizia and
Udine.
40 GDP is not yet factored on a regional level in Slovenia.
41 Figures from Il Piccolo, 28 August 2004, and an interview
with a Slovenian specialist on labour movement, 25 April 2002.
As many of these workers are unregistered, it is not possible
to provide a more precise figure; there are no official statistics
nor is there any official monitoring.
42 The Udine/Videm agreement on local cross-border traffic between
Italy and Yugoslavia in 1955 created four-month permits which
allowed the roughly 690,000 residents living with 10km of the
border four crossings per month, each for a maximum of 24 hours.
The terms of the bilateral agreement were recast in 1982 to
allow the roughly 1 million residents within 20km of the border
permits valid for 60 months, for an unlimited number of crossings,
each for a maximum of 100 hours (Cf. Vidmar 1994). Cross-border
mobility and transfrontier employment (in the Trieste area in
particular) should increase substantially once Slovenia begins
to enjoy the right to free movement of persons in 2011. The
delay in its implementation is due to (by most accounts alarmist)
concerns among member-states (Austria and Germany being the
most vociferously opposed) regarding an influx of lower-cost
labour from Central and Eastern Europe. The EU’s subsequently
delivered a horizontal response to all acceding states on the
issue; despite Slovenia’s asking Italy for a bilateral
derogation on the issue in 2001, Italy fell into line as (more-progressive)
publics in Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Ireland agreed
that free movement should be delayed. To the dismay of some
and the elation of others, Slovenes will, for the time being,
remain shoppers in Trieste rather citizens.
43 DRAE 1999:24, 28. It should be noted that responses were
not tabulated according to mother tongue.
44 The author notes, by way of an example, that upon Croatian
ship’s arrival in Bari in July 2004, there was no Italian
passport or customs control in operation, despite the several
hundred passengers originating outside the Schengen border.
45 It should be noted, however, that a short-term derogation
allowing duty-free sales to continue on the Slovenian side of
the Italo-Slovene borderland played some part in this trend.
46 Nevertheless, Alpe-Adria’s eventual enlargement resulted
in a less-manageable and less-coherent community, and the geopolitical
transformations of 1989 and the disintegration of Yugoslavia
rendered it increasingly less relevant. Croatia and Slovenia
had, in part, ‘lost their motivation to co-operate in
a transnational form (i.e., through co-operation among regions)’
as they could now do so directly with other governments, while
the Austrian Länder lost some federal-governmental support
for such initiatives insofar as then-strategically neutral Austria
‘used to promote transfrontier co-operation as a substitute
for foreign policy’ during the Cold War (Delli Zotti 1996:56).
47 Due to the due territoriality principle (cf. Article 130c
of the Treaty on European Union), Interreg funds cannot be spent
outside the EU, the paradox here being that Interreg attempts
to integrate the Italo-Slovene borderland via interventions
on the Italian side of the border alone. While Phare CBC attempted
to bridge the ‘cross-borderness gap’ through financing
matching projects where possible (and did so support of the
programming principle), it failed to function as a straightforward
supplement to Interreg due to its smaller size and because only
non-profit organisations were legally eligible for its funding.
48 As Anagnostou has written regarding the Turkish Muslim population
of Greece-with direct comparability to South Tyrol, as well
as, potentially, Friuli-Venezia Giulia-‘Minority members
increasingly viewed the EU as an external system providing alternative
protection and support, which the regional reforms and institutions
brought closer, ensuring the irreversibility of the changes
and preventing Greece from “turning the clock back to
the old system”,’ and thus directly reducing the
appeal of Turkish nationalism itself (Anagnostou 2001:116).
49 Or, indeed, italiana, jugoslovanka, goriziana, brika, slovenka,
furlane?
50 Due to constraints of both space and scope, theories on the
origins and development of nationalism, and its relationship
to ethnicity, are not examined specifically here. For the primary
theoretical arguments, cf. Gellner 1983; Smith 1986; Bhaba 1990;
Hobsbawm 1990; Anderson 1991.
51 The ‘variable permeability of borders culminates in…the
major contradiction of the contemporary world system-the fact
that capital and commodities…now flow much more freely
across borders [than] labour,’ (Anderson et al. 2002:9).
52 Social capital ‘refers to connections among individuals’
i.e., social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness
rising from them. ‘In that sense social capital is closely
related to what some have called “civic virtue.”
The difference is that “social capital” calls attention
to the fact that civic virtue is most powerful when embedded
in a dense network of reciprocal social relations. A society
of…virtuous but isolated individuals is not necessarily
rich in social capital,’ (Putnam 2000:19).
53 In the framework of contemporary EU regional policy, ‘less-favoured
regions’ often seemingly have ‘little or no social
capital on which they can draw, a point which turns the spotlight
on factors such as the institutional capacity of the region,
the calibre of the political establishment’ and their
‘disposition to seek joint solutions to common problems,’
(Morgan 1997:496; cf. Doeringer and Terkla 1990).
54 Trentino-Alto Adige is ranked as one of Italy’s three
most ‘civic’ regions, with Friuli-Venezia Giulia
in the top six and Veneto in the top ten (Putnam 1993:97). For
other relevant critiques of Putnam’s work on social capital
and social capital generally, cf. Kaufman and Weintraub 2004;
Mayer 2003; Grix and Knowles 2002; Kaufman 2002; Fine 2001;
Grix 2001; Portes and Landholt 2000; Schuller et al. 2000; Hall
1999; Trigilia 1999; Whiteley 1999; Boix and Posner 1998; Whiteley
1998; Woolcock 1998; Berman 1997; Eubank and Weinberg 1997;
Foley and Edwards 1996; Ladd 1996; Schudson 1996; Skocpol 1996;
Tarrow 1996; Levi 1996; Sabetti 1996; and (of more limited value,
due to its methodological flaws) Schneider et al. 2000.
55 In his more recent work, and in direct response to much criticism,
Putnam has begun to caveat his theory so as to allow for this
unfortunate conundrum, stating that ‘we cannot assume
that social capital is everywhere and always a good thing’
and that ‘social capital can have negative externalities
does not distinguish it in principle from other forms of capital….With
its internal norms of trust of reciprocity, reinforced by a
shared “self-defensive” purpose, the [Ku Klux] Klan-and
its counterparts in other countries-remind us that social capital
is not automatically conducive to democratic governance,’
(Putnam 2002:8-9).
56 On the popularity of MSI among right-wing Italophone voters
in the province of Bolzano, cf. Tassani 1990.
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