| 
Making Slovenian Citizens: The
Problem of the Former Yugoslav Citizens and Asylum Seekers Living
in Slovenia
by Svetolar Andreev
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to look in depth at the problem of
the foreign residents/non-citizens in Slovenia. Several competing
research approaches towards identifying the relevant parameters
of this problem are adopted. Moreover, a conceptual link between
the recent evolution of (national) Slovenian and (supranational)
European citizenship is established. The main assumption of
this paper is that the present situation of foreign nationals
in Slovenia is due to a specific weakness of the state. It is
hypothesised that a combination of historical/cultural and transitional/international
(globalisation) factors have rendered the Slovenian state incapable
of dealing with its citizenship problems. Four analytical perspectives
towards explaining how the weakness of Slovenian state vis-ŕvis
domestic and international actors impedes the solution of a
particular citizenship issue (i.e. of foreign residents in Slovenia
aspiring to obtain citizenship) will be presented. These perspectives
are the nation-building (historical/cultural), the democratisation
(political), the proceduralconstitutional (legal) and the European
(international) perspectives.
According to the 1991 population census, the foreign persons
(i.e. those without Slovenian citizenship) living in Slovenia
were 222,321, or 11.45% of the entire population. Although the
majority of them have gradually been granted Slovenian citizenship,
the latest figures indicate that there are still 45,756 foreigners
(non-citizens) residing in the country, or 2.29% of the entire
population.2 The number of foreign residents is obviously not
too high for Western European standards, but, as many people
in Slovenia and abroad fear, this relatively low figure with
respect to international immigration criteria hides “unpleasant
truths” about the efficiency of the Slovenian administrative
system. It also reflects a possible xenophobic reaction towards
the former SFRY nationals and current asylum-seekers living
on Slovenian soil.
This paper begins with an overview of the notion of citizenship
in a domestic and international context. Then, a brief historical
account of modern Slovenian citizenship is provided. Simultaneously,
the problem of legal residents aspiring to become Slovenian
citizens is described. The subsequent parts of this paper analyse
this distinct citizenship problem from three different perspectives
presented above: the nation-building (historical/cultural),
the democratisation (political) and the European (international)
perspective. The procedural-constitutional (legal) perspective
is thoroughly analysed throughout the paper, which is why it
is not the explicit focus of any one section. Next, a special
investigative section conceptualises the issue of granting Slovenian
citizenship to foreign residents-SFRY nationals as a series
of deals between the Slovenian state and society shortly before
and after independence. The conclusion tries to summarise the
overall findings of this research and look at the most recent
developments in EU-Slovenian relations regarding citizenship.
What is Citizenship? What are
Its Dimensions?
Citizenship can be defined as a special set of relationships
between an individual and a collective authority (which ordinarily
is the state). Historically, citizenship as a concept emerged
in the late 18th century with the French revolution, which proclaimed
the radical removal of class, corporate and political barriers
between the state and supposedly ‘free’ individuals and between
individuals themselves. A new relationship was created. The
main idea behind the establishment of this novel contractual
relation was that, unlike previous governments that had relied
on traditional/divine methods of legitimacy (i.e. the monarchies
and oligarchies), modern governments would draw direct legitimacy
from their own citizens in a new form of political regime called
“la république” or popular democracy. On the one hand, the state
accorded certain rights and privileges to individuals, and accepted
responsibility to support and protect those whom it regarded
its citizens. On the other hand, citizens were expected to show
loyalty to the state by discharging a number of duties, such
as paying taxes, voting, performing public services and, most
importantly, obeying the laws. The majority of these obligations
were imposed by the state, which is why, in this system of political
organisation, the state was referred to as possessing a “monopoly
over legitimate violence”.3
With the passage of time, however, this clear relationship between
the individual and the state became more complicated. In the
last couple of centuries, both the self-perception of citizens
and of the state evolved as they acquired or shed some of their
previous rights and obligations. Such an evolution was marked
by the historic invention of the nation-state, the emergence
of new social and organisational phenomena such as the welfare
state, of the democratic federation, of civil society and of
trade unionism. It is also worth mentioning that from the 19th
Industrial Revolution century onwards and with the progress
of liberal capitalism, groups of individuals began to acquire
additional rights (such as extension of the voting right and
the right to stand as candidates) and new means of influencing
the state, which were separate and distinct from those associated
with citizenship. These new ways of affecting the policy-making
process both within the state and civil society were designated
as “infrastructural powers”.4 After the end of World War II
and the increased interdependence between various regions in
the world, another particularly important development, was the
creation of numerous international organisations which provided
rights to individuals on a basis other than citizenship. A leader
and innovator in this respect has been the European Community
which, for the fulfilment of its aims, generated a direct set
of rights to individuals who were citizens of a member state
or legal residents in the community. It should be mentioned,
however, that European citizenship, as defined by the latest
Treaty establishing the European Community, “shall complement
and not replace national citizenship”.5
The majority of social scientists working on citizenship issues
today would agree that the concept of citizenship is one of
the most multidimensional concepts in the contemporary academic
literature. In the late 1980s, Roger Brubaker presented six
“membership norms” of an idealtypical notion of citizenship:
1. Unitary -all holders of the status should have full rights
and obligations;
2. Sacred -citizens must be willing to make sacrifices for the
state or community that grants them the status;
3. National -membership must be based on a community that is
simultaneously political and cultural;
4. Democratic -citizens should be entitled to participate significantly
in the business of rule, and access to citizenship should be
open to all residents so that, in the long run, residence in
the community and citizenship in it will coincide;
5. Unique -each citizen should belong to one and only one political
community;
6. Consequential -citizenship must entail important social and
political privileges that distinguish its holders from non-citizens.6
Philippe C. Schmitter recently proposed an additional seventh
criteria, which captures an important dimension of the classical
notion of citizenship:
7. Individual -citizenship is an attribute that can only be
possessed and exercised by individual human beings, although
adult parents may be considered to be acting in lieu of their
children and hence for the family as a collective unit.7
In addition, some authors have pointed out that the concept
of citizenship has different meaning in the internal and external
functioning of states.8 Internally, two sets of relations are
important to understanding the notion of citizenship: (a) between
individuals (horizontally) and (b) between individuals and the
state (vertically). Externally, citizenship is generally known
as nationality, despite the fact that, while often closely related,
the two concepts do not always mean the same thing. Because
states are considered the main political actors in international
relations, and the state is seen as the principal subject of
international law, normally individuals acquire certain political
rights and civil freedoms, as well as specific legal treatment
under foreign or international law only through their state
nationality. ‘Nationals’ or citizens of single states can also
benefit from some general entitlements under international law
such as freedom from torture, freedom of expression and so on.
Since its increased prominence in international political and
economic affairs in the last half a century, the EC/EU has demonstrated
a growing potential for dealing with traditionally internal-to-the-state
issues such as monetary policy, social affairs, defence, security,
and citizenship. By gradually “pooling sovereignty” from the
state, European leaders have eventually managed to create a
minimalist version of a supranational citizenship called “European
citizenship”.9
Finally, it should always be borne in mind, that despite its
multidimensionality and versatility, depending on the specific
context (domestic or international), the concept of citizenship
delineates certain choices about inclusion and exclusion. This
sets limits to the human composition of the political entity,
which usually is the state or a supranational grouping of states
as the EU. It should be signalled, however, that the notion
of citizenship can be malleable and used with different meanings
according to the circumstances: “Citizenship can be manipulated
in various ways as an instrument of State policy for defining
simultaneously whom one considers to belong to the group and
who does not belong. It could be argued that it is this need
for a sense of belonging to the European Union that has been
appealed to in the most recent Treaty in order to engender widespread
support and indeed loyalty.”10
Moreover, as already mentioned, it is very difficult to decouple
the notions of ‘citizenship’ and ‘nation’, or ‘membership in
a community’ and ‘national belonging’. Since historically the
concepts of modern ‘citizenship’ and ‘national statehood’ emerged
almost simultaneously a couple of centuries ago, it is virtually
impossible to distinguish between the processes of citizenship-creation,
state-building and nation-building in practice. Another possible
extension to the traditional meaning of citizenship should include
an analysis of “transnational”, “postnational” and “global”
developments. The inclusion of elements of supranational citizenship
in various European documents and in the Treaties might be considered
as a first step towards creating a wider European citizenship
that the present candidate countries from Central and Eastern
Europe will be part of in the near future.
A Historical Overview of the Current
Slovenian Citizenship
The Republic of Slovenia declared its independence on 25 June
1991. This act was preceded by a Plebiscite on the Sovereignty
and Independence of the Republic of Slovenia on 23 December
1990, when around 88 % of the adult population, including all
permanent residents, expressed their joint will to live in an
independent and internationally recognised state. Simultaneously
with the promulgation of the Constitutional Law for Implementing
the Charter on the Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic
of Slovenia four of the so-called state-forming laws came into
force:
- Citizenship Act of the Republic of Slovenia;
- Law on Foreigners;
- Law on Travel Documents;
- Border Control Act.
All four laws are closely interrelated; for the purpose of this
research I will focus mainly on the first two. Below I will
analyse the Citizenship Act and its implications for the Slovenian
democratic regime and society. In the next section, the Law
on Foreigners will also be given serious consideration in analysing
the problem of Slovenian permanent residents and refugees who
are nationals of another SFRY republic.
Primarily, it should be mentioned that the notion of national
citizenship in Slovenia did not evolve in the last years of
the old Yugoslavia merely culminating in the republic’s independence.
In fact, this notion had preceded the proclamation of sovereign
statehood by decades and had virtually coincided with the creation
of a separate Slovenian nation within the former SFRY. Having
existed for substantial period of time both as a legal/political
concept and a societal ideal, modern Slovenian citizenship is
based on a number of political regulations (treaties) and legal
procedures developed by those states that had had jurisdiction
over present-day Slovenian territory. Specialists dealing with
issues of citizenship would indicate that during the establishment
of the new citizenship status in Slovenia its creators have
followed a triple logic by focusing on: (a) the history of the
Slovenian people and nation during the past 200 years, (b) the
legal continuity of the state entities that Slovenia was previously
part of, and (c) the citizenship status of individuals who had
lived permanently in Slovenia before 25 June 1991 and who continue
to reside on Slovenian territory.11
Historically, Slovenia is one of the youngest states in the
world – it has only existed officially since the beginning of
the last decade. It is also one of the smallest states both
in terms of its of its territory and population.12 From the
point of view of its ethnic composition, Slovenia virtually
represents a nation-state: around 90 % of its population is
of Slovenian ethnic origin.13 Tiny communities of Slovenian
origin have also been living in the neighbouring countries (Austria,
Croatia and Italy), in the republics of former SFRY and further
abroad (e.g. in Argentina, Canada and the United States). All
of these factors have been taken into account while drafting
the constitution and state-forming laws with respect to citizenship.
In the provisions of these laws, Slovenian citizenship has mainly
been defined in terms of blood relationship (ius sanguinis).
Notable exceptions have also been made to recognise the existence
of certain ‘historical nationalities’ living on Slovenian territory
like the Italians and Hungarians as well as the Romany community
(ius solis).14 However, no special provisions have been made
to recognise the sizeable community of citizens of other of
SFRY republics and war refugees that have resided permanently
in Slovenia.
Both from a legal and historical point of view, the Citizenship
Act of the Republic of Slovenia shows strong continuity with
laws regarding republican citizenship in the former SFRY as
well as with previous legal documents regulating the political
and legal status of individuals in the Austrian Empire, the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the Democratic Federal
Yugoslavia and the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia.
These legal acts have usually been complemented by a large body
of international treaties regarding citizenship and human rights
in general. These include the citizenship provisions provided
by the peace treaties following World Wars I and II, as well
as numerous UN, Council of Europe, and EC/EU official documents
regarding these issues. Concretely, the Citizenship Act is based
on the following legal principles:
- The Principle of Voluntary Acquisition and Cessation of Citizenship;
- The Principle of the Prevention of Statelessness;
- The Principle of Effectiveness of Slovenian Citizenship;
- The Principle of Equality of Legitimate and Illegitimate Children;
- The Principle of Equality of Men and Women;
- The Principle of Continuity.15
For the sake of space, it will be impossible to discuss all
of these principles and their implications for national citizenship.
However, two principles will be considered separately, because
they have special significance for the discussion of legal residents
from the republics of the former SFRY developed below. These
are the principle of the prevention of statelessness and the
principle of the effectiveness of Slovenian citizenship. According
to the first principle, for a person who was released from the
citizenship of a country, because the country ceased to exist
or because the person was born on a internationally disputed
territory and from parents without citizenship, statelessness
should be prevented by all possible means. Although the Republic
of Slovenia is not a signatory of the 1961 UN Convention on
the Reduction of Statelessness, its relatively liberal Citizenship
Act and naturalisation procedure leaves little doubt that the
country has been firmly committed to solving this problem (at
least “de iure”) from the beginning of its independent existence.
Regarding the principle of the effectiveness of Slovenian citizenship,
the practical results are more mixed depending on the subject
matter and to who it is applied. A critical test for the effectiveness
of any national citizenship is for instance its permissiveness
regarding the acquisition of dual citizenship. Under Article
5 of the Slovenian constitution, Slovenians who do not hold
Slovenian citizenship but who cannot automatically renounce
their previous citizenship after naturalisation, have been granted
special advantages.16 Conversely, dual citizens from another
former SFRY republic have unduly suffered discrimination in
the hands of the Slovenian authorities, because Slovenia had
not concluded bilateral agreements with these new countries
regarding the citizenship status of their nationals.17
Regarding the regularisation of the citizenship status of those
individuals having permanently lived in Slovenia before 25 June
1991 (the day of independence) and having decided to remain
there, several important measures have been taken by Slovenian
legislators to recognise their contribution to the nation and
societal life. First and foremost, these have been the provisions
of Article 40 of the Citizenship Act, which intended to allow
persons who had been registered as permanent residents and actually
residing in the country at the day of the Plebiscite on the
Independence and Sovereignty of the Republic of Slovenia on
23 December 1990 to acquire Slovenian citizenship. Secondly,
a special Law Regulating the Status of Citizens of Other Successor
States of the Former SFRY was passed by Parliament on 8 July
1999, permitting 8-10,000 people to apply for Slovenian citizenship.
Thirdly, in August 2002, the Law on Temporary protection was
amended to allow persons who had the status of temporary protection
(i.e. refugees of wars) on the day of the entry of the law to
apply for permanent residence and, if they fulfilled the necessary
requirements, to apply for citizenship. All of these procedures
were extremely simplified and free of fee.
The question arises then whether there were substantial reasons
for some civil society organisations and the international community
to mobilise strongly in defence of these displaced persons claiming
citizenship rights. Most specialists agree that there were some
serious reasons to do this, because all of the normative regulations
regarding citizenship described above have worked to some extent,
but their implementation has largely remained a matter of discretion
on the part of the relevant state authorities. The government
and the Ministry of the Interior in particular committed a grave
administrative mistake in the beginning of 1992 vis-ŕ-vis a
group of Slovenian residents by removing them from the residents’
register (see the section below). Moreover, the legal-constitutional
basis concerning citizenship was not sufficiently developed
at that time to prevent abuses by individual public officers.
Possible conflicts between the statutory laws were also to be
expected.18 It should be pointed out that following the influx
of a large number of foreign refugees as a result of the wars
in the former SFRY, Slovenian authorities adopted a more cautious
attitude towards admitting foreign immigrants in the country
to satisfy domestic public opinion. Finally, the opinion of
the majority of my interviewees has been that successive amendments
to the Civil Act failed to serve as a substitute for a welldeveloped
asylum and immigration policy which Slovenia is still elaborating
today.19
Presenting the ‘Contours’ of a
Citizenship Problem
Nowadays, there are two main groups of minority residents, or
‘denizens’, in Slovenia. The first group comprises the classical
national minorities described in the Constitution – Hungarians,
Italians and the Roma community. Their number is a mere 13,860
persons or 0.7% of the entire Slovenian population. They enjoy
almost complete legal recognition and protection. The second,
much larger, group consists of members of the nations formerly
belonging to the ‘common state’ ? the SFRY. According to the
1991 census, 222,321 such persons live in Slovenia, and they
represent almost 12% of the country’s population. Because of
their relatively large number and the potentially important
political role they can play as voters and citizens, this latter
minority group has been perceived by Slovenian governing elites
and society either as an asset or as a liability. Despite the
pronounced desire by the majority of the members of this diverse
community to become citizens of the new Slovenian state, the
normative regulations put in place to protect them both as individuals
and as representatives of various ethnic and cultural minorities
have largely failed because of the “rudimental realisation of
the legislation in practice”.20 Moreover, the sporadic attempts
to better integrate these people in Slovenian society have frequently
been unsuccessful because of the virtually total lack of understanding
(and consideration) by the state authorities for the special
of interests and problems of this group of persons.
The main argument of this paper is that, since its creation,
the Slovenian state has been rather weak, hence, it needed the
support of the entire domestic population to conduct painful
systemic reforms and gain external legitimacy. The attitude
towards its national minorities represented a ‘critical test’
for the maturity of the newly-constituted administration to
convince its neighbours and the international community about
its democratic intentions and the ability to protect the different
categories of individuals residing on its territory. That is
why, the Statement of Good Intents approved by the Slovenian
National Assembly on 6 December 1990,21 just two and a half
weeks before the Plebiscite for Independence (23 December 1990),
could be perceived as a deliberate step seeking the support
of the entire Slovenian population to secede from SFRY, including
the permanent residents who were nationals of other Yugoslav
republics. The promise made in this political declaration was
reiterated in the famous Article 40 of the new Slovenian Constitution,
giving the possibility to persons having resided permanently
in the country before the day of the Plebiscite to apply and
obtain citizenship.
Thus, the leadership of the Republic of Slovenia solved a double
problem: on the one hand, it generally recognised the principle
of legal continuity of international agreements signed by the
SFRY by preventing (at least de jure) the occurrence of statelessness
of the Yugoslav citizens who were nationals of other republics
of the collapsing federation, while, on the other hand, it secured
the vote of around 12 % of the resident population by bravely
deciding to integrate this group of persons into the predominantly
mono-ethnic and mono-religious Slovenian society.
In the opinion of most legal experts the Citizenship Act of
the Republic of Slovenia has been quite liberal. According to
the provisions of Article 40, in order to obtain a Slovenian
citizenship one had to fill in a simple declaration/demand and
show proof of one’s permanent stay and residency in the country
at the time of the referendum for independence. No additional
requirements such as taking a language test, showing one’s means
of economic subsistence by having a permanent job, taking an
oath of allegiance to the state symbols and institutions, or
passing a probation period of several years before obtaining
citizenship were made. This virtually automatic formula of granting
nationality to the permanent residents of the republic corresponded
to the general spirit of freedom prevailing in the early days
of democracy and the strong sense of community that the majority
of Slovenian society shared. The period stipulated by Article
40 was six months after the official enactment of the law on
citizenship. The deadline for applying for Slovenian citizenship
under this legal procedure was the 26 February 1992. After this
date, however, there was an additional possibility (which still
exists today) for those who failed to apply on time: they could
acquire citizenship under the provisions on naturalisation.
It is probably interesting to note here that a controversial
Housing Act was adopted parallel to the Citizenship Act. According
to the Housing Act only Slovene citizens could benefit from
and eventually purchase the relatively cheap public flats that
they had been occupying for years. This put additional pressure
on those permanent residents who were nationals of other Yugo-republics
to file their applications for citizenship on time, before they
became ineligible to stay in their own homes.22 Hence, from
a practical and human point of view, the choice of whether or
not to become a citizen of the Slovenian state was not completely
free.
The great majority of those entitled to obtain citizenship by
the Constitution made a claim and received a Slovenian passport,
while a small (albeit significant) minority of the country’s
residents either failed to meet the permanent stay criteria,
missed the deadline to apply, or refused to file a citizenship
application. This group of persons numbered between 20,000 and
80,000, depending on the various counts and predictions made
throughout the 1990s.23 Following the closure of the application
procedure on 26 February 1992, all of these people, as well
as the refugees of war that had begun to come to Slovenia during
that period of time, began to be treated as foreigners and their
legal status was no longer regulated by the Citizenship Act
but by the Aliens Act. Notably, Article 81, Paragraph 2 of this
latter law defined the situation of those citizens of other
SFRY republics who failed to take advantage of the possibility
to become citizens under the provisions of Article 40 of the
Citizenship Act.
It is difficult to describe in few lines why so many people
did not avail themselves of the opportunity given by the Slovenian
government to become citizens. First, one should probably consider
the identity problems that some persons had to overcome in order
to become Slovenian nationals. Being both citizens of another
Yugoslav republic and of the large federal state at the same
time did not make it easy for certain individuals to embrace
the common values of the majority Slovene population living
in a small nation-state. Secondly, during the initially uncertain
period of the planned split from the SFRY, some people did not
believe seriously that either Slovenia could survive as an independent
state or that the former Yugoslavia would collapse so soon.
Thirdly, certain minority group leaders and commanders of the
Yugoslav National Army forces stationed in the republic actively
encouraged the members of their national communities and colleagues
to boycott the proposal of the Slovenian government to grant
citizenship to all permanent residents who wished to do so.
What eventually happened was that most of these active opponents
of independent statehood obtained Slovenian citizenship, preventing
others from settling their legal status. Fourthly, it could
have been imagined that some citizens of the other SFRY republics
would not renounce their Yugoslav nationality simply because
they had property, business or families in the other republics
of the federation. Fifthly, a small group of Slovenian male
residents feared to return to their former countries of origin
to issue documents, because of the increased possibility of
getting apprehended by the Yugoslav federal authorities and
be conscripted for military service. Similarly, sixthly, it
was either too difficult or impossible for some other persons
to return to their home places to resolve their citizenship
status because of the initiation of military and civil conflicts
in parts of SFRY. Finally, seventhly, a large number of permanent
residents in the country (particularly of the nomadic Romany
communities and the elderly persons) were not well-informed
about the severe consequences of not acquiring Slovenian citizenship
within the legal period of six months.
Still, 171,000 people managed to apply and acquired citizenship
under the provisions of Article 40 of the Citizenship Act. This
number was much higher than expected by the state authorities,
since many people had moved to the republic in the last couple
of years before the end of the Yugoslav federation.24 Without
taking into account the specific problems of various categories
of former SFRY nationals living in Slovenia, the officials responsible
for implementing the provisions of Article 40 of the Citizenship
Act and, subsequently of Article 81, paragraph 2 of the Aliens
Act increasingly assumed a position of “take it or leave it”
with respect to the citizenship rights of those who were not
able to apply within the necessary time limits. It can also
be argued that the state authorities, and the Ministry of the
Interior in particular, were taken by surprise by the large
number of applications for Slovenian citizenship under Article
40.25 Furthermore, they were quite uneasy about the large influx
of refugees, the permeability of national borders and the free
movement of citizens of other SFRY republics who used their
federal passport and personal connections to settle in Slovenia.
State security reasons were frequently mentioned with regard
to the importation of crime from South and East, while the Citizenship
Act had to be changed twice at the end of 1991 in order to accommodate
the increased demands by members of both civil society and the
political parties to ban some former Yugoslav National Army
officers who actively combated against the young Slovenian state’s
independence and convicted criminals who were nationals of other
SFRY republics from obtaining citizenship.26
After 26 February 1992, tens of thousands of people actually
living in Slovenia were removed from the registry of permanent
residents and their personal data was transferred to the Aliens
registry. Some NGO activists immediately accused the Ministry
of Interior of ‘deleting’ the names of these individuals and
de facto committing a serious administrative offence by forging
the information in the state registries about the real size
and ethnic composition of the country’s population. The Minister
of Interior, Mr. Igor Bavcar, was additionally blamed for conducting
this operation under conditions of complete secrecy and within
a limited circle of officers from his ministry.27 Several years
later, during a Parliamentary hearing, the Minister of Interior
attempted to come up with rough figures about those who were
removed from the former People’s Republic of Slovenia citizen’s
registry. More precise information was provided, however, to
the public in the mid- 1990s after the Ombudsman and the Constitutional
Court asked for it in order to resolve the case of two nationals
of another former SFRY republic who had brought charges against
the Slovenian state for not granting them permanent residence
status.28
Eventually, on 29 September 1999, after having previously been
heavily pressured by a number of NGOs, the media, some intellectuals
and, of course, the Constitutional Court and the Ombudsman,
the Parliament adopted the Act Regulating the Status of the
Citizens of Other Successor States to the Former SFRY in the
Republic of Slovenia. This special law gave the opportunity
to more than 10,000 people to apply for citizenship, while those
actually residing in Slovenia were granted temporary or permanent
residence permits much more easily.29 The only group of persons
whose residence status was not completely solved by the time
of the writing of this article were former SFRY citizens who
resided in Slovenia under the provisions of the Law on Temporary
Protection. An important amendment to this law in August 2002,
however, granted an estimated couple of thousands of persons
the opportunity to acquire permanent residency following a simplified
procedure.30
What remains problematic both from a legal and a human point
of view regarding the implementation of the above normative
regulations, however, are basically two things: (a) the Slovenian
state has liberally granted residence and citizenship rights
to former Yugoslav nationals, but has obliged them to make proof
of their previous legal stay in the country after having destroyed
most of the evidence about this by removing them from the permanent
residents register and informing the local communes of their
foreigner’s status after 26 February 1992; and (b) there has
been ample evidence that a “sense of guilt” has prevailed among
Slovenian politicians, decision-makers and society in general
about having treated unjustly a minority group of permanent
residents and refugees from the other former SFRY republics,
and that is why these laws were adopted so swiftly and without
active public discussion after the 1999 decision of the Constitutional
Court (see endnote 31). There has not been an admission of mea
culpa by individuals in power or any initiation of a society-wide
debate about who should be eligible to obtain Slovenian citizenship
and residence in general. The current almost complete silence
surrounding this set of issues has left the Slovenian population
divided between a vast majority that fails to recognise its
partly multiethnic and multicultural character and a small minority
that constantly misses the opportunity to integrate in Slovenian
society despite the legal assurances and material help provided
by the state.
Three Perspectives Towards Post-Independence
Slovenian Statehood
In this section, three alternative perspectives towards understanding
the current problems of the Slovenian state will be presented.
The main focus of this narrative will be the impact of the state
transformation on the recentlyestablished citizenship norms
and practices in Slovenia. Special attention will also be paid
to the unresolved residency issue of those SFRY nationals whose
families originally came from other parts of the former federation.
The Nation-Building Perspective
As already mentioned, Slovenia has never been completely ethnically
homogeneous, either before or after its founding as an independent
state in the beginning of the 1990s. Moreover, during their
entire national history Slovenians have been a state minority
and many Slovenians have immigrated to far-away countries like
Argentina, Australia, Canada and the United States with predominantly
multicultural and multiethnic populations to come back after
the independence of their home country from Yugoslavia. Although
a relatively strong ethnic majority on their national territory
both within the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the former SFRY,
Slovenians have always lived alongside other ethnic minorities
such as Germans, Hungarians, Italians and the Romany community.
The rights of some of these indigenous minorities have been
explicitly recognised by the previous and the current Slovenian
constitutions.
The Slovenian independentist movement has always been struggling
against a dominant state authority, be it the Austro-Hungarian
Empire or the Yugoslav federation. In spite of having lived
for centuries in multicultural, multiethnic and quasi-federal
polities, the majority of Slovenians decided at the end of the
20th century to complete their delayed state-building process
by organising themselves as a small but almost ethnically pure
nation. The reasons for perceiving their newly-created state
more as a nation-state than as a multicultural political entity
were both historical and practical. Within the former SFRY,
Slovenes were the only ones among the big constituent nations
to speak a distinctly different Slavic language. Because of
this, until the late 1970s, they experienced little intra-federal
movement of workers and even less intermarrying between Slovenes
and other nationalities. Situated at the North-western rim of
the Balkans, and being among the smallest republics of the Yugoslav
federation (both territorially and population-wise), Slovenia
managed to maintain its traditional contacts with its capitalist
Western neighbours without having always to get the approval
of the federal authorities in Belgrade. Finally, having had
the highest standard of living among all the former SFRY republics
and concentrating most of the foreign direct investments on
their territory, Slovenes considered themselves able to maintain
the inefficient but egalitarian ‘social model’ of the old Yugoslavia
for the majority of its population within a newly-constituted
Slovenian nation-state.
What was created after independence from the SFRY in terms of
both Slovenian nationhood and statehood was, as Miran Komac
described it, a “parent nation”31 which pretended to solve most
of the socio-economic problems of the former state entity by
using the same or a slightly modified social and economic model
but at the same time virtually ignored its diverse cultural
and ethnic heritage after having replaced the federal with a
nationstate model of Slovenian society. This has been an approach
to building a new nation and state, which is rather conservative
and at the same time unifying. It has opened up deep gaps between
various groups of people living in the country: between national
minorities and the Slovenian majority, between permanent residents
and temporary residents and refugees, between emigrants from
Slovenian origin and emigrants from other former SFRY republics,
between persons having a place to live and those not having
one, between people speaking Slovenian and those speaking a
foreign language. Despite the numerous guarantees given to ethnic
minorities living in Slovenia about the preservation of their
cultural traditions and institutions by the Constitution and
other normative documents, what eventually turned out to be
the case in practice was the building of a mono-ethnic, mono-cultural
and mono-religious nation. One can even argue that in spite
of all the democratic gains made by Slovenians since national
independence, gender equality has not improved substantially,
because of the unintentional uniformisation of society and the
slow integration of women and other minorities into the state
administration and political life.32
Regarding the future coexistence between the dominant national
majority and ethnic minorities, Miran Komac contends that concepts
such as “homeland, parent nation, so on” could be very useful
in explaining the role of the state as “the exclusive guarantor
of a nation’s ethnic specificity”. He elaborates his vision
further:
“The romantic perception of the relation between the parent
nation and its minorities, a mixture of charity and protection,
often conceals a distorted perception of national issues. The
use of the phrase “parent nation” recalls a bee-like organisation
of a nation, within which everything is in one way or another
subject to the preservation of the parent – the queen bee”.33
The Democratisation Perspective
Throughout its post-Yugoslav period Slovenia has been described
as a consolidated democratic regime. Inclusive elections have
been regularly held at all levels of governance, and they have
been free and fair. Politicians have not contested the results
of these elections and they have not tried to offer systemic
alternatives to democracy. A new constitution has been adopted
guaranteeing both political and civil rights to the entire population.
The press and other media outlets have been mostly free from
state control, and they have provided the population with alternative
sources of information. Political parties and civic associations
have been allowed to organise and conduct their activities without
state intervention. Finally, the political regime seems to have
met the general expectations of society by being political legitimate
and accountable; that is why the voter turnout has increased
and the electoral volatility has diminished in Slovenia unlike
in most other post-communist countries in Eastern Europe during
the past decade.
Despite this very positive situation regarding democracy in
the country, Slovenia still experiences serious problems integrating
politically its national minorities and the citizens of the
other former SFRY republics living on its territory. The dual
question of providing guarantees to 5-10% of its population
about their equal treatment by the Slovenian state authorities
at the same time as preventing populist politicians using the
issue of ethnic minorities as a “trump card” to win elections
needs further consideration and a rapid solution.
As two of the leading democratisation scholars, Juan Linz and
Alfred Stepan, assert, democracy cannot be consolidated unless
there is behavioural and attitudinal support by the majority
of the population and political organisations for the political
system.34 Regarding behavioural support on the part of various
minorities in Slovenia, it can be argued that there has been
no open protests against certain governmental policies, but
it is also true that most of the minorities have virtually been
‘bought out’ by being granted citizenship or silenced via different
complicated legal and administrative procedures. As regards
the attitudinal support for different post-independence governments
in Slovenia and for the political regime as a whole, the picture
has not been so clear – various opinion polls suggest that both
ethnic Slovenes and national minorities do not trust each other
and think that the state should do more to improve the situation
of minorities.35 The behaviour of some Slovenian politicians
has not been conducive to solving the minority problems either.
For instance, in the autumn of 1994, a number of nationalistically-minded
MPs managed to organise the collection of 40,000 signatures
to call a referendum for the abolition of Article 40 of the
Citizenship Act. While the collection of signatures was stopped
by a decision of Parliament, other deputies from opposition
parties suggested that the provisions of this article allowed
citizens of other former SFRY republics to hold a dual citizenship:
a Slovenian and of another Yugo-state. Altogether six times
either the parliamentary majority or the Constitutional Court
had to intervene to prevent the proposals of extremist politicians
to amend the Citizenship Act from passing in the legislature.
The uncertainty surrounding the legal status of hundreds of
thousands of Slovenian citizens has not contributed to reassuring
the various minority groups in the country and consolidating
democracy.36
The European Perspective
Although the EC/EU has elaborated clear criteria for accession
of the new candidate countries and although the political part
of the so-called Copenhagen Criteria explicitly mentions the
protection of minority rights,37 very little has been done in
practice to protect some of the minority groups in Slovenia
throughout the period of established bilateral relations. Many
European officials and international observers have visited
Slovenia during the past decade, but relatively few attempts
have been made to seriously pressure the Slovenian government
to resolve the residency or citizenship problems of the Romany
community and the nationals of other former SFRY republics living
in the country. Moreover, the rising xenophobia and nationalism
among certain members of Slovenian political elite have laid
open the question of whether Europe can contribute significantly
to building a democratic and multiethnic Slovenian society.
It should be mentioned, however, that in the last couple of
years the EU has engaged more actively with some of the minority
problems in Slovenia, but the impact of European institutions
on settling minority issues has been more indirect than direct.
For instance, the 2002 Annual Progress Report of the European
Commission mentions in detail the recent cases of violation
of human rights in Slovenia.38 It draws special attention to
the unequal social and political conditions of the Romany minority.
The problems of the legal uncertainty facing some of the nationals
of other Yugorepublics and the refugees living under temporary
protection in Slovenia with respect to their still unresolved
residency and citizenship statuses are also indicated in this
report.
Despite a set of critical points, however, Slovenia’s democratic
credentials have never been questioned at the European level.
This has been mainly because (a) Slovenia’s performance regarding
the protection of ethnic minorities has been better-than-average
compared to that of the other candidate states from post-communist
Europe, and (b) some of the current EU member states experience
similar problems with their own minorities and would not welcome
international solutions for issues that are perceived as an
exclusively domestic affair.
European influence to recognise minority rights has worked in
a number of cases, particularly regarding the election of local
representatives. For example, the 1993 Law on Local Elections
was modified in May 2002 to prescribe direct representation
of the Romany community in the municipal councils. Following
this important decision, this minority group39 has had its representatives
sitting on 20 municipal assemblies, while the Cabinet has proposed
that the 2003 budget include additional funds for these 20 municipalities
to implement policies benefiting the Romany population.40 The
latest amendments of the State Administration Act adopted in
May 2002 have complemented the already existing legal basis
granting special rights and protection to the Hungarian and
Italian minorities by additionally allowing the use of the national
languages of these ‘constitutionally-defined’ minority groups
in public offices and during certain administrative procedures.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that Slovenia has been the first
among all the EU candidate states to permit foreign nationals
residing permanently in Slovenia to vote in the local elections
as of 2002. This mainly symbolic gesture shows the willingness
of the country’s political elite to follow the most advanced
European practice in this field – i.e. to grant a specific political
right that is otherwise guaranteed to only EU nationals who
can vote in the local elections of another member state. The
peculiar difference with the European law however is that Article
8b of the Maastricht Treaty stipulates that “every citizen of
the Union residing in a Member State of which he is not a national
shall have the right to vote and stand as a candidate at municipal
elections in the Member State in which he resides, under the
same conditions as nationals of that State”. The new Slovenian
Law on Local Self-Administration (last amended on 11 June 2002)
allows foreigners residing permanently in Slovenia to vote but
not to stand as local candidates.
Granting Citizenship to Nationals
of Other Yugoslav Republics: A Societal Deal?
As already indicated in the previous section, the Slovenian
government experienced various pressures as to whether to grant
citizenship to and treat equally all of its minorities. This
paper argues that one of the crucial incentives (or disincentives)
for different groups of political leaders to pay greater attention
to minority problems in Slovenia has been the weakness of the
state. Although it is impossible to define state weakness in
a few lines, it is probably necessary to mention that it could
manifest itself in the relation to its internal and/or external
environment. Then, since weaknesses can both be temporary and
structural, it is worth analysing how the Slovenian state constituted
itself since independence.
One of the principal hypotheses regarding the structural weakness
of the Slovenian state is that historically it has almost always
been vulnerable in its relations with an external hegemonic
power – be it the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the distant past,
or the former SFRY at the end of the 20th century. In both cases
the Slovenian leadership needed the support of the international
community and its domestic population to assert its legitimate
authority over the national territory. Since both the Austro-Hungarian
Empire and the SFRY possessed the exclusive means and international
legitimacy to represent Slovenia in its external relations,
it was very difficult for an unrecognised state entity to seek
support unilaterally in the international arena. However, in
the early 1990s the desire of the Slovenian leadership to move
the country away from the rump Yugoslav federation was quite
strong, so it had to look for additional support from its entire
domestic constituency.41 By promising to grant citizenship to
all permanent residents shortly before the Plebiscite on the
Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic of Slovenia (23
December 1990), the ruling elite aimed at achieving two things:
a) Obtaining greater support for the country’s independence;
b) Convincing the international community, but also the federal
authorities in Belgrade, that even nationals of other Yugo-republics
residing in Slovenia supported a democratic and free Slovenia.
Depending on the trustworthiness of these suppositions, it can
be claimed that the then Slovenian leadership concluded a more
or less explicit deal with all segments of society to treat
them equally before the law. The proposal to grant citizenship
to all permanent residents made for the first time in the Statement
of Good Intents and enshrined in the new Citizenship Act of
the Republic of Slovenia after independence has been one of
the most farreaching and comprehensive in post-communist Eastern
Europe.
During the early 1990s, this deal has been almost completely
tolerated by the Slovenian governing authorities. However, because
of the unexpectedly high number of applicants from within Slovenia,
the influx of refugees following the initiation of military
and civil conflicts on the territory of the other Yugo-republics
and the rising nationalism and xenophobia among parts of the
Slovenian population instigated by extremist politicians, the
state has proved incapable of following the liberal policies
of granting citizenship and residence to foreign nationals at
the same pace and intensity as in the beginning of the independence
period. On the contrary, some of the state institutions and
ministries began to work against the provisions of Article 40
and related laws. This led to a reaction by members of civil
society and the more moderate politicians in the Slovenian parliament,
who opposed changes to the existing Citizenship Act but fell
short of supporting proactive liberal governmental policies
towards minorities and immigrants. Left on their own, former
nationals of other republics of the SFRY tried to either convert
into ‘good Slovenes’ by speaking the language and following
the local customs, or sunk into anonymity by continuing to practice
their largely marginalised ethnic cultures.42
The role of the EU in the second half of the 1990s has been
paramount in promoting the rights of various minority groups.
Far from being a hegemonic power, the EU has exerted considerable
pressure on the Slovenian authorities in a number of areas,
the most important of which have been the border regime, competition
policy, the free movement of persons and minority rights. One
of the critical issues in the EU-Slovene relations has been
the possibility given to foreign nationals to buy land in Slovenia.
Being a very sensitive issue for the young Slovenian state,
this problem has been counteracted by the issue of the free
movement of workers from Slovenia into the current member states
after enlargement. Transitional periods have been asked on both
sides regarding these issues.43 Thus, it could be concluded
the Slovenian state has experienced a temporary structural weakness
vis-ŕ-vis the EU with respect to fulfilling some of the membership
criteria.
To compensate for this weakness the Slovenian authorities actively
sought to resolve its ‘residue’ problems with the traditional
ethnic minorities like Hungarian, Italians and the Romany, offering
at the same time the possibility for foreign nationals to vote
in local elections. The other, more sizeable, minorities, including
the refugees coming from the rest of Yugoslavia, were also given
legal certainty about the solution of their residency status,
although as indicated by certain NGOs, the application period
had been deliberately made too short. All in all, the Slovenian
state looked for the support of its entire population anew,
in order to obtain external legitimacy for its position over
a number of policies vis-ŕ-vis a much more influential regional
power like the European Union.
Conclusion
Although during most of its post-independence period the Slovenian
authorities have treated some of its minorities (i.e. Hungarians,
Italians and (partly) the Romany community) more favourably,
while ignoring the rights of a large number of nationals from
the other Yugo-republics living in Slovenia who have not been
granted citizenship or permanent residence, the country has
been demonstrating a steadily positive trend in protecting and
integrating its minorities. This paper argues that this process
has been significantly influenced by the specific weaknesses
of the Slovenian state both internationally and domestically.
When pressurised externally in various policy areas either by
the former SFRY or by the EU, Slovenia invariably sought the
support of its whole population regardless of its diverse ethnic
origins. This has been a laudable act of inclusion from a democratic
point of view and an evidence of the political maturity of Slovenian
society. However, during the mid-1990s, certain Slovenian politicians
and administrators tried to disregard their obligations towards
some of the minority groups who did not embrace the Slovenian
language and culture readily. The rising nationalism and xenophobia
in small segments of Slovenian society have received partial
(although not explicit) welcome in the governing circles who
did not want to conduct additional reforms to integrate certain
categories of ethnic minorities and refugees. The acceleration
of the accession process to the EU in the late 1990s created
a new impetus both for the Slovenian state and society to introspect
and define their priority policy areas vis-ŕ-vis their minorities.
Compared to some of the Baltic States where widespread discrimination
against the Russian minority prevails still today, Slovenia
has moved quickly, especially in 2001 and 2002, to adopt legislation
addressing some of the still unresolved minority problems in
the country. Only the future can tell how far these legal provisions
will be implemented in practice and what their effect will be
on individual minority groups.
Endnotes
1 I am grateful to all the people who helped me realise this
project. I am particularly obliged to the following scholars
and experts who enlightened me on some of the past and present
problems of Slovenian citizenship: Matej Accetto, Felicita Medved,
Jasminka Dedic, Matej Lozar, Miran Komac, Slavko Gaber, Simona
Zavratnik, Mihela Zupancic, Zlatko Sabic, Vlasta Jalusic and
Sasa Banjanac-Lubej.
I would like to single out the important role of my colleague
Jonathan Wheatley for correcting the final draft of this text.
I am thankful to my supervisor Prof. Jan Zielonka and two independent
reviewers for the very useful and stimulating comments.
2 Data from the National census held in the Spring of 2002.
Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia (2002).
3 Max Webber describes the state as “a human community that
(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of
physical force within a given territory”. Webber (1946: 77-78).
4 Mann (1988).
5 Article 17 of the Treaty establishing the European Community
(TEC).
6 Brubaker (1989: 4-8).
7 Schmitter (2000, especially the chapter on “Citizenship”:
23-52).
8 Hylan, Loftus, and Whelan (1995: 9).
9 In its Articles 8, 8a, 8b, 8c, 8d and 8e, the early version
of the Treaty of European Union (TEU), popularly known as the
Maastricht Treaty (1992), formally describes the initial set
of rights of its citizens. This document clearly stipulates
that all nationals of the member states are now citizens of
the EU.
10 Hylan, Loftus, and Whelan (1995: 17-18).
11 Mesojedec-Pervinsek (1997). Ms. Mesojedec-Pervinsek is a
State Under-Secretary at the Slovenian Ministry of the Interior,
responsible for citizenship and immigration.
12 On a territory of less than 20,000 square kilometres approximately
2 million persons live. According to the most recent census
results, the country’s population is 1,995,718 people, of whom
1,949,419 are citizens of the Republic of Slovenia (excluding
citizens temporarily residing abroad), 15,285 have permanent
residence in Slovenia, 28,682 have temporary residence, while
2,332 persons are under temporary protection. Slovenians often
joke that they always miss around 50,000 persons to reach 2,000,000
citizens. This ‘missing group’ may in fact be the last three
categories of inhabitants, the majority of whom demand Slovenian
citizenship.
13 At the time of national independence, 87,84% of the country’s
inhabitants were of Slovenian ethnic origin, while small Croatian,
Muslim, Italian and Hungarian communities (each below 1,5%)
also existed. (Population census of the Social Republic of Slovenia,
1991).
14 Article 64 of the Slovenian Constitution grants extensive
rights and privileges to the “autochthonous Italian and Hungarian
ethnic communities in Slovenia”, while Article 65 vaguely mentions
the need for protecting the “Romany ethnic community”.
15 Mesojedec-Pervinsek (1997: 45-55).
16 This is, for instance, a large group of Slovenians having
lived in Argentina, where the release of national citizenship
is impossible.
17 Discussions for solving this entangled issue have been going
on between Slovenia and the Republic of Macedonia. See Mesojedec-Pervinsek
(1997: 62).
18 As one of my interviewees has bluntly put it: “It was not
the Citizenship Act but the Law on Foreigners that created a
mess in the beginning of 1992.”
19 The latest amendment of the Citizenship Act adopted by Parliament
on 25 October 2002 tries to solve some of the citizenship problems
discussed during the previous decade. These ‘new’ provisions
deal with a broad range of issues such as short-term refugees,
stateless persons, persons born on the national territory, ‘recovery’
of citizenship for persons of Slovenian origin and naturalisation
of persons who resided in Slovenia on the day of the Plebiscite
for Independence (23 December 1990).
20 Komac (2001: 284).
21 Izjava o Dobrih Namenih or “Statement of Good Intents” was
adopted at the joint session of the Parliamentary Parties and
was published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia
under No. 44/90/I. The paragraph that is of particular interest
to this research is the following: “The Slovenian State guarantees
its Italian and Hungarian minorities that within the independent
republic of Slovenia they shall enjoy all the rights that are
laid down by its Constitution and laws, as well as international
agreements signed and recognised by the SFRY. Likewise, it guarantees
the members of all other nations and nationalities their right
to overall cultural and linguistic development, and to all those
who have their permanent residence in Slovenia the opportunity
that they can obtain Slovene citizenship, if they so desire.”
22 The adoption of the Housing Act on 3 October 1991 coincided
with the start of the six-month period to apply for Slovenian
citizenship under Article 40. Obviously, the interest of some
permanent residents/citizens of other SFRY republics to obtain
Slovenian citizenship was predominantly economic. (See Articles
91, 100 and 101 of the Housing Act, clarifying who is eligible
to get these apartments at lower than the market rates).
23 According to the official statistics of the Ministry of Interior,
more than 171,000 persons with citizenship of other republics
of the former SFRY who had permanent residence and actually
lived in Slovenia on the day of the Plebiscite applied and obtained
citizenship. Another 30,000 either did not apply, renounced
their permanent residence in Slovenia, or simply failed to clear
their legal status with the state authorities. The Helsinki
Monitor of Slovenia, a human rights NGO, however, indicated
a much higher number of persons residing in Slovenia virtually
stateless. The specialist of this organisation presumed that
these were between 80-130,000 people, including the refugees
and economic immigrants that came to the country after 1992.
Taking into account the fact that at the beginning of Slovenia’s
independence (1990/91) the number of permanent residents from
other SFRY republics was approximately 220,000 people, then,
it could be assumed that the above-mentioned ‘problematic’ category
of people amounted to between 40-50,000 people. (Two of my interviewees
mentioned a figure close to 45,000 people).
24 In fact, the People’s Republic of Slovenia kept a detailed
record of its citizens and residents unlike the remaining republics
of the former SFRY. However, many people moved in the 1970s
and 1980s from other Yugoslav republics to Slovenia to perform
low-skilled or seasonal jobs, that is why some of them had failed
to register with the state authorities as residents.
25 Initially it had been estimated that around 70,000 permanent
residents would apply, but, when more than 170,000 persons did,
then Slovenian politicians realised the full effect of their
previous decision to grant citizenship according to the provisions
of Article 40.
26 See the new paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 40 of the Citizenship
Act of the Republic of Slovenia enacted on 11 December 1991.
27 See for instance the International Helsinki Federation for
Human Rights Annual Report on Slovenia. International Helsinki
Federation for Human Rights (1998).
28 Following a landmark decision of the Constitutional Court
of the Republic of Slovenia in March 1999, Article 81 of the
Aliens Act had to be revised to meet certain human rights provisions
of the Constitution. According to the Court’s verdict, the legislator
was also instructed to adopt a regulation within six months,
which would stipulate more lenient conditions for citizens of
other republics of the former SFRY than those that were applicable
to other foreign nationals, so that the former could obtain
permanent residence permits more easily.
29 After 171,000 persons had acquired citizenship under Article
40 in the beginning of 1992, 16,108 were granted Slovene nationality,
out of which 15,439 already had citizenship of another republic
of the former SFRY (official state statistics as of 16 June
2002).
30 As already mentioned in endnote 19, the most recent amendments
of the Citizenship Act (25 October 2002) will allegedly facilitate
the naturalisation procedure for those having resided in Slovenia
before and on the day of the Plebiscite (23 December 1990).
However, it puts more stringent conditions to future refugees
and immigrants.
31 Komac (2001: 276).
32 See Jaluši? (2001): 297-315).
33 Komac (2001: ibid).
34 Linz and Stepan (1996: 3).
35 See the results of the Slovene Public Opinion (SPO) surveys
since national independence or the conclusions of the research
project on “Interethnic Relations in the Slovene Ethnic Territory”
of the Institute for Ethnic Studies in Ljubljana, both in Komac
(2001: ibid).
36 It is interesting to note that it took the Constitutional
Court more than five years and two terms in office between 1994-1999
to decide on the citizenship case of two Slovenian permanent
residents who were national of another former SFRY republic.
37 The 1993 European Council in Copenhagen decided that the
Eastern European applicants should meet three essential criteria
for membership: 1) stable institutions guaranteeing democracy,
rule of law, human rights and the protection of minorities,
2) the existence of a functional market economy as well as the
capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces
within the Union, and 3) the ability to take on the obligations
of membership including adherence to the aims of political,
economic and monetary union. European Council in Copenhagen
(1993: 13).
38 European Commission (2002: section 2.1).
39 This law, as many other minority-related regulations, is
only applicable to the ‘autochthonous’ Romany population and
excludes the ‘nonautochthonous’ Romany even if they are citizens.
40 European Commission (2002: 27-28).
41 In April 1990 Slovenia held its first democratic elections
and on the 2 July 1990 a Declaration on the Sovereignty of the
Republic of Slovenia was passed by the republican parliament.
42 Komac (2001: 284-91).
43 See Bucar and Brinar (2001); Lozar (2002); and Šabi? (2002).
References
Brubaker, Roger. “Traditions of Nationhood and Politics of Citizenship”,
Social Science Research Council (New York), States and Social
Structures Newsletter 9 (Winter 1989): 4-8.
Bucar, Bojko and Brinar, Irena. “Lessons from Transition and
Accession Periods of Slovenia”. Central European Political Science
Review, Vol. 2, No. 6 (Winter 2001).
European Commission. 2002 Regular Report on Slovenia’s Progress
Towards Accession, COM (2002) 700, Brussels, 2002.
European Council in Copenhagen. Conclusions of the Presidency,
SN 180/93, Brussels, 21-22 June, 1993.
Hyland, Niamh, Loftus, Claire and Whelan, Antony. Citizenship
of the European Union. Dublin: Brunswick Press, 1995.
International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights. Annual Report
on Slovenia, 1998. Available at http://www.ihfhr. org/reports/ar98/ar98slv.htm
[Accessed on 20 March 2003].
Jaluši?, Vlasta. “Freedom Versus Equality? Some Thoughts About
Attitudes Toward Gender Equality Politics in Eastern and Central
Europe”, in Stuart S. Nagel and Amy Robb (eds.) Handbook of
Global Social Policy. NY: Marcel Dekker, 2001: 297-315.
Komac, Miran. “Forming a New Nation-State and the Repression
or Protection of Ethnic Minorities: The Case of Slovenia”, in
Stuart S. Nagel and Amy Robb (eds.) Handbook of Global Social
Policy. NY: Marcel Dekker, 2001: 267-92.
Linz, Juan and Stepan, Alfred. Problems of Democratic Transition
and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-
Communist Europe. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1996.
Lozar, Mattei. Scenarios for Institutional Reform in the EU:
Before and After the Nice Summit. EU Monitor 3. Ljubljana: Peace
Institute, 2002.
Mann, Michael. “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins,
Mechanism and Results”, in Michael Mann (ed.) States, War and
History. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1988.
Mesojedec-Pervinsek, Alenka. “The Body of Citizens at the Independence
of the Republic of Slovenia and Legal Continuity in the Sphere
of Citizenship”, unpublished manuscript, Ljubljana, 1997.
Šabi?, Zlatko. “Slovenia and the European Union: A Different
Kind of Two- Level Game”, presented at the 3d Joint Convention
of CEEISA/NISA/RISA in Moscow, Russia, 20-22 June, 2002.
Schmitter, Philippe C.. How to Democratize the European Union
... and Why Bother? Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,
2000.
Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia. “Population
and citizens of the Republic of Slovenia by Sex, 30 June 2002”,
first release, 28 October 2002.
Webber, Max. Essays in Sociology in Gerth, H. H. and C. Wright
Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1946.
|
